THE MEZQUITA-GARAJE, MEZQUITA-SÓTANO, AND ISLAM IN SPAIN SINCE 11-M

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Abstract: This introductory study attempts to situate the representation of Islam and Islamic space in modern-day Spain within an historical context that reveals the subversion of Islam in Spain by traditionally Catholic governments. Through comparative examinations of how information about Islam was collected, distributed and controlled between the 16th Century and today, an overarching socio-political organization emerges that is shared by a spiritualized autocracy and a modern democracy in light of dictatorial practices and cultural control.

Keywords: Mezquita, mosque, Islam, morisco, Muslim, Catholic, Democracy, Spain, 16th Century, 21st Century, 11-M, dictatorship.

In the past, my work has treated early modern issues concerning the representation of Hispanic people and space. I have turned recently to the issue of the hidden and secret mosque in 16th Century Spain, and have become aware of this phenomenon in Spain today. It is through this lens that I approach the topic of contemporary dictatorship with respect to the representation of Islam within western democracies, particularly since 9-11 in the United States and Canada, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and London bombings that followed. In these respective democracies, we have seen over the last few years a marked increase in the general public’s knowledge of Islam, and this is due to an increase in the media’s circulation of information. Many of the questions and issues we will address here are well articulated in the media, which has ensured that all western peoples know that Muslims attend mosque several times a day, or wear hi’jabs, or choose to live according to Shar’ia, among other popular topics pertaining to Islam in the western media.

This is no different in Spain, where freedom of information is a highly valued commodity. In the late 1970s, after Franco died, reforms were quickly installed toward the creation of a cohesive constitution that would eventually acknowledge the regional communities as unique and autonomous. Linguistic differences, freedoms of expression, and religious freedoms were also acknowledged throughout this process, and a list of religious institutions became the mandate of Spain’s Ministry of Justice, a mandate that still exists today in the form of the Registry of Religious Entities. This registry is now online and, as we will discuss, is one example of how democratic Spain subordinates Islam to Catholicism in information collection and distribution practices. Census data, along with government-based statistics publications, are used by the media and educational institutions every day in Spain. As a category of information, census and demographic data was also collected in 16th Century Spain, and a comparison of how Islam was represented then and now will demonstrate similarities between the two periods and administrations in terms of information management and Islam in Spain.

We will explore other ways that democratic cultures subvert Islam in an apparent attempt to control it within their realms. This comparative study will reveal common policies and practices toward Islam and the space occupied by Islam in Spain. Furthermore, we will see that controls on information and information circulation are common in democratic cultures and governments, as they were in 16th Century municipal government and throughout the Kingdoms and Empires led by Spain. Dictatorial practices in this broad, historical sense can afflict any western democracy, particularly
when the polemics of Islam and westernization, or Islam and Christianity, are involved.

1. BACKGROUND: MORISCO AND MUDÉJAR COOPERATION WITH THE TURKS, INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM, AND IMMIGRATION

After the rapid conquest of Spain by Muslims that began in 711, a reconquest was waged by Catholics almost immediately through local skirmishes as early as 718. By the mid-13th Century, Islam had been confined to southeastern Spain, known then as the Nasrid kingdom of Granada, which managed to protect its sovereignty for nearly 300 years before Granada fell to the fervent efforts of reconquest in 1492. The Muslim population living under Catholic rule, the *mudéjar* population, was restricted in how and when it could worship, but was not yet forced to convert to Catholicism. The economic and social incentive to convert led to some voluntary conversions; most other conversions were forced and/or legislated within the first 10 years of Catholic resettlement in Granada. *Moriscos*, or new Christians, saw their mosques turned into churches and administrative buildings or houses, leading to the establishment of secret mosques in order to sustain Muslim worship under Catholic rule.

The Catholic leaders were aware of possible gatherings taking place in private homes and stores, and demanded that doors be left open on Muslim calendar days in order to ensure that no private worship occurred. During the first half of the 16th Century, the *moriscos* were instructed in the ways of Catholicism; schools for *morisco* children were built, and sermons developed to reach the adult convert. But, a challenge greater than the establishment of *morisco* infrastructure ensued. Many *moriscos* had the same skin colour, hair colour and language capabilities as Christians who had lived in the area for the last few decades. The illustrations that accompanied the 13th-Century work *Cantigas de Santa María* demonstrate that the Muslim populations confined through the reconquest to the south of Spain did not always have darker skin colour and eyes than the Catholic crusaders. In both the 15th and 16th Centuries, *mudéjares* were forced to wear crescent moons on their person in order to be differentiated from the Catholic population. Frans Hogenberg and Georg Braun comment on this reality in a 1575 vista of Granada in the second volume of the *Civitates orbis terrarum*. They depict two *moriscos comunes* in traditional Muslim dress and in clothing a Spaniard would wear, respectively, which suggests that *moriscos*, Muslims and Catholic Spaniards still could not be distinguished one from the other. This observation heightened the urgency with which the Catholic authorities controlled the possibility of secret worship. It also led in part to the expulsion of all *moriscos* between 1609 and 1614 from Spain.

During this same period, the Ottoman Empire had reared up across the world, touching the Old World continents of Africa, Asia and Europe, and having taken the city of Constantinopole in 1453. Throughout the 16th Century, Spain was flanked by the Ottomans to the south across the Maghreb as they moved from east to west; and throughout the Mediterranean and within the Strait of Gibraltar and Atlantic by the Turkish fleet and the Corsairs. The greatest population of *moriscos* still lived in southeastern Spain (especially before the 1568/9 *morisco* revolts), and it was suspected that they would assist the Turks with any incursion into Spanish territory. Despite professing the Catholic faith, the *moriscos* were associated with the Turks by the Catholic decision-makers because of the faith that was perceived to be common between both groups: Islam. Therefore, after the 1568/9 *morisco* revolts, the *moriscos* were forced to transmigrate to other parts of Spain in order to ensure that they would not have access to regions where they could support the Turks, and that the population was more thinly distributed. The transmigration also mitigated labour shortages experienced in many parts of Spain, and integrated the *moriscos* into a labour class upon which Spain depended. The early 17th-Century expulsion left in its wake an even greater socio-economic crisis that lasted well into the next century.

Spain today continues some of these policies toward Muslims, who are no longer forced or compelled to convert to Catholicism, and who should enjoy more freedoms than their 16th Century counterparts as a result of democratic reform and the guarantees of the Spanish constitution. However, two factors influence the treatment of Muslims in Spain: international Islamic terrorism and immigration from the African continent. The former characterizes and suspects all Muslims of possible terrorist links and activities, especially if these Muslims were not born in Spain and exhibit racial, ethnic and
linguistic differences apart from Spain’s general population.

This attitude recalls the 16th-Century outlook on Turkish and morisco collaboration in attacks on Spanish soil, and can be related to the assumption of al-Qaeda involvement in the Madrid bombings (after the Basque group ETA was dismissed as a possibility) when unaffiliated participants were to blame. In fact, the illusion of al-Qaeda involvement was sustained by the government’s later conclusion that the attacks were “al-Qaeda-inspired.” This facilitates the perception that any Muslim who is not a member of al-Qaeda might be inspired to emulate its action or goals, whereas a non-Muslim would not be suspected of being inspired by al-Qaeda or its agenda. Similarly, a group of moriscos purposely donned Turkish clothing in order to appear to be supported by Turkish soldiers while fighting for their freedom in Spain during the morisco revolts. The “Turkish-inspired” tactic confirmed the Catholics’ worst suspicion that the moriscos of Spain would collaborate with the Turkish against Spanish interests. The moriscos’ actions, like those of the Madrid bombers, utilized the prevailing attitudes in Spain in order to strengthen the impact of their respective attacks. Both the Madrid bombers and the Turkish-dressed moriscos represented unique groups that did not reflect the mindsets or actions of all Muslims in Spain in either time period.

Next to international Islamic terrorism, immigration has a two-fold impact on how Muslims are represented in Spain. First, many immigrants to Spain come from countries on the African continent where Islam dominates, and most immigrants are not authorized to land in Spain (they are sin documentación). These immigrants exhibit racial and linguistic traits unlike those of the average Spaniard. As a result of these traits, the immigrant is identified and presumed to have originated from Africa. This has lead to a climate of racism toward black Spanish and non-Spanish nationals. Second, Spain feels pressure from the European Union to control illegal immigration into the continent by way of Spain. It has installed and continues to develop policies governing illegal immigration, the interception and the treatment of immigrants, and their repatriation to Africa. Because of racial and linguistic characteristics, Spanish authorities can identify illegal immigrants who have landed on their soil with relative ease. These individuals spend time in public places for the purpose of finding food or work, and can be encountered in most Spanish cities, and particularly along the southern coast, in small groups. A high unemployment rate for immigrants from countries where Islam dominates is common in Spain. A recent study found that immigrants from traditionally Christian countries had greater integration into the labour market because they were usually employed before immigrating or had a specific skill set required in the target country, whereas immigrants from non-Christian countries who moved to Christian countries had higher unemployment rates. The results of this study suggest that individuals from non-Christian and undemocratic countries have difficulty integrating into a country such as Spain. Alternatively, such individuals may not be accepted as easily as an immigrant from France or Canada.

One of the characteristics these immigrants share in common with worldwide suspicions of terrorist activity is Islam. Therefore, the duality of racial characteristics and religious profession connects illegal immigration with the possibility of terrorism. A recent study by Navarra’s Institute of Statistics demonstrates the relative discomfort Navarrans have with neighbours who emigrated from Muslim countries, the most commonly identified of which include Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan. Ten percent of the respondents thought these neighbours should be expelled from Spain, whereas nearly 20% believed that foreigners should be able to stay only for a limited time. A national survey reveals that more than a quarter of respondents would expel illegal immigrants to their country of origin, while 62% thought reform of immigration policies was required.

Fear of terrorism underpins these public opinions toward immigrants primarily from Muslim countries who exhibit linguistic and racial differences associated with Islam. Immigration can be associated more generally with a deficit of conformity among the new arrivals. Mikel Azurmendi, the President of the Foro Nacional de Integración Social de los Inmigrantes, clearly expresses this position: “Our superior morality lies on human dignity. We have thought that all the people are the same but this doesn’t work the same in any tribe […] The immigrants’ children have to be like ours, they have to learn the same and eat the same.” Religious tolerance in Spain refers in part to conforming practices of the Muslim immigrants, which is an issue for school-aged children who
cannot attend publicly-funded schools for Muslim children and alternatively attend Catholic schools. Each child receives the same education, to paraphrase Azurmendi. This category of religious tolerance is similar to how the moriscos were tolerated by their Catholic neighbours. They were expected to convert, to speak Spanish, and to find an occupation that benefited Catholic society at large. They were expected to pay taxes and rent to the Catholic parishes, which in turn supported the Church ministry and the cost of re-education. The inability of the moriscos to conform to these expectations lead to their expulsion.

Not unlike the moriscos, who faced many barriers to free worship, Muslim immigrants may seek out a place to worship. But, in Spain, this is problematic because there are few mosques. Nonetheless, another phenomenon has emerged over the last decade that is likely a response to the swelling number of Muslims living within Spain: the comunidad. The comunidad is not a traditional mosque with minarets, prayer rooms or calls for prayer. Rather, it describes a group of people that have adapted or constructed a facility (a habilitada) for the purpose of worship, or for administering to the Muslim population of a city or region. The institution is perfectly legal and registered in the Registry of Religious Entities. The media has reported on these comunidades and their habilitadas from time to time, and they are represented as a space of clandestine worship, cellular activity, and as inaccessible to non-Muslim Spaniards.

Spain’s attitudes toward religion are influenced by international terrorism and illegal immigration. Sixty per cent of Spaniards feel that the religions of the world are more a source of conflict than of peace, and that the followers of these religions are intolerant of one another. How does a nation where the profession of Catholic faith accounts for 60-90% of the population digest the increasing number of Muslims within its borders? If the Spaniards surveyed have anything to do with it (of which only one individual in the previously cited survey identified him or herself as Muslim), we can expect to find conflict and intolerance where Muslims and Catholics cohabitate. Vaclav Smil points to cultural intolerance for Shar’ia, the hi’jab, and the lack of public funding for madrasas, etc., as an indication that integration or assimilation of Muslim immigrants is not a priority for European governments, and indeed, may conflict with overall policies toward multiculturalism, human rights, and other liberties afforded under the EU and its constituent states. However, with an increasing and fertile Muslim population, we will see a greater representation of this segment of Spain’s population in demographic data that should shape Spain’s democratic processes of inclusion away from the demand of conformity.

From a comparative perspective, a contemporary reproduction of the convivencia of Spain’s history (where Jews, Muslims and Catholics lived in relative peace in medieval times) will not facilitate a Muslim-Christian syncretism in the same sense, because Spain no longer purposely guides its social and cultural programmes with religiosity. But, Spain has not relinquished all of its overtly Catholic cultural programming, and this will be explored in our analysis of how Spain controls information circulation and the effects of this control. Furthermore, the western world’s current sensitivity to Muslim activity manifests backward-looking interpretations of Spain’s history. A Canadian student writes in her term paper on religious tolerance in Spain that “the [modern] war is being fought by terrorists […] The purpose of al-Qaeda’s existence in Spain is to recapture al-Andalus, the land that was forcibly taken from Muslims in the 15th Century.” Whether or not the al-Andalus Brigade’s intention was to reanimate the lost bastion of the Muslim empire, it is clear that new scholars easily connect modern-day representations with their historical counterparts. There exists a cultural mentality about Islam and its motivations toward western territory that responds to Islam’s polemical relationship with Christianity and its successor, democracy.

2. THE HIDDEN MOSQUE: NEGATIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF ISLAMIC SPACE

The hidden mosque is a term that attempts to describe spaces conserved and dedicated for the purpose of private worship without attaching negative or positive, sectarian or mainstream meanings or associations to the terminology. The hidden mosque is not a public mosque, of which there are 13 today in Spain; nor is it a Muslim prayer room that one might find in a hospital or university. It is not a term used in the media, which often infuses private, Muslim space with references to terrorism (i.e. the sleeper cell), or with illicit behaviour (i.e. la
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mezquita clandestina). In part, this type of representation grows out of the incongruent concepts of private and public space in the western and Islamic worlds, respectively.

The incongruence is more pronounced when Muslims live in western cities. While the mosque is a public space, many non-Muslims find it inaccessible and therefore private and closed-off to them. It is this perception of limitation that promotes negative representations of Muslim places of worship, in addition to activities against the welfare of the state. Nonetheless, the hidden mosque, unlike the public mosque, is only accessible to those who know about it. It cannot be found in the Registry of Religious Entities, yet hundreds of people may know of its existence. Attendees are Muslims displaced as a result of immigration, specific language needs, immobility due to poverty, and insufficient infrastructure for worship. Women easily find themselves without the ability to worship due to the infrastructure of pre-existing buildings not designed to segregate women and men during worship. As a result, women may choose to congregate in private areas such as homes or rented commercial facilities in order to worship.

On the other hand, if a mosque can be hidden, it can be found. The search for hidden mosques is behind the negative representations that we find throughout the media, and the motivation for finding the hidden mosque is to prevent harm to the state caused by activities that are presumed to be taking place in houses and stores across Spain. Therefore, we approach the hidden mosque from two distinct angles: the one presumes benign worshipping practices, and the other exists upon the perception of illicit behaviour.

3. INFORMATION COLLECTION PRACTICES: THE SHADOWS OF CENSUS DATA

Sources for demographic data in Spain are largely supported by governmental and academic agencies affiliated with ministries such as the Ministry of Justice, or the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS). Data that pertains to religious spaces and worshipping practices is usually contained within opinion polls and surveys conducted by the same agencies that analyze national and regional census data. As a result, many attempts to survey public opinion and circumstance are limited by the census data that guide this form of inquiry. For example, national and regional census data do not survey non-Spanish nationals, and therefore demographic information about Spain’s Muslim population is unknowable to a degree, and greatly abstracted. A joint study by various ministries of Spain in late 2007 asked its immigrant Muslim respondents, all of whom were Spanish citizens or had residence permits, questions ranging from how comfortable they felt with going to mosque to the level of acceptance they felt as Muslims within the Spanish community. The flaw in this study, which was conducted by interview, is that it ignores a large portion of the Muslim community by limiting the category of respondents with citizenship and residence status.

A more basic issue with the 2001 National Census conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) is that race, language capabilities, and religious denomination are not categories of information that Spain collects from its citizenry. Without this type of information, it would be difficult for Spain to know the size of its native or naturalized Muslim population, and to administer their needs as citizens. Nonetheless, opinion polls do attempt to collect this information, but the pool of respondents is small and usually totals no more than 2500 individuals. When asked about religious denomination, the CIS polls specifically list Catholicism as an answer, along with Atheism; all other options are generalized within the category “Follower of Another Religion.” In the CIS study #2443, and within most CIS studies with questions about religious affiliation, the respondent who identified him or herself as Catholic or as a follower of another religion is asked to identify the frequency with which he or she attends religious services. The options for the respondent range from “Almost Never” and “Once a Month,” to “Every Sunday and Holiday,” which is problematic because many faiths do not hold weekly offices nor prioritize Sundays for worship, including Islam.

The data by itself does not subvert Islam in Spain. However, the collection of information toward an outcome that favours only Catholics in a representative cross-section of the religious population does subvert Islam. This is further demonstrated by national and regional statistics compiled by agencies such as the Statistics Institute of Andalucía (IEA) and the Statistics Institute of Castilla-La Mancha (IESC-LM) for
marriage ceremonies, where the categories reflect Catholic, “Other Religion,” and civil ceremonies.

The category of “Other Religion” combines all non-Catholic Christian denominations with Judaism, Islam and other minority religions in Spain. The generalization of this category becomes a limitation when this information is circulated or used for funding models. For example, income tax benefits can be given by the individual to a not-for-profit institution, such as the Catholic Church, or to other Christian and Muslim institutions. Unfortunately, the options in the 2007 form for the tax benefit include the Catholic Church, “Other,” “Both Church and Other” and “Neither.” It seems likely that those who married in the Catholic Church would check the Catholic box, while those who married in other places, or in a civil ceremony, might select one of the other boxes. A feedback loop is created by funding models such as this one that favours the Catholic Church. If insufficient infrastructure exists to support marriage ceremonies within other faiths, the number of civil ceremonies will increase with the inclusion of ceremonies that had no other means to take place. Funding models that drive the design behind the collection of tax information are not flexible enough to account for the diversity of Spain’s religious topography. This does not agree with Article 16 of the Constitution that guarantees equal access to religion and liberties of expression accorded to that access and reconfirmed in Ley 26/1992.

Returning to census data and the absence of demographic information by religious group, any figure we could settle upon would be complicated by the undocumented Muslims living in Spain. Institutions such as the Islamic Commission of Spain have recently configured their own data for 2007. It does not attempt to count immigrants without status, yet presents a figure of nearly 1 150 000 Muslims, or 2.5% of the population, worshiping in 13 mosques and 475 habilitadas, or buildings adapted and authorized for their purposes. For example, the Asociación Alforkan in San Javier is a rented space used as a mosque for about 70 people. These habilitadas have limited capacities to serve the local population, which is the case for the Mezquita Nnour in Cádiz, which is a flat that they would like to expand to accommodate local demand for services. The total number of buildings used for prayer is 488, a figure that comes from the Registry of Religious Entities.

Let us consider these figures. In Andalucía, there are 43 Muslim institutions according to the Registry, most of which are mezquitas habilitadas. Eight of these were registered before 1990, and six before 2001. Between 2001 and 2004, only two more were registered, but after 2004 -the year of the Madrid bombings- 26 mosques were registered, which accounts for 60% of the Muslim institutions in the Registry since its inception in 1982. What could cause this growth during such a short period of time? We suppose that immigration has played a great factor in the demand for places of religious worship. On the other hand, since the 11-M terrorist attacks in Madrid, there has been greater vigilance of Muslim activities within Spain’s borders. This may have led to the increase in the number of mosques if they existed before 11-M but had not registered with the Registry. Some percentage of the 26 mosques registered after 2004 were hidden mosques that sought legitimization by the Spanish authorities.

The Muslim population of Andalucía introduces another issue with the Registry’s listing of 43 Muslim institutions. As one of the most populous autonomies of Spain, Andalucía hosts at least 185 000 Muslims who are legally entitled to live there, including Spanish nationals, documented foreign workers for harvest, visiting professors and teachers, and foreign students studying in Andalucian universities. Over the last 50 years, Andalucía has nationalized more than 75 000 Muslims, some of whom may have been Spanish nationals to begin with, and during this period it is estimated that the children of this group number 109 000, which seems to be a conservative estimate and based on this period’s birth rate for all of Spain. Other figures circulating in the media have placed Andalucía’s residential and authorized foreign Muslim population at 250 000, and it is doubled to account for the population growth of undocumented Muslims. In the case of Huelva’s Comunidad islámica Almuhayerun y Alansar, a community of 3000 Muslims, the demand for their services reaches 12 000 individuals as a result of Summer travel and foreign harvest workers. Huelva, because it is a coastal city, attracts many undocumented immigrants from Africa. If we use the figure of 12 000 as a self-sustainable population count, then Andalucía by extension could support 513 000 individuals with existing Muslim infrastructure. However, we know from the
example of the Mezquita Nnour in Cádiz that a group of 12 000 is far greater than it could ever handle. Of the 43 Andalucian institutions, 38 are comunidades of questionable infrastructure; they provide prayers for smaller groups of adults and studies for a limited number of students. Some of the comunidades have multiple buildings, which is the case in Huelva, or satellite buildings, that as a collective form the Muslim infrastructure for an area. Even the new mosque being constructed in Sevilla (to be completed in 2010) will only hold 500 individuals in the prayer room with the option of overfilling onto the patio, and Sevilla’s population is estimated at 7 000 Muslims -another conservative estimate that does not include tourists or immigrants. It seems clear, therefore, that Muslims must be worshiping in alternative venues, because there appears to be insufficient space in institutions registered with the government. Some of these alternative venues are listed at <http:www.islamicfinder.org>, a web page that provides listings for world-wide services for Muslims. Many of the Spanish facilities are not listed in the Registry of Religious Entities. There are also examples of facilities that were listed on the web page listing service years before they were registered with authorities.

As we have shown, Spain’s current information collection practices do not adequately address the Spanish Muslim population, as evidenced by the absence of religion, language and race categories of information collected in the 2001 census. Surveys and opinion polls limit the type of data collected by specifying Catholicism as a category of information and combining all other religions into a single category. When this data is used for funding models, Muslims are at a great disadvantage because the Muslim community is not articulated in the data. As such, hidden mosques and habilitadas will continue to be a phenomenon in Spain because funding for Muslim infrastructure is sought from the Muslim community, and from foreign sponsoring entities, as is the case for the new mosque in Sevilla. The media’s representation of these make-shift mosques, and of international sources of funding, is negative and associated with fears of terrorism. The hegemony of democracy over undemocratic social systems, Catholicism over Islam, and the perception that democracy and Catholicism are less likely to use terrorism unlike the undemocratic and Islamic social systems, ensures that in the western world Islam will be subverted. Spain has a history of using the census to effectuate a pro-Catholic outcome from the data. 16th Century demographic resources tend to be regional in nature, which is the case for the Libro de habices (c. 1505), a census of all morisco properties of Granada. Habices describe properties that were repurposed to serve the Church, rather than the Islamic social system that prevailed before 1492. Moriscos, just as Muslims before, paid rent to the parish church (or, in Nasrid times, the local mosque). The Libro de habices reveals mosques that were converted to churches, hidden mosques that had operated in secret, and mosques that had paid for the privilege to continue operations, including a madrasa that would later be inventoried by its parish church11. It also details the occupants of the habices, almost all of whom were moriscos. A few madéjares are mentioned in the text, which tells us that there were most certainly mosques operating in public or private spaces under Catholic rule. The census of morisco properties was intended to reassess rents due to the Church, particularly since the mass conversion of so many Muslims to Catholicism required significant resources of the Catholic Church in Granada. Schools were built to re-educate adults and extra clerics needed to be paid in order to achieve this goal, while children attended schools for moriscos and were educated as Catholics12. Not unlike survey data from the 21st Century, or the 2007 tax benefit, the Libro de habices specifically collected information that could only benefit the Catholic Church. The data also reveals the secret operation of mosques, and the authorized use of mosques, not unlike the Registry of Religious Entities.

There exist two census attempts, dated 1530 and 1594, that catalogue the number of inhabitants in each town and province13. The citizens are referred to as vecinos, a generic term that does not differentiate the morisco from the “old Christian” or traditional Catholic in most cases. The towns were asked to provide this information to the Catholic leaders, in part so that the taxation and rents could be adjusted to better reflect the town size. In this period many towns had morisco populations due to the transmigration of moriscos after 1569; however, these communities are not acknowledged in the 1594 census. This type of census only records the Catholic population of Spain, and we cannot be sure if the data includes moriscos. On the other hand, the representation and consolidation
of Spain as a Catholic nation required that moriscos be an undifferentiated part of the population, especially if they were suspected of secretly worshipping as Muslims. Local authorities providing a town’s demographic information would not have wanted to identify a community of moriscos within the jurisdiction in order to keep the Inquisition away from the town. Therefore, the desire to consolidate Spain as a Catholic nation through the offices of the Inquisition is tied to the desire at the local town level to minimize the representation of moriscos and Muslims within the demographic data they provided in order to deflect attention. These towns were also motivated by the labour force provided by the morisco community, as a labour shortage was experienced by much of Spain at this time and moriscos alleviated some of the burden. Today’s Spain may be no different; the practices for information collection maintain a relatively homogenous religious composition for the nation. By not sampling more of the Muslim population, including the undocumented immigrants, Spain prevents the aggregation of figures for illegal immigration and/or the Muslim population from becoming available to other members of the European Union who pressure Spain to better control illegal immigration. It is in this way that Spain’s information collection practices have minimized its Muslim population in both time periods.

A 1609 census, however, takes a different approach. The data for Valencia purposely divided the population into the categories of east Valencia and west Valencia. After Valencia was reconquered, the mudéjares were ordered to move away from the coast and out of larger cities. West Valencia was where many of the displaced resettled. The data subdivides into Old Christians (traditional Catholics) and New Christians (moriscos). The number of morisco houses in W. Valencia is 19,946; with an average of 5 individuals per morisco house, that is a total of 99,730 moriscos. E. Valencia had 12,529 houses, for a population of 62,645. Before the expulsion of the moriscos, the province of Valencia alone had a population of 160,000 strong, equaling nearly 40% of the total population for the province. In the resources we have used so far, Valencia has never differentiated its morisco population from the traditional Catholic population, and it did so at this moment in order to justify, and comprehend the effects of, the expulsion of the moriscos that happened later that year. A similar attempt was made between the years 1581 and 1589 for all of Spain. According to Gonzalez’s calculations, the total number of moriscos in Spain eclipsed 230,000 individuals, or about 3% of the national population of 8 million, which seems conservative given the fact that local towns did not always disclose their morisco populations.

Returning to labour, illegal immigrants in Spain can find work at ports or in city centres. Immigrants make up a class of workers today in Spain that work in construction, kitchens, or on ships. Some work as part of a highly organized cartel of African immigrants who sell the same selection of CDs, DVDs and t-shirts in cities and on beaches across the country. Most of these workers cannot speak Spanish and are disinclined to engage in conversation, perhaps because they know they are vulnerable to the authorities because of their different racial and linguistic characteristics. Nonetheless, Spain seems to have a need for this labour force, which suggests that illegal immigration, and the arrival of many more Muslims to the Peninsula, is not likely to abate.

4. INFORMATION CIRCULATION PRACTICES: THE MEDIA, SILENCE AND CONTROL

News outlets such as El mundo frequently report on “clandestine” activities of the Muslims living within Spain’s borders. A 2006 article used the Registry of Religious Entities to craft the argument that there are too many Muslims in Spain to be supported by the services offered by the 233 mosques registered with the authorities: “se estima que hay, al menos, otras 200 en situación ilegal.” The article specifically identifies “garjaes, naves o pisos son utilizados como centros de adoctrinamiento religioso”14. In English, as in Spanish, indoctrination carries a negative connotation, and for this reason the hidden mosque is characterised as a space where terrorists might flourish, which again highlights the possibility of Islam as a mechanism for terrorist activity. The same article supposes that possible terrorists worshiping in these places would possess “rasgos magrebies,” further connecting Spain’s illegal immigration problem with terrorism and the illegal mosque.

Many news outlets paraphrased, quoted and distributed the text of an Audiencia Nacional brief that outlined details surrounding the 11-M attacks. After 11-M, it was concluded that “a través de los conocidos de las mezquitas, empezaron [the terrorists] a trazar amistad con
una serie de personas, árabes en general, sobre todo marroquíes procedentes del mundo de la delincuencia común, trabajadores de extracción económica y cultura muy escasa y fácilmente influenciables”\(^{15}\). The government report clearly connects without discrimination Muslims from Africa with terrorism while attaching conditions of poverty to those who would be easily influenced by terrorists looking to indoctrinate people in mosques. This opens the possibility that the millions of impoverished Africans in Spain could be indoctrinated by terrorists. The same report concludes that materials in support of jihad, and sermons, were circulated through the mosque, and that these materials consequently were discussed in private homes at a later date\(^{16}\). The linkage between Muslims who met at mosque and then reassembled in private homes with terrorism and worship creates an unavoidable representation of Muslim worship as terrorist activity, especially when it occurs in private.

The places that *El mundo* claimed were ideal for illegal mosques (garages, boats or warehouses, and apartments) do appear throughout the government’s reconstruction of the events leading up to 11-M. In this sense, the *mezquita-garaje* and the *mezquita-sótano* (basement mosque) are places of worship that the media use exclusively to describe places where terrorist activities are planned. This lexicon for terrorism in Spain is inflexible; it cannot be applied to Muslim worship without invoking the connotation of terrorism, which is problematic for the displaced Muslim population in Spain that does not have access to an authorised mosque.

Consequently, there is a silence maintained in both the media and the Muslim community of Spain. Hidden mosques that are unregistered throughout the country exist to meet the demand for worship within the Muslim community. This is not a representation expressed by the media, nor is it one for which the Muslim community advocates, especially by groups such as the Islamic Commission of Spain or the Federation of Religious Islamic Entities of Spain (FEERI). In part, this position must be due to the status of the attendees; illegal immigrants may not fit within FEERI’s mandate.

Nonetheless, the polemic of silence over the hidden mosque is not unique to Spain. The United Kingdom’s Home Office addresses the connection between “extremist preachers, clerics or teachers” and radicals taking over “places of worship […] to use them to disseminate extremist views and practices” in *Preventing Extremism Together: Places of Worship* (2005), which was published a few months after the London bombings. The report concluded that if public places of worship were closed, then “other places to which extremists may move could be harder to monitor than a place of worship.” The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) objected to the Home Office’s report, and insisted that terrorists do not work within public mosques, but rather, must be working outside of the mosque in private homes\(^{17}\). Moreover, one respondent to the Home Office report demonstrated prevailing public attitudes about terrorism and the mosque: “It is clearly obvious that religious events in Places of Worship can easily be hijacked by evil anti-democratic forces. It is equally obvious that we will find it difficult to know what is going on.” The respondent’s addendum that “all religious events ought to be carried out in our national language of English” is a startling admission that identifies language differences with certain religious groups, and also with terrorism\(^{18}\).

The MCB released a working paper titled *Voices from the Minaret* in May 2006 detailing the problems facing mosques since the London bombings. It notes many of the issues we have raised thus far about its Muslim population, especially in terms of accessibility to places to accommodate women and the linguistic variety of the community. According to the MCB, the “back-door” mosque is a place where Muslims could be “indoctrinated by a sub-culture outside of the mosque,” thereby cleaving the government-authorized mosque from that of the uninstitutionalized prayer or religious community that exists, in the aforementioned case, for women or for services conducted in regional African languages. Because only 57% of mosques in the UK have facilities for women, they must find make-shift places to gather in groups. Finally, a Muslim contributor to the working paper complained that the “media portray the good Muslim as [having] no beard and well spoken. And [the] bad Muslim as [having a] beard and bad English.”

We have seen this stereotype in Spain with respect to non-Spanish speakers within the Muslim and immigrant populations. The stereotype is a form of cultural control that demands conformity of Muslims living in the western world. The image of the “bad Muslim”
is more than a representation of the anti-
democratic immigrant; he also has a beard and
speaks Arabic or another non-western language.
The use of physical and linguistic characteristics
to stereotype religious practices was also a
factor in controlling the mudéjar and morisco
populations of Spain. In 1535, moriscos of
Magacela (Badajoz) were ordered not to speak
nor teach Arabic to their children. They were
also forced to shave their beards19. Other
stereotyped characteristics of moriscos included
laziness and unemployment, the latter of which
describes frequently the groups of immigrants
who meet in plazas looking for work. In 16th
Century Granada, the Inquisition arrested a man
for wearing silk (which moriscos could no longer do) and for not working. As a result of
these offences, he was charged with secretly
worshiping Allah20.

The language we have seen thus far has
contributed to a lexicon with which Muslims
have historically been represented in Spain and
throughout the western world. However, much
generic language is used to describe Islamic
space, such that mezquita is a less-commonly
encountered term in the 16th Century, as are
related terms for Islamic architecture and
culture, including “madrasa,” “minaret,” and
“Muslim.” As a result, the historiography for
Spanish Islam is difficult to access, because
madrasas are referred to as schools and mosques
were converted to churches and are referred to
as such. This poses a problem for historians who
always have to read between the lines of
manuscript resources in order to extract
references to hidden and authorised mosques
and madrasas21.

This generic language erases unique cultural
representations, especially when compared to
specific language describing Catholic space. In
the Registry of Religious Entities, there are
more than 1037 iglesias or churches, while only
eleven instances employ mezquita in the same
way as Catholics use iglesia in the official name
of the religious entity. Muslim places of worship
are more commonly referred to using comunidad, centro or asociación. The term comunidad appears in the Registry 631 times;
many of these references are habilitadas or
make-shift mosques, or describe places of
worship that include madrasas. Some of the
comunidades refer to Jewish, Hindi, and
Evangelical (Protestant) places of worship,
which suggests that comunidad in relation to
religious space indicates a non-Catholic space
with a high incidence for Islamic space. The
term has historically been used to refer to groups
of Muslims and Jews in Spain, which is the case
in the 1484 Ordenanzas reales22. After the
comunero revolts in the early 16th Century, the
term became synonymous with difference and
revolt. Sebastian de Covarrubias Orozco, in his
Tesoro de la lengua Castellana (1611) provides
only one definition for the term comunidad:
“Comunidades, los levantamientos de Pueblos,
que al fin como no tienen cabeça ni fundamento
se pierden.” Not surprisingly, we find the term
used frequently to describe non-Catholic forms
of religious space in many documents dating
from the 17th Century. With the moriscos
expelled between 1609-1614, the focus was then
turned on the reformist “Comunidades de
presbíteros” throughout northern Spain that were
expelled along with all Protestants in the
1620s23.
Generic language not only undermines unique cultural expressions, but also, it whitewashes historical documents in the case of 16th Century Spain, and minimizes the presence of Islam in the Registry of Religious Entities. As a form of control, generic language silences cultural differences and, in representation, prevents these differences from realising integration into the dominant culture. Therefore, the Spanish mosque will continue to be an inaccessible, private space to the general population of Spain as it was in the 16th Century.

CONCLUSIONS

This study attempts to break into the issue of the hidden mosque and the representation of Muslim worshipping practices today in Spain in light of 16th-Century representations of Islam in Spain. We have focused on key primary statistical resources for both periods in an effort to demonstrate the disproportionate information collection and circulation practices that tend to favour Catholicism and democracy while stigmatizing Islam and immigration. We have also identified mechanisms of cultural control exercised upon Muslims in the form of representational strategies that include how Muslims should appear, speak and worship in order to avoid becoming associated with terrorism and undemocratic practices. The “good Muslim” and the “bad Muslim” occupy distinct spaces of worship in the western mentalities of Spain and the United Kingdom. When these representations become ensnared in definitions and applications for democracy and democratic process (as we saw in the American poster of Zapatero), a polemic emerges that is suffocating to the Muslims who try to live within the western world.

How democratic countries such as France, Britain, the United States and Canada have purposely and inadvertently subverted Islam by associating terrorism and other social issues with Islamic religious space is a question that we have not addressed here, and much work needs to be done on this question. If Spain is any indication, there are roots beneath the barriers that marginalize access to religious freedoms for Muslims. These roots grow out of the polemical relationship the western world had with Islam during the period of Catholic control throughout much of Europe, which is ameliorated by contemporary relationships with Islam. The same control mechanisms are used today in Democratic Spain as they were in 16th Century Catholic Spain. For Muslims of both periods, this control facilitates a climate of dictatorship. We have shown that the Muslim communities of the UK and Spain adapted to the preferences and agendas of the dominant democratic or Catholic culture, respectively, in order to avoid the penalties levied by laws, media coverage, public opinion and the ensuing feedback loop that they form.

NOTES

1. A famous example of this behaviour is Rosalind Williams Lecraft v. Spain, filed September 11th, 2006 before the United Nations Humans Rights Committee for racial profiling by Spanish police. Rosalind was not an immigrant from Africa, but this case nonetheless demonstrates widespread racial profiling in Spain.
6. In any given survey, the profession of Catholic faith varies from 60-90%, where the next largest category of faith is “atheist.” For our purposes, see Centro de investigaciones sociológicas. Actitudes y creencias religiosas, CIS 2443. January 2002, questions 22, 24 and 24a.
11. Moreno Olmedo, María Angustias, Catálogo del Archivo histórico de la Alhambra. Granada, Publicaciones del Patronato de la Alhambra y

12 In July of 1517, and February of 1524, properties provided to the Muslims by the Catholic administration were ordered to pay for the salaries of two men whose posts were “para doctrinar moriscos en las Alpujarras.” In Moreno Olmedo, María Angustias, Catálogo del Archivo histórico de la Alhambra. op. cit. #166, L-58-12.

13 Unless otherwise noted, all 16th Century census data proceeds from the manuscript reproductions by González, Tomás, Censo de población de las provincias y partidos de la Corona de Castilla en el Siglo XVII. Madrid, Imprenta Real, 1829 (unpaginated).


16 Ibid., 81.


19 Archivo General de Simancas. Consejo Real de Castilla. CRC 60.13.


21 An example of this can be found in Navarro Pedreño, César, “De la Murcia musulmana a la Murcia cristiana”. Revista ArqueoMurcia, vol. 2 (2004), 46 pages: 30.

22 Díaz de Montalvo, Alfonso, Ordenanzas reales, Book IV. 1484, Law XVII.

23 An example of this can be found in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón. Agramunt. Leg. # 1 and #2; and Prats de Rei. Leg. #1 and #2, and Vol. #4 and #5.