

THE STATEHOOD OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA ACCORDING TO THE HARTSHORNE MODEL*

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Abstract: The statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina is examined with the help of the Hartshorne model in this paper. We argue that the state in its current form is kept together mainly by external forces, since among the internal forces the centrifugal ones (pulling states apart according to the model) overrule the centripetal ones (keeping states together). We give a brief overview of the characteristics and genesis of the state in order to be able to collect the forces affecting the state. We argue that unless a state idea or *raison d'être* is developed, continuous external efforts are needed to provide relative stability.

Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hartshorne model, centrifugal and centripetal forces, political geography

INTRODUCTION.

The lasting problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the still-unsolved territorial-political conflicts of Europe.

The direct problem derives from the mismatch of ethnic and state borders which are the consequences of centuries-old territorial processes. In Southeast-Europe, one of the regions of Europe characterized by delayed modernization compared to the rest of the continent, even ethnogenesis and the formation of modern states appeared later, and thus more intensive and accompanied by great turbulence. These processes have been going on in the region from the mid-19th century in several waves and continue even today, most prominently in the cases of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This situation could only be

suspended temporarily by the pseudo-federative¹ Yugoslavia, after the disintegration of which at the end of the 20th century the tensions erupted with unexpected force.

Several issues remain unanswered in today's Balkans of which one of the most prominent is the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, best described today as a stalemate or deadlock.² Bosnia-Herzegovina operates on a very low level of efficiency; its GDP/capita is the second lowest in Europe after Moldova according to the World Bank data; the turnover of the black economy are estimated to reach 35% of the official GDP; official unemployment is over 20%, but 40% of employed work is in black and grey sectors of economy³. Besides corruption the oversized bureaucracy, compared to the performance of the state, also hinders development. Both for EU accession and for the achievement of an effective, functional and stable state, fundamental reforms would be essential, which until now the country has been unable to complete.

In contrast to the other post-Yugoslav states, the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a rather problematic and as yet unfinished procedure.⁴ The country practically functions today as a protectorate and lacks the criterion of a stable and unquestionable statehood, while some of its „regions” are and were taking steps towards independence.⁵ This paper attempts to analyse the problems of statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its entities; the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Federacija Bosna i Hercegovina, hereafter: FBiH) and the Republic of Srpska (Republika Srpska, hereafter: RS) with the use of an old but still relevant political geographical method (the Hartshorne model)⁶.

1. THE HARTSHORNE MODEL.

Richard Hartshorne, one of the most prominent American geographers and political geographers of the first half of the 20th century, developed his model⁷ after the Second World War, when political geography had gained rather a bad reputation due to “its role played during the war”. According to his model the major subject of analysis in political geography is the state or other regions with state-like nature. The main task of the analysis should be to examine how the state can organize the different regions under its sovereignty to form an effective and integrated unit of them.⁸ In his approach the emphasis is on the integrity and the effective performance of the state thus it is highly functionalist.

One may raise the question whether it is appropriate to use a more than half a century old model to analyse political geographical processes and situations of the 21st century. First we consider the Hartshorne model to be a well-constructed and long standing theory on its own. Besides this we also consider important the fact that under the processes of globalization, experienced around the globe, at regional and local levels one may again observe the growing importance of territorial entities at the beginning of our century. According to various scholars the territoriality has not even been questioned by globalization; their importance in political geographical processes remains prominent.⁹

Ordinary people live their lives within the framework of states and subnational territorial entities. These are the systems of reference of everyday life; the framework of socialization, so they are the territorial features to which the strongest identity is linked. This phenomenon seems to be growing today; when the belief in the exclusivity of positive effects of globalization is increasingly labile, and the role of the states in the socio-economic processes of the world is becoming more important. In the light of the factors stated above, it is argued that the functionalist model of the effective state – of course with the use of a critical approach – may be suitable to analyse the performance of territorial-political formations even at the beginning of the 21st century.

The effective functioning of a state and its competitiveness in the international arena are determined by two basic groups of forces, according to Hartshorne, which affect all states.

Hartshorne called the forces keeping the state together *centripetal*, while the ones pulling them apart as *centrifugal*. A compact geographical shape, stable borders, ethnically and religiously homogeneous society speaking one language, minimal regional economic cleavages and first of all the so-called ‘state idea’ he considered to belong into the first group. The most common case of the state idea is when one nation forms a (nation) state, where the state idea is to include the people belonging to the same nation into the same state. There are also other types of state ideas as well, for example in the case of Switzerland being neutrality and multiculturalism.¹⁰

On the other hand, centrifugal forces can be described as the opposites of the above mentioned circumstances: a fragmented state area, unstable borders, heterogeneous society (in terms of ethnicity, religion, and language), large socio-economic differences between regions, and the lack of a state idea. In the mid-nineties Pap N. revised the Hartshorne model and added regional policy and regional development as a centripetal factor.¹¹

The main criticism of the model lies in its highly functionalist approach, namely that Hartshorne regarded integrating regions, and effective performance as the main function of the state. Furthermore it lacks the inter-state context (analysing the states on their own, without their relations with other states) and it is rather static.¹²

In this paper the inter-state relations are considered important in addition to those listed above, since, as we will argue later, this is one of the core elements of the ‘Bosnia-case’. At the same time, for a state struggling to keep its integrity, effective performance and territorial integrity can be major functions. An attempt to tackle other criticisms regarding state interests versus the interests of the society is made by the analysis of the territorial aspirations of the subnational entities strongly connected to the major ethnic groups.

2. THE BIRTH AND MAIN STRUCTURES OF A DYSFUNCTIONAL BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA.

2.1. The fall of Yugoslavia.

The most complex stage in the wave of system changes sweeping Central Europe, (itself having

been provoked by the collapse of the bipolar world order), was the transformation of a non-aligned Yugoslavia, the one-time 'favourite' of the Western world. Unlike in the case of other states that went through political system changes, the former Yugoslavia became a hotbed of a series of armed conflicts breaking out in several distinct waves between varying belligerent parties. Those wars could only be ended through the intervention of international forces. After several years of bitter conflict, there was no chance of saving the integrity of the state. Consequently, upon its disintegration, a group of sovereign republics emerged; however, the single most important problem that led to civil war – namely ethnic diversity – has remained in many territories.

Upon disintegration, a number of state formations emerged that had never or only for a very short period existed historically in any similar form. The borders that had functioned during the previous seventy years as internal borders – in actual practice, as administrative borders – suddenly became international despite the fact that they only coincided with ethnic boundaries in the rarest of cases. Most of the territories inhabited by the ethnic groups of former Yugoslavia frequently reached far beyond the borders of the respective republics into the territory of (newly-formed) neighbouring sovereign states after the disintegration of the Yugoslavian state.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the most populous group, (the Muslim-Bosniak after which the country is named) used to have only a relative majority and it was the last in the sequence of the nations of Yugoslavia which went through ethnogenesis and started to form a distinct nation in the mid-nineties. Besides this the Bosniaks lived only in a few areas in homogeneous ethnic blocks¹³, among the republics the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina had the least ethnic nature.

After the secession and successor wars of Croatia and Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have any other choice but to separate from Yugoslavia. This was however only the aspiration of the Bosniaks and Croats. The Serbs, consisting one third of the population, wanted to remain as a part of Yugoslavia as it would have meant that they continue to be in the same state with the Serbs of Serbia. This may be considered as a direct motive for the outbreak of the armed conflicts. The main goals during the

war had been securing territories and gaining the loyalty of their inhabitants. The main instrument for this – initially but not exclusively used by the Serbs – was ethnic homogenization. The Serbian leadership attempted to use this to create an ethno-territorial situation which could be a suitable basis, during peace negotiations, for an independent entity or one joining Serbia.¹⁴

2.2. Ethnic homogenization.

From the many different aspects and consequences of the civil war in Bosnia, one thing should be highlighted which has had arguably the greatest effect on the viability and stability of the country. This is the ethnic homogenization that occurred during the war and created a long lasting segregated ethnic landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina instead of the pre-war ethnic mosaic pattern. This latter factor may be considered to be a centripetal force (within multi-ethnic circumstances) on the country since the lack of homogenous ethnic areas prevent or at least hinder the formation of ethnically-based territorial claims, movements and separatism. On the contrary, homogenous ethnic territories – some of which are adjacent to 'mother nations' in neighbouring states – are strong centrifugal forces since they can form the territorial basis of ethno-territorial separatism.

Measuring ethnic homogenization is not an easy task. The so-called Simpson diversity index, originally coming from the field of biology and measuring biodiversity in an ecosystem, later being applied to geography in Hungary by Péter Bajmócy, shows the likelihood of a member in a community belonging to a given ethnic group meeting other members of the same or different ethnic groups¹⁵. Applying a mathematical formula¹⁶ we arrive at values between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates a completely homogenous population while 1 is a community where everyone is of different ethnicity. Comparing the diversity indices of an area at two different points in time gives the rate of homogenization. In other words, it is not only the diversity index (EDI) but alterations in it (Δ EDI) which are our most important measurements in evaluating the ethnic homogenization of the region.

The primary objectives of the war accompanying the breakup of the state were the securing of political independence in the occupied areas, the satisfaction of nationalist territorial needs and the homogenization of the possessed and the occupied territories. Since the

ethnic composition of the region prior to 1991 was one of the most diverse in the whole of Europe, the individual national objectives could only be achieved at the expense of other nations. It is not proposed that the breakup was a direct consequence of ethnic tensions, nor that ancient ethnic hatreds caused the conflict, but once it commenced, the main driving force was ethnically-based territorial power. The mismatch of ethnic and administrative borders, and, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the lack of ethnically homogenous territories which could have been a basis for territorial political formations, was the main obstacle to a peaceful solution. The change in this situation resulted in ethnically-based conflicts, ethnic cleansing and homogenization. Fear and the conflict itself forced millions to leave their homes. This forced migration was undoubtedly of an ethnic nature and generally, though not in all affected regions, has led to ethnic homogenization of the area.

The statistically provable homogenization is detectable not so much over larger territorial units (the Western Balkans, the federal republics) but rather at territorial meso-levels (entities, counties, municipalities) and settlement level, while the ethnic homogeneity of the territory of the former state has hardly changed. The successor states of former Yugoslavia - Slovenia excluded - show a growth of only 0.3% in the homogenization index.

From evaluating the data the conclusion was drawn that it is not primarily the proportion of various ethnicities, not the region's ethnic diversity that became modified by the war, but that the settlement areas of ethnic groups in the region began to become clearly distinguishable. This is supported by the fact that the ethnic homogenization of the former Yugoslavia can be considered insignificant, but that of the individual succession states and the territorial units within them are considerable.

Table 1: The change of ethnic diversity index of Yugoslav succession states and other sub national territorial formations between 1991 and 2004 in percentage points.

Republic / entity / autonomous area	EDI (pp)
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	-5
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	-22
Bosnian Serb Republic	-26
CROATIA	-18
MACEDONIA	2
MONTENEGRO	11
SERBIA PRIOR 2008 (Serbia Proper + Vojvodina + Kosovo)	1
SERBIA AFTER 2008 (Serbia Proper + Vojvodina)	-5
SERBIA PROPER	-4
KOSOVO	-13
VOJVODINA	-9
ex-YUGOSLAVIA (EXCLUDING SLOVENIA)	-0,3

Source: statistical institutions.

Despite the fact that no official census data on actual ethnic proportion are available for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it can be stated with some assurance that at the state level diversity has changed little, and that the 5% rate is the same as that of Serbia.

The ethnic structures with slight changes at state level present a larger variation at subnational

levels. Following the Dayton Agreement, an extreme and legitimized version of separation came into existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs enjoy a majority in RS, while the other two major ethnic groups in the FBiH have an absolute majority. Further homogenization can be seen in the cantons, indicating extreme ethnic segregation of the country.¹⁷ As a result of the homogenization, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the

major ethnic groups have been spatially segregated either on entity level (Serbs – non-Serbs), on cantonal level (Croats – Bosniaks within the Federation), or on municipal level (Serbs – Croats – Bosniaks within the multiethnic cantons of the Federation).

This ethnic pattern has been only slightly changed by repatriation during which approximately half a million refugees and internally displaced persons returned to areas not under the control of their ethnic group. However these statistics hide the real numbers where in many cases return is only 'theoretical', since the conditions (social, economic, security, dignity etc.) of living in the pre-war territories are no longer present.¹⁸

2.3. The main consequences of the Dayton Peace Accords

The international community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina (6-7th April 1992) with its former republic boundaries which were in force in Yugoslavia. The peace treaty, which was agreed upon in Dayton, Ohio, USA (between 1st and 21st November 1995), as well as the new constitution of the country, which was born as an annex of the peace treaty, also recognized the former administrative borders as international ones. This decision may seem obvious today but at the time it was one of the most hotly debated issues. According to the Serb party the borders of the republics functioned only as administrative boundaries within Yugoslavia, so during the settlement negotiations the principle of ethnic self-determination should have had supremacy over the principle of inviolability of borders. On the other hand the Bosniak and Croat party emphasized the international nature of their borders, referring also to the constitution of Yugoslavia, and could not accept any other solutions but the independence within their pre-war borders. During the settlement process the international community sided with the Bosniak and Croat party and accepted the borders as international ones.¹⁹

Only by international pressure and with the forced compromise of all the belligerent parties was it possible to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why in Dayton in 1995 a peace and a constitution forming one of the annexes of the treaty was agreed, which attempted to fulfil some of the claims of each of the parties, but in effect allowed none of them to be entirely satisfied.²⁰ An even bigger problem


is that national self-determination (or sometimes only the illusion of it), which was the prerequisite of keeping the state together, could have only been guaranteed only by the extreme decentralization of the country.

The result has been a country consisting of two semi-independent entities (FBiH, RS), divided by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), organized on ethnic grounds as well as a special district (Brčko District). The boundary line dividing the state parts (entities) follows the post-war ethnic fault-lines, created during the ethnic cleansing of the war. This means the homogenization of pre-war ethnic composition, the segregation of constituent nations so the entities are the result of war and ethnic cleansing.²¹

The entities enjoy widespread rights which initially included, among others, defence, finance, internal affairs (including law enforcement/police), media, education, economy and taxation, and even limited diplomacy as well, leaving only very 'light' sectors at the state level (international air traffic, combating international crime etc.). Since the signing of the peace agreement, integration has succeeded in several fields (monetary policy, defence, taxation, intelligence, police reform) even though at times they only exist on paper. Real power is therefore laid in the hands of the political elites of the entities (which are ethnically bound). At state level there stands a tripartite, weak state-presidency with the head rotated among the ethnic groups and a council of ministers which are able to make decisions only when they can reach almost full consensus.²²

The area of FBiH, being the common entity of Croats and Bosniaks, had been further decentralized (cantonized) to allow the coexistence of the two, in some times during the conflict warring parties, possible. The need for cantonizing the entity was clearly emphasised by the Croats which was fuelled first by the fact that they also created their warring statelet (Republic of Herzegbosna) just like the Serbs and Bosniaks, and secondly by the concerns of the constantly growing demographic predominance of the Bosniaks within FBiH. This level of territorial administration is non-existent in the RS where there is no intermediate level between municipalities and entity.

Fig. 1: Territorial administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.



Source: Edited by the autor

In addition to territorial administration, state administration is also highly decentralized. In order to prevent any of the former belligerents dominating the others, the so-called „etni ključ” (ethnic key) has been re-introduced. This means that all of the public offices are filled with employees at the same ethnic rate as the ethnic composition of the respective territorial unit. This principle is used in the selection of public servants from the highest to the lowest territorial level of the state. Vast use of veto, which is also meant to defend national interests, has undermined the functionality of the state. During the fifteen years since Dayton, the majority of the important legislation, with a lack of inter-ethnic compromise, had been enforced by the High Representative, a quasi-head of state or governor appointed to Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Peace Implementation Council (states involved into the peace process).²³

As many experts have noted, the peace of Dayton was necessary at the time. It has stopped a war, but it was not constructed to be suitable as the legal basis of a prosperous and effective

state. Dayton has done its duty, Dayton can go, one may say, but approximately half of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina insist on it. Those who most fiercely opposed the peace treaty in 1995 are the most deliberate defenders of it now since it is considered to be the guarantee of their ethno-territorial interests; the agreement preventing them from getting under the supremacy of a demographically more vital Bosniak majority.²⁴

Some consider the major root of the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina are that the domestic political fault-lines of the country still run along ethnic differences. From elections to elections the vast majority of citizens give their votes to political parties organized on ethnic grounds which contributes to the division of the country on ethnic basis. In local municipal politics no changes can be expected regarding this situation in the coming decades. Besides the ethnicization of politics almost all sectors and segments of the society (education, media, even personal life)²⁵ are characterized by ethnicity-driven thinking and decision making. The institutionalization and reproduction of which through education

and socialization may result in the continuation of this ethnic division of the country long into the future.

2.4. The ethnocratic regimes.

The characteristics of the war (primarily the ethnic homogenization)²⁶ and the settlement (primarily the extreme decentralization)²⁷ together with the post-war demographic (growing rate of Bosniak population)²⁸ and political trends (ethnicization of political sphere)²⁹ led to the creation of ethnocratic regimes within the country on the subnational levels.³⁰ Originally ethnocracy is a term introduced to describe state-level policies aiming to favour one ethnic group over another³¹, but in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina it is a subnational phenomenon. Predominantly in the RS, but to a lesser extent in the FBiH, and also in the Croat cantons of the FBiH, the major fault-lines run according to ethnic dividing lines.

All aspects of everyday life are characterized by ethnically-based thinking and division, including, for example; politics, where all the major parties are founded on ethnicity; education, where the three major ethnic groups have their own, in many aspects, antagonistic school curricula and; the fact that inter-ethnic contact is characterized by mutual mistrust³². The most extensive examples for ethnically-based division and discrimination can be found on municipal level, where local ethnically homogenized communities can “effectively” undermine the process of repatriation and the recreation of a mosaic ethnic pattern, which is seen as crucial for the stability of the country.³³

2.5. The need and the obstacles of change.

For the political stability and functioning ability of the country a thorough constitutional and administrative reform seems inevitable. In a country with four million inhabitants the territorial administration has five levels, there are 14 parliaments and 180 ministries working. The costs of running such an administration uses 60% of the GDP, which, according to experts, is unsustainable and may result in a total financial breakdown.³⁴

In addition, reform is a prerequisite of economic development, which is also an important element of overall stability in the country and the society. The Bosnian economy has not been able to overcome the losses (estimations vary

between 31 and 70 billion USD) suffered during the 1992-95 war. The post-war prosperity was fragile and illusory since it started from a very low level and was mainly fuelled by the reconstruction financed by aid.³⁵ The main problem in the economic sector of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the extensive black and grey economies and widespread corruption.

Of the three constituent nations, only the Bosniaks favour centralization and an increase in the power and efficiency of central government. This is understandable since they are in a relative majority. Also the proportion of Bosniaks in the population is growing to the extent that they are expected to achieve an absolute majority in the near future, which together with the ethnic determination of domestic politics is a good position. The Bosniak political leaders are also aware of the difficulties of realizing centralization, therefore the idea of regionalizing the country is gaining ground. This “new” regionalization would not stand on ethnic grounds but on the rationality of economy and territorial division of labour.³⁶

The major opposition to centralization is the political elite of the RS, who consider any moves towards centralization or a reduction of the rights of RS as an ethnically-based anti-Serb measure. Although the elite of the RS admits the low efficiency of the state, the abolition of the RS is not an option; their greatest fear is a unitary, Bosniak-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croats more or less side with the Serb position, defending their ethnic rights, not favouring a centralized Bosnia, but instead struggling to have an entity on their own. This effort is from time to time supported by Bosnian Serb politicians as well.

3. THE FUTURE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA ACCORDING TO THE HARTSHORNE MODEL.

In what follows an attempt is made, with the help of the Hartshorne model, to collect the centrifugal and centripetal forces affecting Bosnia-Herzegovina and to define the major challenges the country has to face.

3.1. Centrifugal forces.

As stated above Bosnia-Herzegovina was born in a bloody civil war without an overall victor. The war was not finished; it was merely stopped by external forces more or less according to the

then recent situation. But since the war was fought by groups within an internationally recognized state and the total division of the country had not been the desire of the international community, the former belligerents remained in the same state. Moreover the scale of the hostilities (almost all families were affected) and the instruments used in the war (ethnic cleansing, mass killing, mass rape, deliberate destruction of symbols etc.) still make it hard, if not impossible, to establish an environment where inter-ethnic cooperation prevails. This unique *post-war society* is one of the major centrifugal forces of the state.

Paradoxically also peace, similar to the war, and the *political and territorial settlement* which followed, increased centrifugal forces. Some territorial units of the extremely decentralized state, where decision making and public and economic administration is focused on entity and cantonal level, have almost state-level rights, which are antagonistic to the integrity of the state as a whole. On the other hand the need for consensus makes the central government almost dysfunctional in an ethnocratic state like Bosnia. The weak central government and the strong local and regional governments, organized on ethnic grounds, form a serious centrifugal force.

Probably the most significant centrifugal force affecting Bosnia-Herzegovina is the *large scale ethnic and religious diversity* of its society. None of the three largest and constituent nations officially has an absolute majority (as far as we know, as there was no census held in the country since 1991). Moreover the three major ethnic groups belong to three religions which further increases the mental distance between them. Assuming the statements above are correct and considering the major wartime fault-lines had been running between ethnic groups, and if we accept that the basic objectives of war had been to attempt to modify the ethno-territorial situation, we may also accept that the three centrifugal forces listed so far are strongly interrelated and are able to destabilize any country.

Furthermore Bosnian Serbs and Croats created practically ethnically homogenized territories during the war which lie, in many cases, along their mother countries, thus along the larger groups of their nations (ethnic groups). Bosniaks do not have another country dominated by them, but experience a higher reproduction rate and

emigration also affects them less. As a consequence they have no other option but the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand their ethnogenesis only occurred during the Bosnian war and as a consequence it is only a 20-year-old nation with all the challenges and difficulties of being a nation in its youth.

Another important centrifugal force to consider is the *lack of a strong territorial (or other) identity, independent from the three major ethnic/religious groups*, although several attempts to create this have been made throughout history. The citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina prefer to identify themselves as Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks, the later meaning exclusively Muslim South Slavs. The term Bosnian refers to all of the citizens regardless ethnicity and religion, but remains merely a theoretical and technical category. Since Croats and Serbs have a nation state in the neighbourhood, their Bosnian identity and loyalty to the state may be problematic. One may find evidence of this ethnic independence in the symbols used in the country, in the media, education and in practically every segment of everyday life. A partial explanation may be the fact that the independent statehood of Bosnia does not have a long history, it usually formed part of other states (with the exception of a medieval Bosnia).

One important consequence of the territorial segregation of the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina is that in spite of the existence of a historically evolved core area around Sarajevo, *two new cores were born* and underpinned. Around Banja Luka a Serb core area is emerging, while Croats are trying to establish one around Mostar. This is accompanied by the foundations of ethnically-based institutions (e.g. universities), erecting symbolic buildings (huge religious symbols and buildings), and the conspicuous occupation of public spaces (national symbols, signs, flags, graffiti).³⁷ The tripling of the core area is also strengthened by the peace treaty as it allows the ethnic groups to form separate administrative territorial units, and to create their own spatial structures.

In the entities and cantons of Bosnia-Herzegovina the *power is in the hands of ethnocratic elites*.³⁸ This means that societal relations, accessing public goods, participating in decision making and advocating interests, and overall individual welfare and success are strongly dependent on ethno-territorial grounds.

This is obvious, for example, in education where each of the ethnic groups teach and are taught different, often antagonistic (Croatian, Serbian, Bosniak) history, geography and literature. In the long run, this inevitably works against the stability and unity of the state.

3.2. Centripetal forces.

Among the centripetal forces, mostly less important factors which are not related to the armed conflicts of the former Yugoslavia identified. However, it should also be noted that even Hartshorne did not consider these types of centripetal forces as decisive ones.³⁹

The first of these is the *favourable shape* of the country. A compact shape, lacking great geometric extremities is a positive factor according to the state theory of political geography. Another positive consideration is that *the borders of the country – though not as state borders but administrative ones – have a relatively long history*. In addition *they are well marked by physical geographical features*, since they follow rivers such as the Drina and the Sava or mountain ranges such as the Dinarides. However, with respect to the borders a more important fact to consider is that they are not ethnic borders (as stated above) so they represent much more a destabilizing factor than a stabilizing one.

The internal *spatial development cleavages are rather small* or at least they are not the most significant social problem of the country. This may be considered as a centripetal force.

After identifying and briefly analysing the centripetal and centrifugal forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina it might be said that, according to the Hartshorne model, the country should not exist. Admittedly Hartshorne emphasizes that even in case of the supremacy of centrifugal forces, the state can exist for a while, but sooner or later an internal or external direct cause can lead to the fall of the state. This raises the question of what force has been keeping the state together for more than 15 years? One may only find the answer outside the Hartshorne model since it is the will of the international community to keep the country together and prevent it from partition.

3.3. The external factor.

The war can also be seen as the final instrument of the ethnic groups to 'enforce their interests'.⁴⁰

Therefore, among the Serbs and the Croats' primary objectives for war stood the creation of a homogeneous ethnic area and the strengthening of the ties with their mother country in some form. On the other hand Bosniaks did not have any other alternative but to defend the unity and integrity of the state. There are several reasons why the international community sided with the Bosniaks in this question.

The first is the *moral* reason. The starting point is the opinion that the Bosniaks suffered the most; they were the victims of the aggression, so any kind of partition would be an acceptance of war and ethnic cleansing as a legal instrument of state-building. The state, therefore, should be kept together and efforts should be made to reconstruct the pre-war ethno-territorial structures and to create an environment of peaceful coexistence.

The second reason is the approach of *international law*, according to which the Badinter-commission (set up in 1991 to provide legal advice about the conflict in Yugoslavia) issued opinions in which it advised the new borders be recognized according to the former internal administrative borders. The commission cited both the constitution of Yugoslavia and the 'uti possidetis' principle of international law (according to which, for example, the borders of the former African colonies had also been recognized).⁴¹ Since then serious criticisms have been formulated about these decisions.⁴²

Other grounds for the international community's support of the Bosniaks is the *fear of setting a precedent*, should it mean anything. According to this, the Bosnian partition could set a precedent for other ethno-territorial conflicts in the Balkans. In the wider perspective, the numerous separatist movements around the world could gain real or perceived legitimization of their causes.

Another motive we may call *international security*. This covers the problems of the remains of a theoretically partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina which could be a hotbed of permanent social, political and economic crises thus fuelling radicalism. From time to time in western commentaries one may read about fears of the spread of fundamentalism in Bosnia as well as about Islamic warriors remaining in the country after the war and posing a security threat. This latter fear could have been increased

by the partition of Bosnia, with the creation of a homogeneous Islamic country out of the fragmented parts of the Bosniak inhabited central areas of the country.

Thus the international community does not only consider it important to preserve the integrity of the state but also to improve its functional ability and efficiency. However state-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been drastically slowed down by internal disagreement. In spite of this there is no other choice for the international community but to support the integrity of the state, which also means that for as long as the centripetal forces do not out-weigh the centrifugal forces, energy should be invested into the system from external sources to keep it stable. In practical terms this means financial aid, investment, as well as continuous attention and control.

4. THE ENTITIES OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND THE HARTSHORNE MODEL.

A major criticism of the Hartshorne model is that as a consequence of its functionalist approach, it views the state as an entity which exists *ab ovo*, and has its own will and reason on its own. By contrast there are those who regards the state only as a territorial formation of the societies within it. In this theory functionality and efficiency is not an attribute of the state, but rather a consequence of the decisions and acts of the various groups of the given society, as the state itself is also a result of various social, historical and political processes⁴³. That is why in cases of success or failure of the state there are always winners and losers within the society which, and the interactions of which are not represented in the Hartshorne model. In addition, therefore, the analysis of the state is expanded to the subnational entities (RS, FBiH) as well, since the success of the state may easily mean the failure of the RS and vice versa.

4.1. The RS and the Hartshorne model.

The primary and major challenger to the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the elite of the RS. The birth and the existence of the entity is intended to provide the maximum possible self-determination and segregation for the Bosnian Serbs. This means the operation of an ethnocratic regime in the case of the entity born in armed conflict.

According to the Hartshorne model, the most important centripetal force of the RS is the already existing 'state-idea', which is undoubtedly founded upon the national and religious consciousness. The Serb nation and the Orthodox Church constitute the basic idea of the entity, which fundamentally demarcates Bosnian Serbs from non-Serbs. However this only works when we examine it in the Bosnian environment and functions to demarcate only Serbs from non-Serbs. A theoretically independent RS would inevitably become part of the state idea of a multiple times larger Serbia as it is part of it in some sense.

Important centripetal forces regarding the RS, are the relatively homogeneous ethnic, religious and linguistic space and the clear core area around Banja Luka. The majority of the institutions of the RS, as well as the educational system work subordinated to nation-building, which also strengthens centripetal forces, just like the centralized public administration.

In terms of centrifugal forces, the unusual and extremely disadvantageous shape of the entity, the illegitimacy of many parts of its borders, including their wartime genesis, and the inadequate infrastructural systems (public utilities, transportation, energy systems) must be highlighted.⁴⁴ The most important centrifugal factors, however, are the external ones.

One is the above mentioned efforts of the international community to keep the country together which makes it impossible for the RS to gain independence in the short run. In the long run a second serious centrifugal force threatens the RS, namely the "attractivity" of neighbouring Serbia as mentioned. From this it may be concluded that the independence of RS might only have any reality (if it has any reality at all) in mid-term, as a transition state.

4.2. The FBiH and the Hartshorne model.

The FBiH, does not display as many centripetal forces as RS could. Since it is as artificial as the RS with wartime borders and unsustainable spatial structures lacking any territorial logic, these factors act as centrifugal forces as well.

An important difference is that while the RS is almost ethnically homogeneous, the FBiH is home to two major ethnic groups. To ease the tensions between them, the territory of the entity is further decentralized. The cantons, experiencing a wide range of rights, have been

established on ethnic grounds and hence are likely to form the basis of ethnically-based separatism. In contrast to the RS, the FBiH is both an ethnically and territorially divided entity which are serious centrifugal forces. Moreover the majority of the Croat cantons are adjacent to Croatia and have special relations with that country.

The consequence of ethnically-based territorial decentralization and the ethnicization of everyday life is that the institutional and education systems also strengthen centrifugal forces. In contrast to the RS where these structures contribute to a single nation, in the FBiH the interests of the two nations undermine the processes. For example Croat history is taught in the Croat cantons and Bosniak history is taught in the Bosniak cantons, which again does not favour the creation of a strong, common idea of the state.⁴⁵

CONCLUSIONS

Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state held together by external forces which can be proven by the use of the Hartshorne model as well. In contrast to Croatia or Kosovo, where the dominant ethnic group almost completely homogenized their territory, in Bosnia-Herzegovina this could not be done due to large-scale ethnic diversity. The conflict, however, has not come to an end, it was only stopped by international actors. Therefore, while in the previous cases nation- and state-building could be started and which may produce the major elements of stability of the states and a strong identity for its inhabitants (through education, culture, symbols, holidays, media, the socialization of everyday life), the post-war ethnic tensions and divisions make it impossible to do so in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The individual ethnic groups (being the citizens of the same state) organize their territories, gained during the war and in Dayton, according to their antagonistic partial ethnic interests.

The result is the lack of the most important element, according to the Hartshorne model: of the stability and integrity of a state, the state idea, the *raison d'être*. Moreover the centrifugal forces are more numerous and more decisive than the few centripetal forces identified by this study.

The state is kept together by external forces, primarily by the EU, requiring continuous energy input through numerous methods (aid, investment, high representative, international

police, etc.). As soon as the external energy input is terminated, however, the country will return to a path of dissolution as a result of the centrifugal forces affecting it, unless a new *raison d'être*, independent from the ethnic groups of the country can be found.

Notes

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