INTRODUCTION

The current war in Iraq, begun in March 2003, combined with the war on terrorism and the overwhelming dominance of American troops in the Middle East, has placed the defense situation of the United States in a global spotlight. Coverage of coalition war efforts receives nightly attention much the same as it did during the first Gulf War. Perhaps the biggest story, and biggest victory, was the capture of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in November of 2003 from a rather unsophisticated bunker in Tikrit, Iraq eight months after bombing began and twelve years after official combat operations in Desert Storm ended. Hussein’s capture put an end to the debate over the question of removing him from power although it left the question of removing him at the end of Desert Storm as open and speculative as it ever was.

The aim of this exposition is to explore the idea of removing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power at the end of Desert Storm in 1991. The idea of removing Hussein in 1991 is more poignant today considering the ethnic divisions and internal strife in present Iraq since the war began in March 2003. Are the critics who second guess the George H. W. Bush Administration correct in their speculation? Would the world have been better off is the coalition, or at least the United States, removed Hussein in some form or fashion from power in 1991? Was it even possible to remove Hussein in 1991? We shall consider these questions as we progress in our treatment.

1. ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

Khadduri and Ghareeb provide a historical context for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: “Instability in the regimes and frequent Cabinet changes made it exceedingly difficult for the Iraqi negotiators to put forth a definitive set of proposals to Kuwait as a basis for an agreement to settle the dispute between the two countries.” Secretary of State Henry Kissinger points out that Iraq supported Palestine in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 with an Armored Division based in Syria. Khadduri and Ghareeb build upon the military strength of Iraq when they set out the underdog nature of Kuwait and hint that, as a result of their willingness to consider Iraqi proposals for annexation or giving up sovereignty, Kuwait perhaps deserved to be invaded and overrun because they made no effort to count...
terbalance Iraq’s enormous military strength. “Kuwait thus often complained that whenever it was seriously considering a set of Iraqi proposals, the new Iraqi Cabinet that was suddenly formed repudiated the proposals that had just been submitted by the former Cabinet”4.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Senior Researcher at Tel Aviv University, writes that Hussein’s initial claim of oil price gouging by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates struck a nerve far and wide across the Arab community and threatened to bolster his argument for annexing Kuwait. “As for the ‘Arab street,’ Saddam’s Robin Hood stance against the wealthy Arab shaykhs and evil Western imperialists did resonate among Palestinians, in Yemen and in North Africa, where the Gulf crisis was wound up with domestic political considerations”5. Thus, considering Iraq’s military strength and Hussein’s resonant “Robin Hood stance” it is self-evident that not only is the Iraqi invasion the catalyst for the removal of Saddam Hussein but the conflict involves long-simmering tensions and disagreements that carry the potential to explode at any moment.

Though Hussein was officially removed from power in November 2003, by the George W. Bush Administration, conflicts between the three dominant ethnic groups, Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites, have undermined, and continue to threaten to undermine, coalition efforts to bring democracy and stability to Iraq. Thomas G. Mahnken, Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College has written: “For all the effort President Bush and his advisors took in planning the liberation of Kuwait, they spent remarkably little time thinking about how to ensure a durable postwar settlement”6.

Freedman and Karsh outline the immediate aftermath of Iraq’s defeat and the effect it had on the national stability: “Iraqis took matters into their own hands and, for the first time in Iraq’s modern history, rose in strength against their unelected ruler. First to erupt was the southern city of Basra. The rebellion spread quickly to engulf the predominantly Shi’ite southern Iraq, including the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Many towns fell to the rebels, numerous armoured vehicles were reportedly destroyed, and some Republican Guard units were said to have surrendered. Fighting then moved to some Sunni cities and even reached Baghdad, where widespread clashes with the security forces. And numerous ‘hit and run’ incidents were recorded”7.

The immediate uprising among the population illustrates the yearning among the Shi’a and Sunni population alike to remove Hussein. It also reveals the shrewd timing of the attempted rebellion. Had the Sunni and Shi’a rebels attempted to stage a rebellion at a time when Iraq was not on its knees and military morale was not devastated, it is almost a given that the rebellion would be put down with the same ferocity as was evident in the elimination of the Kurdish threat.

In A World Transformed, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and President Bush express their disappointment with the rebellion but simultaneously reveal their fundamental misunderstanding of the situation. “We were disappointed that Saddam’s defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect”8. Both men go on to

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4 Khadduri, Majid; Ghareeb, Edmund, War..., op. cit., 232-233.
6 Mahnken, Thomas G. “A Squandered Opportunity? The Decision to End the Gulf War”, in Andrew J. Bacevich; Efraim Inbar (eds.), The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered. London, Frank Cass Publishers, 121. See also Congressman C. W. Bill Young, “Extension of Remarks”, 8 March 1991. Congressman Young (D-FL) contends that an alternate route for neutralizing Saddam: “Legislation I drafted in January, after seeing Saddam Hussein parade beaten Americans and allied POW’s before Iraqi television cameras, would have authorized the United States to pay up to $100 million to any individual or individuals providing information or assisting in the capture of Saddam Hussein. Previous Congresses have taken steps to provide the authority for the similar payment of rewards to those who assist in the capture of terrorists and drug kingpins. It was at the request of our Administration, which so skillfully held together a diverse coalition of allied forces, that I held off introducing this legislation to avert any disruption in the support of our allied forces, especially those in the Arab community”.
explain that while "the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the Iraqi people... for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising". Scowcroft and Bush supported the removal of Saddam but "neither the United States nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state" due to concerns "about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Breaking up the Iraqi state would pose its own destabilizing problems".

In seeking and endorsing a rebellion but not supporting the rebels, Scowcroft and Bush reveal the difficult situation as well as their misunderstanding. Neither considered the fact that it would impossible to remove Saddam while simultaneously preventing a disintegration of the Iraqi state. The only possible method to accomplish this goal would be to install a puppet regime but it would require the backing and participation of all coalition members and more Arab Gulf states than had been active in coalition combat actions. Further, the spectre of a western puppet regime in Baghdad would further inflame and agitate Tehran, who would be opposed to any western influence in the Middle East, and, by proxy, the Shi'a population in Iraq, who have naturally been closer to and more susceptible to the influence of Tehran than Baghdad.

Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard Trainor explain the initial moments of victory where the seeds of rebellion were planted and killed before they would ripen and bear fruit:

"On the Voice of America, Radio Monte Carlo, the British Broadcasting Company, and clandestine radio stations, like the CIA-equipped but Saudi-operated Voice of Free Iraq, the shiite leaders in An Najaf learned both of the magnitude of the Iraqi defeat and President Bush's call for the ouster of Saddam Hussein. For the long-suppressed enemies of the Saddam Hussein regime, it looked like the moment to strike. In An Najaf, Karbala, An Nasiriyah, and Basra, the planning of a Shiite revolt shifted into high gear. In the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, the Kurds also saw an opportunity to break away from Baghdad's domination."11

While Gordon and Trainor explain that "the goal was the replacement of one Iraqi dictator by another Iraqi strongman committed to holding Iraq together," they also refute the majority opinion of the Shi’a closeness to Tehran. "Iraq’s Shiites had been loyal members of Baghdad’s army in Saddam Hussein’s eight-year war with Iran and, with some notable exceptions, did not favor attaching their region to Iran". It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of Shi'ites were closer spiritually to Tehran but remained in Iraq by virtue of the location of Shi’ite mosques and holy sites in Najaf and other holy cities in Iraq.

John Simpson, foreign affairs editor of the BBC, provides a stark and candid account of popular sentiment among Kurdish Iraqis that is indicative of the long-simmering discontent with Hussein. An unnamed Kurdish woman in Baghdad, in August 1990, spoke to Simpson of the frightening measures by which Saddam ruled with an iron fist. "You must understand that everything we say is listened to and that we are in great danger from talking to you. I hate this place; I hate this man; we have to get rid of him". Simpson then writes that "nobody, of course, at that stage thought that it might even be a possibility, because my impression was that they thought the West liked Saddam too much to want to attack him or overthrow him".

It is striking and tragic, although it is not false, that Kurds, as well as Shi’ites, alike thought Saddam had a friend in the west willing to overlook transgressions in terms of suppressing Kurds with gas and invading a fellow Arab nation. Con-

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9 Ibid., 488.
10 Ibid., 488.
12 Ibid., 449-450.
13 Ibid., 451.
15 Ibid. For further first-hand accounts, see Joel Turnipseed's Baghdad Express and Anthony Swofford's Jarhead. Both men were enlisted Marines who saw action in Desert Storm.
considering this, it is surprising that the Kurds did not partake in the post-war rebelliousness. It may have been their best chance to take revenge on Saddam's regime for its genocidal successes.

Roger Hilsman, Professor of Government and International Politics at Columbia University, proposes that the Bush actually wanted to send aid to rebels but soon was confronted with the reality that Shi’ite rebels were closer to Iran than the West. Allowing Shi’ites to wage a victorious rebellion and allowing them to take control of Iraq forcefully, and potentially with the support of Iran, would be a bigger mistake and cause far greater problems that allowing a weak Saddam to remain in power. This provides the major reasoning why, once Kurds and Shi’ites commenced rebellion, western support was nowhere to be found. Hilsman exposes the seemingly hypocritical nature of such a policy: “The United States... opposed Soviet repression in the Baltics, criticized Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians, and then accepted the annihilation of tens of thousands of Kurds and Shiites”16.

Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, in American Foreign Relations, simplify the situation by reiterating the popular position. “Bush hoped that the Iraqi military or disgruntled associates in the Ba’ath party would oust Saddam in a coup. Yet when Kurds in northern Iraq and Shi’ites in the south rebelled, Bush did little to help”17. The major problem is that nothing would change by refusing to aid Iraqi rebels. The coalition victory that came with so little resistance seemed meaningless without the final blow, being the removal of Hussein, being accomplished successfully. “One [unnamed Middle East] specialist complained that it seemed the United States had fought the Gulf War merely to maintain the status quo. The United States was standing by while the Kurds and Shiites were being slaughtered to keep Iraq from being broken up”18.

The reality that preventing internal instability was accomplished, over the long run, just by the increased coalition and American presence in the Gulf region cannot be overlooked. Further, the status quo has been strengthened by the same American presence. A future interstate conflicts, specifically an Iraqi invasion of a fellow Arab nation, was certainly less likely, if not altogether preempted given the increased American presence. Mahnken refutes the popular position by explaining that the coalition was not faced with a choice between ending the war within the famed hundred hour mark and pressuring Hussein to leave or removing him forcefully. He claims that “the real choice was between ending the war before coalition forces had completed their mission and pursuing options to compel Iraq to accept defeat. The time to do so was prior to the declaration of a ceasefire. Once the US government announced a halt to military operations, its leverage over Saddam evaporated.”19.

2. TARGETING SADDAM

“War is murder and weapons are made for only one purpose”20. Therefore, is it inconceivable to eliminate Iraqi leadership or the city of Baghdad as legitimate military targets? Shimon Peres, former Israeli Foreign Minister and former Prime Minister, writes in The New Middle East that “the Middle East needs democracy as much as a human needs oxygen. Democracy is not only a process that guarantees personal and civil freedom but also is a watchdog for peace, working to dispel the factors that underlie fundamentalist agitation”21. How could the coalition balance the prospect of removing Hussein with ensuring democracy in Iraq? The prospect of recurrent anti-West governments in Baghdad was an ominous consideration in 1990. Ambrose and Brinkley, in Rise to Globalism, set the dilemma in broad strokes:

18 Hilsman, Roger, George Bush…, op. cit., 137.
19 Mahnken Thomas G., “A squandered opportunity? The decision to end the Gulf War”, in Andrew Bacevich; Efrain Inbar (eds.), The Gulf War…, op. cit., 122.
21 Peres, Shimon with Arye Naor, The New Middle East. New York, Henry Holt Company, 64.
“With the road to Baghdad open, the expectation was that United States and other coalition troops would occupy the city, take Hussein prisoner, put him on trial and establish a new government. Nevertheless, Bush never intended to assume such responsibilities and risks. American casualties in the 100-hour war had been 79 killed, 213 wounded. American casualties in street fighting in Baghdad could be expected to be much higher and might take weeks, even months, to complete. Bush’s astonishing popularity rating (90 percent, the highest ever for any president) would not have survived a protracted war. No U.N. resolution authorized the occupation of Iraq. The Arab partners in the coalition would not have supported a move on Baghdad. In any case, Bush and virtually everyone else anticipated that either the humiliated Iraqi army leaders would overthrow Hussein or that the people would revolt against him. Indeed, Bush encouraged the Iraqi people to do just that.22

However, David R. Henderson, associate professor of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School, explains that the economic repercussions of a change in the government of Iraq are complex and critical to the success of the region, especially if diplomacy is to replace Hussein’s dictatorial regime. “Saddam cannot single-handedly cause shortages and gasoline lines. Only the U.S. government can do that. As long as our government avoids imposing price controls, any cutback in supplies that Saddam causes will result in higher prices, not shortages. That is the lesson to be learned from the 1970s.”23

Mohd Naseem Khan, of the Institute for Defence Analyses, posits that:

“assured and uninterrupted flow of Gulf oil is the foremost determinat of US security interest in the region. The US’ overall policy towards the Gulf revolves around oil, Israel’s security, threats from Islamic movements and Arab nationalist regiments—that may use chemical weapons, nuclear programmes and missiles.”24

Richard P. Hallion sets the record straight with regard to the legitimacy of the President of Iraq himself as a military target. “Contrary to some accounts appearing after the war, there was never any explicit planning effort devoted to targeting Saddam Hussein personally. He was never ‘targeted’ in the UN resolution, the U.S. national objectives, or the actual attack plans.”25 Hallion goes on to explain the nature of assassination and the release by the Army’s Office of the Judge Advocate General of “a milestone Memorandum of Law on the subject of assassination, with the coordination and concurrence of a variety of other agencies, including the Department of State, the National Security Council, the CIA, and the Department of Justice, as well as the other legal branches of the Department of Defense and the military services.”26 According to this memo, Saddam was a lawful target because “civilians who work within a military objective are at risk from attack during the times in which they are present within that objective, whether their injury or death is incidental to the attack of that military objective or results from their direct attack. Neither would be assassination.”27 However, the justification via this memo is flawed because Saddam was a field commander of the Iraqi military and, thus, occupied a military position. Saddam was not a civilian.

Now the question becomes: Why didn’t the coalition at least take the fight to Baghdad, notwithstanding the ineligibility of Hussein as a military target? Bin, Hill, and Jones posit that “from a military point of view, Iraqi troops might well have fought hard and inflicted significant casualties on Coalition troops if they had advanced toward Baghdad. The lack of determination of Iraqi soldiers to defend Kuwait was a key factor in allowing the Coalition to win with few casualties of its

26 Ibid., 150.
27 Ibid., 150-151.
own". The authors, however, resign themselves to the fact that "no one can say whether Iraqi troops would have been determined to keep Western soldiers out of Baghdad. Indeed, military planners had concluded that Baghdad ‘was too far away to hold even if it could be captured, and ... that its capture would exceed the U.N. charter for the Coalition forces’.

In *My American Journey*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and current Secretary of State, Colin Powell explains that while "we would have loved to see Saddam overthrown by his own people for the death and destruction he had brought down on them". Such an occurrence, however, reveals the true problem of overthrowing Saddam. "It is naïve... to think that if Saddam had fallen, he would necessarily have been replaced by a Jeffersonian in some sort of democracy where people read The Federalist papers along with the Koran. Quite possibly, we would have wound up with a Saddam by another name." General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, concurs with Powell when he writes in *It Doesn’t Take a Hero*: "I will confess that emotionally, I, like so many others, would have liked to see Saddam Hussein brought to some form of justice." Schwarzkopf is quick to cite that the UN resolutions only authorized the removal of Iraqi troops by force and not the death or removal of Hussein or any Iraqi leadership in any form.

Schwarzkopf goes on to mention that a primary reason for US failure in Vietnam was the lack of international legitimacy for US involvement. But that aside, removing Saddam caused political difficulty and would have undoubtedly led to instability in Iraq and the Gulf, rising oil prices, and tough political climate. Keeping Saddam in power ensured that the Iraqi military has been effectively neutered along with the nuclear and biological weapons capability. Saddam would become entrenched in Baghdad, unable to travel freely. Because Saddam had been defeated so convincingly, his voice no longer mattered in Gulf politics. US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Richard Murphy sets out the Bush Administration’s official view of the matter:

“If he survives, and is defanged, so what, why worry about it? He can make all the speeches he wants. A weakened Saddam with a weakened army and a weakened political reputation is maybe better for us if he is in power than if he is martyred. I don’t think we want to get anywhere near Baghdad.”

Former President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a duo known for successful foreign policy, also spoke and wrote about the Gulf War and the dilemma posed by going to war with Iraq and inspiring a rebellion but not insisting on the absolute removal or replacement of Hussein. Nixon biographer and foreign policy assistant Monica Crowley, in *Nixon in Winter*, writes:

“Bush was inviting a coup, not a revolution, and consequently we had no debt to the rebels. The chaotic situation in Iraq that this debate spawned indicated to Nixon that we should have advanced to Baghdad while we had the Iraqi troops in a rout, removed Hussein, and destroyed more military hardware.”

Nixon creates a boxing analogy to explain the strategic weakness created by leaving Hussein in power. In *Seize the Moment* that “In the Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition scored a knockdown but not a knockout. We won round one, but Saddam Hussein’s strategy is to go the distance.” However, the

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31 Ibid., 527.


Iraqi military, which had been almost destroyed completely by coalition troops was not a factor at all. “Because he knows that he cannot fight us toe-to-toe, Saddam will try to win on points by staying in power, recovering gradually, retaining his weapons of mass destruction, and waiting for the United States to lose patience and throw in the towel”36.

Nixon also espoused a post-war, long-term foreign policy shift in the Gulf region. A surface reading of the following policy will lead readers to compare it an acceptance of the status quo. In Beyond Peace, the former president wrote that the United States should brush off the idea of containment and modify a plan of isolation with regard to Iraq and Iran. “The objective should be to give both countries problems at home so that they cannot cause problems abroad. Our strategy toward Iraq should be to completely isolate Saddam Hussein’s regime from the outside ad to support dissident groups on the inside”37. Nixon then espouses a return to America’s old bag of tricks. “We should actively support the main opposition to Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi National Congress, as it seeks to force Baghdad to open up its political system. We should also offer Jordan increased economic incentives and a major role in the Arab-Israeli peace process as encouragement to turn off the spigot of trade until Saddam Hussein falls from power”38. Nixon, however, does not make any mention of the ability of Iraqi National Congress [INC] to retain Iraq’s territorial integrity without repressing popular sentiment among and between Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds.

Kissinger, in Does America Need A Foreign Policy?, approaches the Middle East situation from a different perspective. “Fear of the disintegration of Iraq was another justification for ending the war quickly. A Shiite rebellion had broken out n Basra and might have produced an Iran-leaning republic. In the long term, Iran was considered the ultimate danger in the Gulf”39. Kissinger then explains that “an independent Kurd republic in the north of Iraq might disquiet Turkey and undermine its commitment to support American policy in the Gulf”40. However, Kissinger does not consider that a victory against Iraq and a potential breakup of the dictatorial Ba’ath regime constituted the overwhelming majority of American policy in the Gulf. Nonetheless, the situation mentioned by Kissinger brings up the recurrent dilemma: How does the United States remove Hussein without inviting Iran and Turkey to carve out and possibly annex sections of Iraq?

Mazarr, Snider, and Blackwell, in Desert Storm The Gulf War and What We Learned quote Kissinger as explaining that removing Hussein would not occur as a result of negotiations “Negotiations, [Kissinger] contended, imply that each side has a legitimate claim; Iraq has no such claim to any part of Kuwait”41. Any further effort to proffer a diplomatic end to Desert Storm, especially after diplomacy was unsuccessful in preventing the war, “would enable Saddam Hussein to claim some gain from his aggression, while the goal of gulf strategy must be to demonstrate its failure”42.

Peter Calvocoressi, in World Politics 1945 – 2000, explains that not only were Arab gover-

36 Ibid., 215.
37 Ibid., 146.
39 Ibid, 190.
ments outraged by Hussein’s invasion of a fellow Arab nation but Saudi Arabia was only held together by a few threads. A revolution in Iraq by religious Shi’ites and moderate Kurds would most likely inspire a revolution among Wahhabists in Saudi Arabia who would overthrow the Saudi monarchy that was friendly to the west and replace it with a regime more akin to Iran than the Saud family. Above all, a revolution might give Hussein a chance to find exile for a few years and then return when the time was ripe. Calvocoressi states:

“Since the fall of the shah in Iran the United States had become determined to prevent a similar fate overtaking the Saudi monarchy. The Cold War had come to an end. Arab governments which had supported Iraq against Iran were angered by Hussein’s attack on one of themselves and feared his pretension to leadership in the Arab world—pretensions nourished by a view of [Saddam] as successor to Michel Aflaq, who had died in 1989 in Paris after long years in exile in Iraq”43.

Bob Woodward, reporter for the Washington Post, however, explains that regardless of any attempt to remove Hussein, whether diplomatically or militarily, the military goal of pushing the Iraqi military out of Kuwait was not to be overlooked at all. In fact, the two goals were symbiotic. Hussein would feel no pressure or susceptibility to leave or be removed if the Iraqi military was not met with sound defeat in Kuwait. Likewise, the Iraqi military would never be fully and completely neutralized with Hussein as Field Genera. Woodward, however, explores the threat posed by a wily Iraqi military. “The nightmare would be for Saddam to pull out of Kuwait and move back into Iraq but stay on the border. ‘There would be 400,000 to 500,000 Iraqis,’ Scowcroft said. They could wait indefinitely, threatening to invade again, effectively holding the United States hostage to the actions of the vast Iraqi army”44.

Yet the official position of the Bush Administration did not change at all. In a press briefing on 16 April 1991, President Bush explained that “[…] the most important thing […] is to get Saddam Hussein out of there. So, if you came to me as a broker, and you said, ‘I can get him out of there, but he’d have to be able to live a happy life forevermore in some third country, with all kinds of conditions never to go back and brutalize his people again,’ I might be – I’d have to think about it, but I might be willing to say, ‘Well, as far as our pressing charges, we’d be willing to get him out’. We want him out of there so badly, and I think it’s so important to the tranquility of Iran – of Iraq that, under that condition, we might. But his crimes, do I think he’s guilty of war crimes? The environmental terror, the rape and pillage of Kuwait, what he’s done to his own people; I would think there would be plenty of grounds under which he would be prosecuted for war crimes”45.

While H.W. Brands, Distinguished Professor of History at Texas A&M University, claims that “Political speeches typically hide as much as they reveal”, he concedes that “in this case Bush’s remarks fairly summarized the basis of his decision for war”46. Bush introduced an entirely new variable into the removal equation by discussing possible war crimes. The best case scenario for a war crimes prosecution would hinge upon a removal of Hussein from the presidency of Iraq. Bush’s volunteering of sorts to use American military to accomplish a removal only reiterates the delicate balance created by the inspired rebellion between ensuring Iraq’s territorial integrity and ensuring the removal of Hussein. Sanctions would have to be maintained regardless of who the next Iraqi president would be until it could be proven that such a person would be a friend to the West. Robert M. Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser, reiterates the official position. “All possible sanctions will be maintained until he is gone. . . Any easing of sanctions will be considered only when there is a new government”47.

Cockburn and Cockburn, in Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein, explain that

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President Bush would struggle with the end result of the official policy. "Each time [Bush] would patiently explain that the United Nations resolutions under which he had launched the war authorized only the liberation of Kuwait and he could not legally have gone further"\(^{48}\). The authors seem to gloss over the possibility of assassination or another form of a targeted attack, regardless of the legality provided by the JAG memorandum, given the advanced nature of intelligence. However, the same authors justify the status quo by mentioning that "Iraqi resistance would have stiffened. And anyway, if the Americans had gotten to Baghdad, they would have had to occupy the place for months afterward. That was not quite the whole story... No one wanted to encourage democracy in Iraq. It might prove catching. It had been a conservative war to keep the Middle East as it was, not to introduce change\(^{49}\).

Fred H. Lawson, Professor of Government at Mills University, provides a further detailing of consequences for the retention of Hussein in a position of national and military leadership. Lawson concludes that American military presence, due to the potential instability, "generated further threats to Iraqi security, eliciting even greater belligerence on Baghdad's part. Washington's evident willingness to exercise military muscle in Gulf affairs led the Iraqi leadership to conclude that it must take desperate measures to buttress the country's strategic position before the United States and its allies succeeded in circumscribing Iraq's ability to influence the course of future events in the region\(^{50}\).

3. SADDAM THE ENIGMA

As General Robert H. Scales writes in *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War*, Saddam represented an enigma that would prove as dangerous a military leader as he was a leader of the Iraqi people. Scales states that "never trained as a military man, Saddam had a reputation for exercising strict personal command over his armed forces in the field... Saddam reserved major decisions for himself, and he rewarded failure harshly\(^{51}\). General Wafiq al-Samarrai, Director of Iraq Military Intelligence during the Gulf War, provides an important insight to Saddam as a broken man subject to periods of low self-esteem and depression:

"Before the cease-fire was announced his morale was very deteriorated and he was very tense and tired. He was almost completely collapsed... He was in very poor condition and at that moment he was really saved by Bush's offer of cease-fire. Before the cease-fire, he felt his doom was very close by. As I just said, he sat before me and he was almost in tears, not crying, but almost in tears... He said 'We do not know what God will bring upon us tomorrow'. This shows he was virtually collapsing. So, he was at the lowest\(^{52}\)."

HRH General Khalid Bin Sultan, the highest ranking Saudi General, in *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*, points out that "[...Saddam Hussein...appears to have had little insight into the workings of the international system, and a poor understanding of how his armies would fare in a clash with the forces of a superpower]\(^{53}\). Sultan, not one to miss the opportunity to make political criticism, points out that Saddam dovetails war with politics. "[Saddam] was politically mistaken when he imagined that war could be avoided, and militarily mistaken when he believed that he could escape defeat. A brutal dictator, inspiring fear in those around him, is seldom told the truth\(^{54}\)."

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\(^{49}\) Ibid., 32-33.


\(^{54}\) Ibid., 464-465.
Naval Historian Norman Friedman, in Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait, seconds HRH Gen. Sultan in shedding light onto Hussein as a vulnerable, paranoid man. Friedman writes that “Saddam seems to have believed that however much he paid, only blood ties could bring positive loyalty[...]. Given his own motivation to seize and maintain power, he probably could not believe that any material inducement could compete with the army’s natural appetite for power”\(^55\). Friedman, however, goes on to coordinate Hussein’s personal paranoia with the instructions given to the Iraqi military that illustrate why that military was soundly defeated in Desert Storm.

“[...] In the Iran-Iraq war he tended to shun the aggressive armored tactics that would have required (and developed) the sort of tank commanders who might later have been interested in overthrowing him (and who so frequently run coups in the Third World). He found static tactics, and the kind of forces (such as combat engineers) used to fight a static war, much less threatening internally\(^56\).

4. 1998 TO 2003: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES?

After President Bush was defeated for reelection in 1992 by Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, the situation in Iraq simmered on the back burner: constantly gaining heat but not bubbling over. The coalition had gone their separate ways once victory had been declared but had, at the very least in some cases, pledged support for keeping Hussein in check. Michael Collins Dunn, Professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, writes that “despite a broad representation of the Arab and non-Arab worlds in the ranks of the coalition that liberated Kuwait, the U.S. provided by far the largest military component and shared overall command with Saudi Arabia, which provided the bases from which most of the military operations were conducted”\(^57\). This kept the United States military constantly engaged in the Middle East and proved to military and political leaders alike that the maintenance of peace would be more difficult than victory if war should break out again.

Faleh A. Jabar, a research fellow at the School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London, writes that one enabler of postwar ability was an inadvertent, or perhaps not, American military blunder. “Paradoxically, the Americans virtually wiped out the very units that had triggered the uprising against Saddam, whereas they left the elite units in the middle sector of the country almost intact”\(^58\). By 1998, the focus would turn to weapons of mass destruction and the potential that Hussein might possess or have the ability to create with ease one or more weapons. The Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf (CPSG), a conglomerate of noted American policymakers including former Secretaries of Defense Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. The CPSG advocated a series of steps designed to overthrow Hussein and end the threat in 1998. These steps included

“1. Backing an opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress, as a provisional government and trying to secure for it Iraq’s seat in the United Nations;
2. Funding the opposition group with seized Iraqi assets and lifting sanctions in areas it controls;
3. Protecting the opposition group with U.S. air power;
4. Providing U.S. ground troops as reinforcements if necessary;
5. Bringing Hussein before an international tribunal on war crimes charges”\(^59\).

In an interview with the Financial Times on 12 February 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell referenced a military campaign, undertaken by President Clinton in 1998, and stated that such time

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 22.
was the perfect opportunity to create regime change. “We believe that Iraq would be better served with a different leadership with a different regime so we have had a policy of regime change, which really has been there all along but was crystallized by President Clinton in 1998 at the time of Operation Desert Fox about that period”60.

In his 2004 autobiography, *My Life*, President Clinton stated his case on a previous bombing designed as retaliation with cruise missiles against Iraqi intelligence targets because Iraqi intelligence had been linked to an assassination plot against President Bush. Readers will note that the former President attempts, albeit in a subtle fashion, to shift the blame of the lack of success in this pivotal mission, which then permeates to each subsequent attack on Iraq.

“I asked the Pentagon to recommend a course of action, and General Powell came to me with the missile attack on the intelligence headquarters as both a proportionate response and an effective deterrent. I felt we would have been justified in hitting Iraq harder, but Powell made a persuasive case that the attack would deter further Iraqi terrorism, and that dropping bombs on more targets, including presidential palaces, would have been unlikely to kill Saddam Hussein and almost certain to kill more innocent people”61.

Moller considers the prospect of removing Saddam in 1997 or 1998 as an important and doable strategic accomplishment for the West. Moller writes:

“It might be possible to depose Saddam, either by means of successful surgical strikes against his presumed whereabouts (the Presidential palaces, for instances) or by marching all the way to Baghdad. Indeed, several observers have argued that it was a mistake not to have proceeded to the Iraqi capital in 1991 – but better late than never”62.

However, Moller outlines an alternative means to accomplish the goal:

“1. There are more effective ways of deposing Saddam than air bombardment such as special forces infiltration or targeted assassination. While assassination “would be unlawful as well as unethical, such activities would at least be deniable”.

2. An attack to depose Saddam would be “an even more blatant violation of international law than an attack to ensure compliance with UN resolutions”.

3. An attack to depose Saddam relies on the availability of a replacement. The Iraqi people and regional Arabs are likely to see any replacement as a foreign agent and would probably lead to continued “discord and turmoil”63.

Richard Butler, former head of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to disarm Iraq, points out the staying power of Hussein makes him especially difficult because he has outlasted all the original cast of Desert Storm who sought his overthrowing. That Hussein gloats in his being the last man, of the original cast at least, left in power seems to solidify his own grandiose ambitions. Butler states:

“Put simply, a tyrant with imperial ambitions had been slowed down. But there is now another side to those events 10 years later. Saddam is still there, and his take on the events of 1991 is that he won the war. Incredible though it may seem, this is the official Iraqi version, which claims that Bush, having recognised the valour and might of the Iraqi Republican Guard, surrendered. Saddam has boasted often that Bush is gone, Margaret Thatcher is gone, he even mentions Mikhail Gorbachev – but then proclaims he is still in power”64.

Yet we are still confronted by the question of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Clovis

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63 Ibid.

Maksoud, International Relations Professor at American University and former Arab League envoy to the United Nations, reminds us of that fact when he states that “a forced overthrow anywhere threatens stability by challenging national sovereignty.” Therefore, any attempt to overthrow Hussein, even after 1991, would be doomed to eventual failure and a potential change in global power, unless the plan included a concerted effort that included ethnic groups that populated Iraq.

The administration of President George W. Bush would learn this lesson the hard way when results of combat efforts in Operation Iraqi Freedom would mirror those of Desert Storm. Bob Woodward, in Plan of Attack, made a cogent observation when he illustrated the fear exhibited by a key player in Desert Storm, Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia:

“What is the chance of Saddam surviving this?” Bandar asked. He believed Saddam was intent in killing everyone involved at a high level with the 1991 Gulf War, including himself. Rumsfeld and Myers didn’t answer. ‘Saddam, this time, will be out period?’ Bandar asked skeptically. ‘What will happen to him?’ Cheney, who had been quiet as usual, replied, ‘Prince Bandar, once we start, Saddam is toast’.

Jean Edward Smith, the John Marshall Professor of Political Science at Marshall University, blames President George H. W. Bush, however, for the results of the aftermath of Desert Storm, including the subsequent second war in Iraq, in George Bush’s War. Though Smith gets the argument and the facts wrong, he makes a good point with respect to US involvement in the Middle East.

“For the first time in its history, the United States finds itself deeply embroiled in the muddled affairs of the Middle East. An Army support service remains in Saudi Arabia, unsure of its mission yet hesitant to withdraw. A mighty armada stands offshore, poised to intervene should that be required. More than 20 percent of the Air Force is still deployed in the Gulf, combat-loaded and ready for action, while a mountain of military supplies, all properly accounted for, too valuable to be abandoned but too expensive to move, lies moldering in the heat.”

Smith’s argument points out that the end result of Desert Storm has had long-lasting effects both in terms of American military commitment to preventing Hussein and, consequently, a change in the global threat assessment. Having resources in or near Iraq to quickly put out fires created by Hussein eventually reduces resources that would have been useful in other parts of the world, such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Afghanistan, although such outcomes in those parts of the world were as successful and decisive as Desert Storm.

Andrew J. Bacevich, Director of the Center for International Relations and Professor of History at Boston University, makes five major arguments in support of leaving Hussein in power based on the position that Hussein in power represents less of a threat than the definite unknown once he is removed. Each of Bacevich’s five arguments summarizes what has been espoused by the leading contemporary figures of Desert Storm: Schwarzkopf, Powell, Bush, and was considered the extent of the legal commitment and authority given to the coalition. Bacevich states that:

1. By 28 February, 1991, “Iraq had been forced to withdraw from Kuwait, the Kuwaiti government was ready to be restored, Saddam’s ability to threaten the region had been greatly curtailed, and the safety and security of Americans abroad was assured”. Therefore, all military goals had been accomplished soundly and swiftly.

2. Continuing the ground campaign would have changed the nature of the war. Had coalition forces invaded Iraq, they potentially could have faced determined resistance by the Iraqis. Soldiers who had been unwilling to defend Kuwait would have been more determined in defending their own homes.

3. If the coalition had continued the war and marched on Baghdad, Iraq might have escalated to the use of chemical or biological weapons.

4. A continuation of the war could have led to the collapse of Iraq. Analysts in the US intelligence community worried that Iraq might collapse into three enclaves.

5. Supporters of the decision to halt the ground war after 100 hours argue that the conti-

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65 McWhirter, Cameron, “If Hussein is ousted, what is next?”, The Detroit News, 16 September 2002.
nuation of the war would have split the multinational coalition. Had we tried to install a new Iraqi government, they argue, the Arab public would likely have turned against us.\footnote{68 Bacevich, Andrew J., “Splendid Little War: America’s Persian Gulf Adventure Ten Years On”, in id; Efrain Inbar, (eds.), \textit{The Gulf War…}, op. cit., 138-139.}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco, accurately sums up the entire US policy toward Saddam Hussein that undoubtedly enabled the growth of the Iraqi military and, also in proportion, the growth of Hussein’s ego and confidence. Zunes writes:

“The U.S. quietly supported Saddam Hussein during the 1980s through direct economic aid, indirect military aid, and the transfer of technologies with military applications. Washington rejected calls for sanctions when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 and when it used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and Kurdish civilians\footnote{69 Zunes, Stephen, “Iraq: 10 Years After Gulf War”. \textit{Foreign Policy in Focus}, VI-1 (January 2001).}.”

This ugly precedent created all kinds of havoc in terms of continuing the war after the hundred hour mark. Citing the previous use of chemical weapons also became a rallying cry of sorts in 1990 and again in 2003 when Hussein’s menacing potential as well as his menacing legacy became intolerable when considered in conjunction with the war on terrorism. Zunes continues by mentioning that “the U.S. Navy intervened in the Persian Gulf against Iran in 1987, further bolstering the Iraqi war effort. The Reagan and Bush administrations dismissed concerns about human rights abuses by Saddam’s totalitarian regime. Such special treatment likely led the Iraqi dictator to believe that appeasement would continue.”\footnote{70 Ibid. See also Marolda and Schneller \textit{Shield and Sword: The US Navy and the Persian Gulf War} for a detailed account of the US Navy’s efforts in the Persian Gulf. For an overall account of the 1990-1 war, see massive, 900-plus-page Report to Congress entitled “The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War” at \url{http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs.html#collarch}.}

Lt. Col. Thomas B. Sward, USMC, draws an comparison that proves politics makes strange bedfellows. Lt. Col. Sward mentions that President Bush, a Republican, in seeking a solution to the Iraqi invasion that involved the global community, had a strong similarity to two Democratic presidents Wilson and Roosevelt. Where President Wilson wanted to establish a League of Nations and Roosevelt wanted the United Nations, President Bush also sought that same type of multinational response to a global problem. Sward writes that “after the Cold War, President Bush envisioned a world where disagreement between Nation-States could be accomplished through international organizations, and conflict could be resolved through the collective effort of coalitions. Indeed, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the UN became a cooperative organization of action instead of a forum of confrontation between the Soviets and Americans.”\footnote{71 Sward, Lt. Col. Thomas B.; Sward, Lt. Col. Thomas B., USMC, “Advice and Consent, and US Foreign Policy. The Gap Between Consultation and Miscalculation”. National War College. Best Student Papers Academic Year 1999-2000 [document on line] Available from Internet at: \url{http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/nwcsp00.html}.}

Thomas H., Harvey, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, frames the Bush Administration in an altogether different manner. Mr. Harvey exposes the dark side to the one superpower world that President Nixon wrote of soon after the USSR disintegrated. According to Harvey, “US reticence to accept rules, constraints, and institutional mandates has fed international concerns about a US predilection for unilateral action in its global dealings. A dismissive attitude toward the input of allies and partners or a failure to properly reward support from other states can eventually lead to resentment in important capitals.”\footnote{72 Harvey, Thomas H., OSD, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: US Policy Toward Iraq”. \textit{The Fundamentals of Strategic Logic}, National War College. Best Student Papers Academic Year 2003 [document on line] Available from Internet at: \url{http://www.ndu.edu/library/n4/NWCAY03Index.html}.} In mentioning the “dismissive attitude”, Harvey neglects the simple state of affairs at the end of the Cold War. The United States was simply the only nation in the world who could meet the threat of Iraq with overwhelming force and still be able to defend its homeland without any significant lessening of strength at home. Harvey, though, is right to point
out that “[...] this phenomenon of alienation parallels another notable trend in international affairs: the sense of Muslim grievance and victimization, particularly among Arab peoples, in their relations with the West”\textsuperscript{73}. The entire global community would begin to feel the effects of that “sense of Muslim grievance and victimization” beginning in 1993 with the truck bombing of the World Trade Center and then in 1998 with the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The culmination of that grievance and victimization, as an application of Harvey’s logic would lead us, would be the events of 11\textsuperscript{th} September, 2001. Harvey, however, is right to infer that a neglecting of the inner workings of Muslim countries to negate, neutralize, or lessen that grievance is what allowed the Muslim fundamentalist terrorism to truly take hold and strike at the West almost at will.

So, then, what is a President to do? President Bush could only hope that the cease-fire at Safwan after the hundred hour war would leave the United States in a position to thwart Hussein’s future attempts at dominance in the Middle East. Bush would need to be careful not to sign a treaty that he could not defend because “if a President has no right to defend an agreement for which Americans have died, any settlement turns into a disguised surrender”\textsuperscript{74}. Michael C. Hudson, Seif Ghobash Professor of International Relations at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, explains that the United States is not the only nation that needs to keep a watchful eye on Hussein as Saudi Arabia walks a very thin line between friendly relations with the west but unpopularity on the domestic front. “On the strategic level, the some fifteen-year old Saudi policy of good relations with Iraq has of course collapsed, yet an Iraq ruled by the present apparatus (with or without Saddam Hussein) must be considered a continuing menace, notwithstanding the destruction of much of its military muscle”\textsuperscript{75}.

The present George W. Bush Administration is, as of August 2004, experiencing a similar situation concerning Muqtada al-Sadr. Larry Diamond, senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, writes that “the same administration that was bold enough to launch an unpopular war against Saddam blanched at the prospect of confronting a bully such as Sadr—even though he was reviled by the majority of the Shiite population and the religious establishment”\textsuperscript{76}. Is al-Sadr the next Saddam? Bush would do well to heed the warning of Secretary Kissinger: “[...the bargaining position of the victor always diminishes with time. Whatever is not exacted during the shock of defeat becomes increasingly difficult to attain later—a lesson America had to learn with respect to Iraq at the end of the 1991 Gulf War]”. He would do well not to repeat the mistakes of his father’s Administration. Negotiate from a position of strength. It is quite possible that President Bush, in 1991, lost his chance forever to dismantle Hussein’s Ba’ath regime when he allowed the cease-fire at Safwan instead of bringing the fight to Baghdad regardless of the potential for Iraqi military to defend their home territory better than they defended Kuwait.

Saddam has proven to be an enigma and overall complex figure. Not much is known about his personal life although wide speculation is made often. Laurie Mylroie, professor at Harvard, and Judith Miller, of the New York Times, write that “it is one of the ironies of history that Saddam Hussein rules the land where civilization began”\textsuperscript{78}. Samir al-Khalil, an assumed name, points out that men such as Saddam Hussein “[...] are feared, not loved; above all they command enormous respect in a populace to whom strength of character is invariably associated with the ability to both sustain and inflict pain”\textsuperscript{79}. The logical question, given this entire discussion of popular rebellion, would

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Mylroie, Laurie; Miller, Judith, \textit{Saddam Hussein and the crisis in the Gulf}. New York, Times Books, 1990, 60.
be: how could a man like Hussein commit such atrocities as he has without incurring the wrath of his own people? Al-Khalil explains that the madness of Hussein has an almost hypnotic effect on the population. A combination of economic and social factors keeps the population from well or as fast as growing as nations in the west and, therefore, entrech poverty, depression, and the susceptibility to radical behavior designed to bring about the benefits of the west without the sacrifices. “The madness inherent in the elevation of raw violence to such a status in the affairs of human beings appears as such only from the outside; from within respect, no matter how grudgingly bestowed, eventually gives way to awe.”

Yet Mr. Harvey makes the important point once more in believing that had the US, with or without the aid and assistance of the coalition or outside Arab states, would have faced trouble even if the goal of removing Hussein had been accomplished and democracy had been installed into Baghdad. Harvey explains:

“Assuming the US did muster the will and resources for the undertaking, it is questionable whether the seed of representative institutions, rule of law, freedom of expression, and other hallmarks of Western political experience would easily take root in soil as unfamiliar and potentially inhospitable as Iraq. Further, world-wide Muslim reaction to the spectacle of US remaking an Arab society and picking winners among the various competing Iraqi opposition groups could inflame all the simmering resentments against the West, confirm suspicions of Washington’s purported intent to eliminate Arab voices that resist US hegemony, and put US Arab allies in the uncomfortable and dangerous position of deflecting charges of being accomplices to US neo-colonial designs.”

All in all, the question of the fruitfulness of removing Saddam Hussein from power in 1991 hinges upon the willingness of the military leaders and President Bush to subject themselves to the unknown quantity inherent in a new adventure: how far would they be willing to go to accomplish a goal that could change the political landscape of the Middle East as well as cement each of their legacies as peacemakers? How many American and coalition lives would they be willing to sacrifice to dethrone Hussein and defeat an Iraqi Republican Guard that would defend Baghdad to the death? How long, given the 1992 presidential election, could President Bush have guaranteed American involvement to accomplish that goal if it was clear that it would be a lengthy expedition? As with all important conflicts in history, we are left with more questions than answers. We know that the UN charter that was held up as the document that legitimized American involvement in the Middle East did not authorize the killing or removal of Hussein. Yet we also know that the US military was going to be the most powerful in the world during this time and that military could have killed or removed Hussein if the order was handed down. The balance between the capability of changing the Middle East by removing or killing Hussein and the reality of letting him simmer illustrates perfectly the delicate balances and fragile relationships in the global community that mean the difference between war and peace.

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80 Ibid., 119.
81 Harvey, Thomas H., “Between Iraq…”, op. cit.