MUSLIM-STATE RELATIONS IN EAST AFRICA UNDER CONDITIONS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OR ONE-PARTY DICTATORSHIPS

Abdin Chande
Adelphi University, United States. E-mail: chande@adelphi.edu


Abstract: This paper examines how Muslims in East Africa have been alternately peripheralized, coopted and even on one occasion favored in the politics of military or one-party dictatorships. In response to the regional or ethnically-based politics of the post-colonial period, Muslim groups have devised strategies to promote their communities’ goals or interests either within or outside officially sanctioned organizational circles. These strategies have ranged from seeking accommodation with governing parties, positioning themselves as pressure groups articulating the interests and grievances of their religious constituencies to, on rare occasions, resorting to outright armed opposition against the government.

Keywords: Colonialism, education, ethnicity, Islam, Muslim organizations, politics.

INTRODUCTION

The role of religion in post-colonial East African societies has been one of the contentious issues inherited from the colonial past, especially in the light of concerns over political stability, one-party and military dictatorships, human rights, democracy and socio-economic justice. This paper focuses on some aspects of the relations between religion and one-party and military dictatorships in the three respective countries.

The first section of this paper will examine the growing Muslim critique of authoritarian rule in Kenya, especially of Moi’s one-party rule with its record of corruption and widespread human rights abuses. The Moi regime alienated Muslims who were marginalized by his politics of privileging both ethnicity (as Kenyatta too had done) and religion (Christianity as Moi increasingly did). Muslims expressed communal and regional frustrations at post-colonial politics that have favored up-country Africans, first the Kikuyu (under Kenyatta) and later Kalenjin (under Moi) ethnic groups. The policies of these two rulers promoted increasing social inequalities in the country.

The second section will investigate the “Nubi” rule of Idi Amin which unleashed a reign of terror in Uganda, partly in response to the perceived threat by the Ugandan exiles (Obote’s Langi and Acholi ex-soldiers) in Tanzania, with the tacit approval of the Nyerere regime. This was a unique period in Uganda’s history in which Islam was favored for the first time and in a country where Muslims were a minority (between 12 and 16 percent). Amin realized that he could not maintain his political grip on the country by falling back on the narrow support basis of his small ethnic group, the Kakwa, made up of both Muslims and Christians. He also could not rely entirely on the “Nubi” factor, a non-ethnic category, and slightly broader embracing anyone who is a Muslim from the northwestern part of Uganda who spoke the language of Kinubi and shared in the Nubi culture. He needed a much broader political legitimacy than that offered by the narrow-based Kakwa and Nubi identities; for this, he increasingly turned to Islam, especially in the latter part of his rule (1971-79), to court Arab/Islamic financial backers for his cash-strapped regime. It should be remembered that Amin had alienated his earlier Western supporters (Britain in particular) and had rid the country of its Asian financial/commercial elite.

The fall of the Idi Amin regime and the establishment of the Obote II rule (plagued by massive guerrilla activities in southern and
western part of the country) and later the triumphant seizure of power by Museveni’s NRM (National Resistance Movement) had their initial negative repercussions on the local Muslim community. One consequence was that some Muslims (although their number was small) took up arms in opposition to the Museveni regime.

The third section focuses on how Islam and Muslims fared during the period of Ujamaa or one-party socialism in Tanzania. This was the era when Nyerere’s Ujamaa regime attempted to coopt all groups (Muslim ones included) to its socialist agenda and intervened actively to shape institutions of civil society within its socialist national narrative. While Tanzania’s political culture, as embodied in the Ujamaa ideology in the era of socialism and one-party politics -mid-1960s to mid-1980s- aimed at changing conditions that promoted inequality in the country, nonetheless, even there regional disparities and economic and political advantages that have disproportionately favored products of Christian mission education (the basis for elite formation) became contentious issues among some Muslim groups.

1. SHIFT IN POWER FROM COASTAL TO HINTERLAND KENYA

East African Muslims were once wielders of power on the Indian Ocean coast, many centuries before the era of the European Scramble for African territories. It was, however, the process of European colonization, moving from the coast to the interior, that shifted the balance of power in favour of the hinterland ethnic groups. It was among the followers of African ancestral/traditional religions that the European Christian missionaries, with the introduction of Christian Mission schools, had the most success in evangelizing the local populations. Education in these schools (far more numerous than government ones) became the basis for elite recruitment both in the colonial and post-colonial periods. By the 1960s, the decade when many African colonies obtained their independence, the Muslims of Kenya found themselves at a disadvantage as most high positions in government fell to non-Muslims educated in up-country Christian mission schools. Fearing their unfair treatment by the dominant ethnic groups, some coastal Muslims even launched the Mwambao movement to agitate for autonomy, though other Muslims, including most in up-country areas, joined the dominant African political parties such as KANU and KADU in the struggle for political freedom.

Muslim efforts in the post-colonial period focused both on promoting a stricter form of Islam, in opposition to the popular local version within the community, and on achieving educational modernization for their youth to prepare them for the competitive job market. A disproportionate number of Christian mission schools having been established in the interior of the country, coupled with the fact that economic development during the colonial period hinged on the prime farming lands (the so-called “white highlands” of upland Kenya where the capital, Nairobi, was established) which African Christians inherited after independence, has meant that the Muslim community exists in the shadow of the dominant Christian population. This fact explains to some extent why Muslims not just in Kenya but in many other countries of sub-Saharan Africa tend to be the least culturally Westernized (partly a function of exposure to Western, including Christian mission, type schools).

The failure of coastal Muslims to introduce their faith into the interior until the period from the second half of the 19th century onwards meant that Islam (like Christianity) was a newcomer in the region, but (unlike Christian missions) lacked the backing of a major sponsoring power. Furthermore, unlike the case in Tanganyika, there was no development of major caravan routes from the coast to the interior to facilitate the spread of Islam, certainly no significant Swahili middlemen to play the role of intermediaries for the colonial administration in the interior as coastal Swahili did for the Germans, and finally no major Sufi brotherhoods such as the Qadiriyya to entrench Islam and to popularize or indigenize it. Worse, with economic development and the locus of political power being centered in the interior of the country, even the management of the coastal economy, and especially that of Mombasa, came under the direction of non-Muslims. In fact, by the end of the 1960s the relatively more educated up-country Africans who had flocked to the coast to take up employment there made up about half, if not more, of Mombasa’s population.
2. ISLAM, POLITICS AND LAW IN MOI’S ONE-PARTY RULE

It has been difficult to separate religion and politics, especially in newly independent states such as Kenya, where the State seeks to monopolize legitimate authority and to exercise it without tolerating any competitors or challengers from any quarters. The political leadership in East Africa as well as other parts of Africa has discouraged criticism or any open discussion of public policy on the part of religious figures or organizations, even as it has sought to coopt them to the State’s political agendas, especially during the period of the one-party/military dictatorship. As far as these organizations were concerned, however, who else was going to speak for their disadvantaged communities in countries where there were growing social inequalities, falling standards of living, and increasing arbitrariness of the State—which has in some cases exacerbated conditions of ethnic tensions and inter-ethnic/communal violence,—if not members of civil society? Specific leaders such as Daniel Arap Moi (a Christian) and Idi Amin (a Muslim), in fact, made a big deal about their religions and were often seen in church or mosque, even as they flouted the teachings of their respective religions in their inhumane dealings and mistreatment of their fellow countrymen. For both any criticism or hard-headed evaluation of their policies was interpreted as a sign of disloyalty.

The attempted bureaucratization of Muslim communities in East Africa through the formation of national associations such as SUPKEM (Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims), BAKWATA (Baraza Kuu La Waislamu wa Tanzania) and the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) is an attempt on the part of politicians and Muslim leaders to mobilize Muslims to protect and to advance their interests in a single centralized body in the absence of institutions similar to those of the Catholics or the Anglicans. Sunni Islam lacks a hierarchical organization such as that of the church through which the ruling elite might try to contact a leading religious figure who speaks on behalf of the whole community. As a result, not just politicians, but Muslims themselves, have sought to create such a centralized body to channel their energies and efforts in the realization of their goals. For their part, the political leaders (with their own political agendas in mind) have supported the creation of such organizations through which they hoped to exercise social control.

While the creation of a corporate identity (through the establishment of SUPKEM in 1973 in the case of Kenya) supposedly will assist to channel social influence, lobby for legalization of Islamic law, promote Muslim educational facilities and so on, nevertheless, institutionalization (i.e., bureaucratization) brings its own problems. While it provides an opportunity for political leaders to control the Muslim leadership, it also fosters the growth of oppositional groups that will challenge the central Muslim leadership for not representing their interests or their radical activist orientation. Some Muslim groups have, in fact, viewed SUPKEM as an instrument to manage the State’s domination of the Muslim community. This means that monolithic control is not possible owing to the fact that (as the example below will indicate) religious authority in Islam is more diffused than it is in Christianity.

In the early 1980s SUPKEM was placed in a difficult situation during the Succession (Inheritance) law crisis by being strongly criticized by other more outspoken Muslims/groups for not being able to take a firm stand on behalf of the Muslim community. The larger context within which to understand this controversy was the intense Muslim pressure during the colonial period that had successfully resulted in the establishment of Muslim religious (Kadhi) courts, and in entrenching them in the 1963 constitution of Kenya. It should be noted that during the late colonial period the coastal strip of Kenya theoretically belonged to the Sultan, but in practice was administered by the British. Therefore, despite the opposition of British missionaries, in order to accommodate the needs of the different faith communities the colonial governments in East Africa took care to recognize Islamic and African customary laws. Ultimately, however, the British common law, which had been influenced by Christianity, was made supreme over both. Later after independence African political leaders (themselves products of Christian missionary schools) revisited these laws with the intention of harmonizing them into uniform laws applicable to everyone. This was resisted by Muslims who objected to Western/Christian values being imposed on them. The Kenyan government’s intentions in 1982, when it drafted the Law of succession
Muslim-State Relations

Act, was to unify all family laws among the different communities into a single code applicable to all people. Muslim opposition was immediate as they saw the proposed law as contravening their religious beliefs. They pointed out that they would not be bound to obey it. Nevertheless, through concerted efforts and much lobbying, Kenyan Muslims, whose Kadhi courts had been enshrined in and protected by the constitution, managed to be exempted from the proposed reforms.

3. MUSLIM-STATE ENCOUNTERS IN KENYA

Turning to the arena of politics, Muslim-State relations in Kenya were cordial under President Kenyatta despite his Kikuyu-centric policies as expressed in distribution of positions of power, access to foreign aid, resettlement plans and other economic opportunities and privileges that favored his kinsmen. President Moi made matters worse when he privileged both ethnicity (Kalenjin) and religion (Christianity). Muslim disaffection got worse when Moi’s increasingly autocratic government continued to politically marginalize them. This became more apparent during the period of worsening political and economic situation in the country. In a political system plagued by patronage and ethnic lobbying, Muslim politicians (Moi loyalists) accomplished little in terms of promoting the interests of Muslim masses. This situation led some Muslims, especially young preachers, to become active on behalf of their community by relating their sermons to the issues of the day. A noted feature of this era was the rising Muslim political consciousness.

A number of factors contributed to this rise in Muslim activism in the period between the mid-1970s and the present. These include the growth of global Muslim networks that have expanded as well as promoted opportunities for higher Islamic education in the Muslim World. This has led to the rise of a new group of ulama (religious scholars), locally or foreign trained, with a more pan-Islamic or global outlook to Islam. The process of Muslim activism was further facilitated by the growth of the number of Muslim graduates of secular education at the country’s four local universities. Like other Kenyans, these Muslim youths have become a bit disillusioned by the performance of their post-colonial national State. One last factor worth mentioning is the world-wide impact of and heightened awareness created (at least initially) by the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran. This led Muslims to become more assertive in this atmosphere of growing Muslim political awareness.

By January 1992 this growing Muslim self-confidence inspired young educated Muslims to establish the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK). Shaykh Khalid Balala, a university of Madina graduate and self employed businessman, emerged as the leader of the movement. His main supporters were mainly the disenchanted Muslim youths of the coast province based in the old port city of Mombasa. Quite expectedly, IPK’s creation was greeted with hostility by the Moi government that feared that the party might erode Kanu (the ruling party’s) support in Muslim areas. He was, therefore, quick to condemn it as a fundamentalist group to be avoided by Muslims. But this failed to address the fact that the appearance of IPK represented a break with Moi’s divisive top-down “Nyayo” politics, designed supposedly to promote the politics of “peace, love and unity.” For coastal Muslims Nyayo politics was associated with Muslim MPs who were thought to have enriched themselves in return for supporting the Moi government. IPK was successful in capitalizing on the general feeling of alienation on the part of coastal Muslims, though the government moved quickly to deny it official recognition (on the grounds that it was a religiously based organization despite having a secular constitution). Tensions ran high in Mombasa and eventually erupted into a two-day rampage on May 19 and 20 1992. This was followed by the arrest of some Muslim preachers at a public rally. That action in turn ignited a two-day riot (cries of “Allahu Akbar” could be heard in the city) in which four Muslims were reported shot dead by the Kenyan police. Further riots followed in Mombasa in September 1992 and in Lamu in August and September 1993.

Clearly coastal Muslim alienation from the political process was reflected in a growing Muslim (and other civil groups’) critique of authoritarian corrupt rule of Moi’s one party-rule. Opponents of the regime blamed it for mismanaging the economy that stagnated by the end of the 1980s, for endemic corruption and nepotism in favour of certain ethnic groups, for promoting inter-ethnic tensions, as well as for contributing to the appalling human rights record (with opponents being detained, exiled, tortured and in some cases even killed or found
to have died in mysterious circumstances). Like other post-colonial African nationalist governments, the Moi government was seen as predatory of its population, and it had failed to promote equality of opportunity for all ethnic, religious and social groups.

Muslim grievances in Kenya focused on such issues as: low representation in public institutions and government ministries; lack of even a single university on the coast - all the public universities in post-independent Kenya were established in the interior, including Moi University in Eldoret; - up-country African Christians from certain ethnic groups being given the lion’s share of jobs and profits from tourism and hotels on the coast; and lack of developmental projects (apart from those centered on tourism)\(^1\). Shaykh Balala’s impassioned speeches to Muslim crowds in Mombasa made their case with reference to these concerns that those with political power had failed to address.

Following the arrest of Sheikh Balala and a one-day strike that paralyzed Mombasa, SUPKEM, the official Muslim national organization, led a Muslim delegation which called upon President Moi to pledge support to the President and distance himself from IPK. Clearly the riots had pushed IPK to prominence and led like-minded Muslims to speak out on behalf of their community in opposition to SUPKEM. Even Ali Mazrui, who was in Kenya at the time, was denied permission to give a public lecture on the situation, as he too (a native of Mombasa) agreed that the Muslim faced discrimination in Kenya. To make matters worse, Moi had a hand in the formation of an association known as the United Muslims of Africa (UMA headed by Masumbuko). This was a clear attempt to divide coastal Muslims along ethnic lines by suggesting that UMA was a party for “Africans” and IPK for “Arabs.”

As Kenya made its slow torturous journey of transition from one-party dictatorship to multi-party ethnically-based factional politics, Moi was able to outmanouvre his opponents by subverting the electoral process to his advantage. He was aware, for instance, that the two rival and most numerically significant ethnic groups in the country, the Kikuyu and Luo, would not vote as a bloc for each others’ candidates. Accordingly, his policy of divide and rule effectively built a coalition of support among the smaller ethnic groups as a way of countering the two largest ones. This policy not only made IPK an unimportant player in the 1997 elections – it performed poorly even when it aligned itself with opposition parties-, but the major parties themselves, plagued by ethnic rivalries, were also unable to forge a united front to successfully challenge Moi’s KANU. It was only in 2002 that Moi was forced to step down as President, as the constitution (reflected in the new rules of the political game as they had been drawn up in a multi-party environment) did not allow him to run for another term of office. Nevertheless, he managed to leave behind such a horrendous legacy of an ethnically and regionally divided nation that its outcome was seen in the December 27, 2007 elections in Kenya, in which his successor, president Kibaki (a Kikuyu, like Kenyatta), is thought to have lost the election to Odinga (a Luo, the main rival group to the Kikuyu). The outcome of this disputed election was the eruption of violence and the expression of what some in the media have described as instances of “ethnic cleansing.” In any case, the coastal Muslims had voted overwhelmingly for Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) - as did many Kenyans from different regions of the country-, which had promised to deal fairly with Muslims and to provide them with representation and a voice in the government.

One final note here on the Muslim situation in Kenya has to do with the tragic episode of the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1997, as well as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. in 2001, all of which took place during the Moi Presidency. These tragic events in East Africa complicated matters for Muslims, particularly those of the coastal region of Kenya who complained of Muslim profiling and harassment by law enforcement agents. Even prior to these events coastal Muslims had complained for years about being treated as strangers, as there was a tendency in Kenya of assimilating/associating Muslim with Arab on the coast.

4. RELIGIO-POLITICAL COMPETITION IN UGANDA’S HISTORY

In Uganda, right from the earliest times relations between religions have been far more difficult, even belligerent, than they have been in Kenya and Tanzania. The long history of Islam on the East African coast, for instance, in Kenya partly explains the willingness on the part of the British colonial administration to accommodate
Muslims by allowing a system of parallel courts, with Muslim Kadhi courts being recognized by law. In contrast in Uganda a single court system was introduced after Christian forces triumphed over Muslim ones in on-going religious struggles. Although Islam first reached Uganda in 1840, three and a half decades earlier than Christianity, it lost out to Christianity, which arrived under the sponsorship of the British. As a result, the Christian missions came to wield far more power and influence in Uganda than they did in Kenya and Tanzania.

In the bitter rivalries and religious struggles that mark Uganda’s political history in the southern part of the country known as Buganda (in which the Imperial British East Africa Company took the side of their religious compatriots), the Anglican Protestants emerged victorious after first defeating Muslims in 1889-1890, then Catholics in 1892 and Muslims again in 1893. The 1900 Uganda Agreement further validated this religio-political victory with allocation of lands to Christian missions (Muslims received none) and enshrining Christian religion as the basis of secular law, with Muslims being left alienated, despised and embittered.

Clearly religion in Uganda was so highly politicized that economic status became a function of religious affiliation. Thus the Protestants/Anglicans became the most privileged, receiving the most land, getting a head start in education, and landing the best jobs in the colonial administration. If the Catholics felt neglected - at least they had their schools and health clinics and worked hard to expand them-, the situation was even worse for Muslims who, during the era of independence, found themselves unable to influence legislation to their advantage. The best they could do was to align themselves with the politically dominant Protestants against their Catholic rivals, hoping for some advantages. In fact, in 1956 (about six years before the attainment of independence) Catholics formed the Democratic Party (DP) to address their economic and political issues. Muslims had no party of their own and were actively courted by the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC, the party of Protestants outside Buganda), which was able to form a government at the time of independence with what would be a temporary alliance of convenience with the support of Kabaka Yekka (KY, the “King Only” party of Protestants in Buganda). The KY party also had its Muslim supporters within Buganda since one of the Muslim leaders, Prince Badru Kakungulu, was the uncle of Kabaka/King Mutesa II.

5. ISLAM AND POLITICS IN UGANDA: OBOTE AND NAAM

The pitfalls that have bedevilled the Ugandan Muslim community as reflected in its leadership struggles partly mirror larger political struggles within the country and partly reveal factional competition in the absence of a hierarchically organized church-like organization with clear lines of authority from the center to the local (mosque) level. As a result, local mosques throughout the country are not beholden to a central or national “mosque” headquarters based, say, in Kampala, but are autonomous units dependent on local Muslims for support to stay financially afloat. Lack of this central organization meant that it was easier therefore for politicians to take advantage of this situation to create or exacerbate divisions within the Muslim community.

The Obote regime did just that by supporting one section of the Muslim community (with many supporters outside Buganda) against another led by Prince Kakungulu who had ties to the Buganda royal family. The government-supported group came to be known as NAAM (National Association for the Advancement of Muslims), which was established in the mid-1960s with the tacit involvement of a Muslim minister in Obote’s cabinet who also happened to be his cousin, Alhaj Adoko Nekyon. Obote’s ruling party (UPC) supported NAAM in its protracted struggles against the newly-formed Prince Kakungulu’s Uganda Muslim Community (UMC) to control mosques across the country. NAAM’s main mosque was located in Wandegeya, Kampala, while UMC’s central mosque was based in Kibuli, a different part of the city. The political significance of NAAM was its emergence as an official unit of the UPC government, which had cultivated it as a Muslim support base for the party. NAAM’s rivals or opponents (supporters of UMC and predominantly Baganda, who detested Obote for his mistreatment of Baganda, including exiling their king) were subjected to detentions on certain occasions. In fact, Prince Badru Kakungulu was himself arrested in October 1970 at the height of Obote’s one-party dictatorship.
6. ISLAM: FROM PERIPHERAL TO
OFFICIAL RELIGION IN ONE-PARTY
AND MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS

Idi Amin, head of the armed forces and initially an Obote ally, behaved like all other Muslim officials during the rule of Obote by becoming a member of NAAM. Nevertheless, as a sign of the growing rift between him and Obote that had emerged by 1970, Amin began to patronize Badru Kakungulu’s mosque in Kibuli, thus indicating his support for UMC. On one occasion, following prayers at this mosque, he also made the statement (clearly meant for Obote) that he feared no one but God. Clearly Amin had not suddenly politicized religion, since the history of the country from colonial to post-colonial periods was filled with instances of the intertwining of religion and politics.

After all, was not the DP mainly for Catholics, Obote’s UPC for Protestants outside Buganda, and KY for Protestants in Buganda? Moreover, had Obote not himself mixed religion and politics by supporting NAAM, whose creation by Obote’s cousin had the purpose of cultivating a Muslim support base for the party both inside and especially outside Buganda?

In 1971 the Obote government was overthrown by Idi Amin, who became instrumental in mediating between the two Muslim factions by creating a single national Muslim association, known as the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC), to replace the two factionally-based organizations. Shaykh Matovu was appointed the Mufti of Uganda and Shaykh Mulumba, formerly a member of rival Muslim group UMC (Uganda Muslim Community), became his deputy. Amin also provided the Muslim community with land around the Old Kampala Hill (since none had been allocated to them by the 1900 Uganda Agreement) on which to build their headquarters.

Once in power, Amin could not rely entirely on his numerically small Kakwa ethnic group (which included both Muslims and non-Muslims) to stay in power. He had to widen his primary base of support by falling back on the “Nubi” identity, far more inclusive and expansive enough to absorb new groups. Thus the “Nubi” provided the core political geography of Idi Amin’s army, which included Muslim Kakwa, Madi, Alur, Lugbara and other West Nilers. But first, who were these Nubi and where did they come from?

7. THE “NUBI” FACTOR IN AMIN’S REGIME

The origin of the Ugandan Nubi goes back to a small number of rural southern Sudanese migrants who (in the second half of the nineteenth century) first served in mercenary roles which became the basis for their subsequent recruitment in the colonial army. This initial migrant status (as scholars have noted) has created a sense of openness and ethnic ambiguity. The Nubi, however, cannot be considered to be an ethnic group, despite speaking the language of Kinubi. The latter is a variant dialect/colloquial Sudanese trade Arabic interspersed with words from the local Nilotic languages. They are associated with garrison towns in the south of the country where the language developed. They share certain cultural traits, expressed in dress, food, way of life, distinct community features that set them apart from others, and a connection with Islam.

The criteria employed to determine their ethnic status fail as there is no territory or homeland associated with them. On the contrary, Nubi communities exist as enclaves in different parts of the country, from West Nile in northwestern Uganda to eastern and southern parts of the country. Second, quite apart from their military connection which goes back to colonial times, their strong association with Islam is what provides them with a strong religious consciousness and an identity rooted in this religion. They are thus above everything else Muslims. Finally, the Nubi, as the late Omari Kokole (himself a Ugandan Nubi) put it, are an open community or even a “Muslim club” whose membership extends to those who meet certain religious and cultural criteria (which includes speaking the language of Kinubi).

As a consequence, the Nubi are known for their long tradition of military service in independent Uganda, although given their small numbers (relative to most ethnic groups in Uganda) they continued to be a marginal and minority group within the wider ethnic landscape of Uganda. Nevertheless, their fortunes changed in 1971 when a kinsman, Idi Amin, seized power in a military coup. Idi Amin came from the West Nile District, a long neglected area of the country where the earliest descendants of Ugandan Nubi had been stationed in military garrisons. This and the fact that he was ethnically a Kakwa, a speaker of Kinubi, a professional soldier all his life, and a Muslim,
made him meet all the criteria for being a Nubi in Uganda. But how was Amin going to keep this military alliance (primarily of Nubi, but also including some non-Muslim West Nilers) and provide incentives for it to stay loyal? The solution was provided by evicting Asians (people of Indian and Pakistani origins whose presence goes back to the era of European colonialism) in 1972 - Amin did not care that among them were fellow Muslims, and by redistributing their property among his soldiers. The Nubi had for the first time gained political power and their community had been thrust to the forefront of the army’s distributary system with relation to access to business (especially that of expelled Asians) and trade. There were now privileges and opportunities that accrued to being Nubi. This began the process of Nubianization on the part of some Ugandans who sought social mobility through becoming Muslim, adopting the language of Kinubi. Moreover, the process of incorporating different ethnic groups in the West Nile District into the Nubi identity, especially if they had military connections, was encouraged. Finally, as Amin’s rule progressed (particularly after he had purged the army of Acholis and Langis, former President Obote’s ethnic group, considered by him as rivals for the control of the army), his power base in the army eventually shrank to a group of Nubi/Kakwa Muslims and mercenary recruits from his kindred Bari-speakers, part of the Anya Nya movement in southern Sudan. This meant that former allies from his home district of West Nile (that is, non-Muslim Lugbara, Madi, Alur, and others) now became enemies and were persecuted. Thus there was no group that was safe from Amin’s widening circle of terror, especially as his regime became more and more isolated.

In absence of functioning political parties or opposition groups of any kind during the Amin era - even his ministries struggled to establish coherence to his erratic and ever changing policy directives-, Amin, in fact, ruled the country from a number of military barracks scattered throughout the country. His military commanders functioned as the coercive arm of the government. Finally, the Amin government established other coercive units with such fancy names as the State Research Bureau and Public Safety Unit (in addition to the military police), with the purpose of conducting interrogations, tortures and executions. As he tightened his political grip on the country, he unleashed a reign of terror in which killings (which included those of Acholi and Langi soldiers), disappearance of opponents and other widespread human-rights abuses became the order of the day. No one dared to criticize him or his oppressive policies. Those who did paid a high price (for instance, the Acholi archbishop Luwum of the Church of Uganda). Even fellow Muslims were not immune from the punishment of death if they dared to criticize him or if they were perceived to be critics of his regime. For instance, brigadier Hussein (himself a Nubi), considered an Obote loyalist, was killed quite

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8. ISLAM DURING THE AMIN PERIOD

How did the majority of the Muslims in the rest of the country (who were non-Nubi) receive the Amin regime? Did they associate with it or shun it? For starters, it was not possible for all Ugandan Muslims to become Nubi even if they wanted to and, in fact, this did not happen. While it was the Nubi who gained the lion’s share of economic benefits in the country, other Muslims belonging to different ethnic groups also gained advantages stemming from their membership in the wider Muslim/Umma community. The attention the previously neglected Muslim community began to receive from Idi Amin came with risks of perceived close association with an unpopular regime, especially as he courted Saudi Arabian and Libyan economic assistance to make up for what was lost when political relations with Britain soured. Within a short period of time, the businesses of evicted Asians had been run into the ground, as the country became plagued with shortages, unmaintained machinery, lack of spare parts and in general a declining economy, which meant that this association was a mixed blessing for them. Some did benefit though, as the system of rewards in Amin’s Uganda first and foremost was directed toward the Kakwa/Nubi, who became a sort of ruling elite. Second, Muslims who had relatives in the army (with its distributary system) had access to business opportunities and did also benefit. Third, as Amin’s military regime increasingly associated itself with Muslims, particularly during its pursuit of pro-Arab foreign policy (which brought some economic dividends), he took some impulsive courses of action. This included, for instance, making Islam (with a 12-16 percent share of the population) the official religion of the country during a conference he attended in Lahore, Pakistan in 1974.
early in the era of Amin’s rule. Shaaban Nkutu, a former minister in the Obote government, was also believed to have been killed for a similar reason. Even Ali Mazrui (arguably the most well known professor at Makerere university in Kampala at the time) had to tread carefully when voicing his opinions in his public lectures/speeches on the situation in the country. In a strategy devised to reduce the number of unnecessary killings in the country, Mazrui, for instance, attempted to make a subtle argument to convince Amin that the Acholi and the Langi were, in fact, two totally different ethnic groups. The strategy failed to halt the killing of either group. As the Amin regime became increasingly erratic, Mazrui himself was forced to flee the country when he felt his life was in danger. Many of Amin’s own ministers had to flee the country if they thought their lives were in danger, or in order to speak out against the killings and human rights abuses without fearing reprisals. One such minister was H. Kyemba, who wrote a book appropriately entitled *A State of Blood: the Inside Story of Idi Amin*.

In the light of the above, no religious leader in the Muslim community was willing to take the risk of crossing Idi Amin. In fact, their relationship with him was cordial as well as opportunistic. They were, of course, thankful to him for ending their squabbles by establishing a central organization, the UMSC, that unified leadership of the two main Muslim antagonistic camps under one umbrella organization. Moreover, he had provided this Muslim Supreme Council with financial assets, including some lands and property that belonged to the evicted Asians. Furthermore, he had set up the system of Kadhiship (Muslim consultants, not judges, and certainly not paid by the government as they are in Kenya) for different parts of the country, although they had more of an advisory role than anything else. More significantly, even if only symbolic, the Constitution of Uganda, drafted during the Museveni era, empowered the Parliament (clause 1(d) of article 129) to establish Kadhis’ Courts for marriage, divorce, inheritance of property and guardianship, as might be prescribed by Parliament, though currently these do not exist. That such a course was even contemplated is a testimony of the legacy of Idi Amin. Most importantly, through Idi Amin’s pursuit of a pro-Arab foreign policy Ugandan Muslims became beneficiaries of Islamic education at foreign universities and especially the Islamic University of Madina in Saudi Arabia. The graduates of this Saudi education became the torch bearers of a new wave of Islam that has impacted the country in the 1980s and 1990s and introduced the controversy over “true” Islam versus syncretic Islam33.

Idi Amin also made Uganda a member of the Jeddah-based Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), a move that was later challenged by Christian groups in the post-Amin period. Nevertheless, the Museveni government (which has pursued a policy of national reconciliation) has maintained this membership in the hope of gaining certain economic benefits from rich oil-producing Muslim countries. This has included the establishment in 1988 of the Islamic University of Mbale (funded by OIC) and other investment projects by Libya. Among them, the Tropical Bank, fruit processing (DAWDA), textiles (Tri-star), National Housing Corporation, Uganda Telecom, hotels like Victoria Hotel in Entebbe and a coffee processing plant34.

9. ISLAM AFTER THE FALL OF AMIN

In the aftermath of the fall of the Idi Amin regime in 1979 following the invasion of the country by Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan Acholi/Langi and other exiles, many Kakwa/Nubi, blamed for the atrocities of the Amin era, fled the country for fear of retaliation. Some Nubi lost their lives or their properties, which were destroyed by neighbours or angry mobs. Some of the worst anti-Muslim backlash took place in Western Uganda, where the Muslims of Bushenyi were killed by a mob of attackers (as it is claimed), either at the instigation or by tacit approval of the Ugandan exiles.

In Amin’s own home district of West Nile the majority of the people, suffering persecution and mistreatment by Ugandan troops who occupied the district, joined the remnants of what had constituted Amin’s Uganda National Army in exile in southern Sudan and northeast Zaire35. In this atmosphere of suspicion and revenge, all Ugandan West Nilers were labelled as Sudanese, Nubians or Anyanya (i.e. foreigners), and were collectively associated with Amin’s regime, irrespective of their political involvement or lack of it in his regime. This explains why they were neglected by UN aid agencies, as their guilt was implicitly assumed36. In fact, the demonization of the “Nubi” was justified on the basis of the concept of indigeneity and nativism,
by which they were constructed as being “foreign.” This is similarly how indigeneity defined national citizens in the case of the Hutu and Tutsi prior to the Rwandan tragedy of 1994. Accordingly, the concept of nativism (characterized by xenophobia) was at play in the public perceptions of the West Nilers in general and “Nubi” in particular as foreigners. This is the reason why at the end of the 1980s -by then the hated Obote II regime (1980-1985) was no longer in power-, when the majority of West Nile Muslims who had fled to Sudan returned, most of them favoured to use designations such as “Muslim Kakwa,” “Muslim Madi” and “Muslim Lugbara” rather than the label of “Nubi”. The Kakwa, Madi and Lugbara are recognizable Ugandan ethnic groups in the northwestern part of the country. Nubi, on the other hand, as we have already pointed out, are not an ethnic group. One further legacy of the post-Amin era -which has been described as an act of ethnosuicide by the Amin regime- was the destruction of the close association between the Nubi as a social group and their military service in the country’s armed forces. For the first time in the country’s modern history, the army was now dominated by Bantu speakers from the southern half of the country, instead of the northern Nilotic speakers.

For the rest of the Ugandan Muslims the situation was slightly different. While they too suffered (especially those who had been part of the regime) and Islam was certainly demonized, nevertheless, their victimization was not to the same degree as that of West Niler Muslims who bore the brunt of this anger. This was a clear indication that ordinary Ugandans had been able to distinguish between other Muslims and their Nubi co-religionists. Perhaps this had to do with the fact that Muslims in Uganda did not live a separate existence (the way the Nubi had done in the past) as a minority set apart from their kindred ethnic groups. This succeeded to some extent in blunting any guilt by association or animosity directed toward them by the more numerous Christian members of their ethnic groups.

The Muslim situation was relatively better under Museveni, who has attempted to woo Muslim investors to the country, including retaining Uganda’s membership in the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) and maintaining good relations with the oil producing nation of Libya. In fact, President Gaddafi of Libya was in Uganda’s capital, Kampala, on 19 March 2008, to officially open the Gaddafi National mosque, with half a dozen African heads of State in attendance. The mosque took many years to build and can accommodate up to 30,000 worshippers. Within its outside perimeter, it has space for shops for those who want to rent this property. Gaddafi National Mosque is touted to be the second largest mosque in Africa. All this is a legacy of the Amin era.

The eventual return to power by Obote in 1980 meant that the Muslim community witnessed once more the old Muslim leadership conflicts or alignments that pitted UPC/government-supported Sheikh Kamulegeya against Sheikh Mulumba of the UMC, and later Sheikh Kakoza against Sheikh Luwemba. While the NRM administration, which assumed power in 1986, also played this game of supporting one rival Muslim leader (for instance, President Museveni supported Sheikh Luwemba) against another (Museveni’s vice-President threw his weight behind Sheikh Kakoza), nonetheless, by 1993 the NRM government established a committee to attempt to get the different factions to reconcile.

By the 1990s there were new Muslim players on the stage, that is, the influential Salafi Tabligh (known locally Tabliq) movement which attracted many Muslim youth to join them. These were the products of the Saudi universities and especially the Islamic University of Madina, which had trained many students in the period from the 1970s onwards. On their return to Uganda, these students became champions of a stricter form of Islam, and started to challenge the traditional Muslim scholars’ understanding of Islam. By the early 1990s the Tabligh movement fragmented into two groups, the larger moderate one being led by Shaykh Kakeeto and the smaller and more radical one by Shaykh Mukulu, who was critical of the UMSC (Uganda Muslim Supreme Council). Mukulu’s young activists began to defy what they considered to be non-Muslim authority. By 1995 not only had Mukulu fled the country, but coincidentally the Uganda Muslim Liberation Army (UMLA) came into existence to champion the rights of Muslims against what they saw as President Museveni’s disregard for their rights and interests. They considered the Museveni government as attempting to undermine their religion and their community by converting mosques into offices, as part of a policy to return several properties (belonging to Asians who had been expelled by Idi Amin in
1972) formerly under the control of UMSC to their former Asian owners. Museveni considers these young Muslims (who do not enjoy the backing of their community) who have taken up arms against his government as being misled by disgruntled persons supported by the Tourabi faction in Sudan.

10. MUSLIM-STATE RELATIONS FROM COLONIAL TO POST-COLONIAL ERAS IN TANZANIA

Muslim groups, responding to socio-economic inequalities of the nineteenth and twentieth century colonial era, participated actively in anti-colonial resistance of one form or another. More specifically, colonial developments, particularly the Christian domination of the educational system, created conditions for increasing politicization of Muslim groups. Coincidentally, this was also the period when Islam in Tanzania, in its growth and consolidation in the hinterland of the country, became an integrating factor for the identity of Africans who participated in anti-colonial struggles.

In the first regional opposition to the colonial order during the Maji maji uprising (1905-1907), adherents of tariqa (the Qadiriyya) played a role in the struggle against German rule for its abuses, including forced labour and the introduction of a host of taxes. Similarly, at the end of the First World War, when Britain took over the colony, it was the urban Muslims who were at the forefront of organized efforts for change in the territory. In 1922 the first such organization, TTACSA (Tanganyika Territorial African Civil Servants’ Association) was set up in Tanga to promote the interests of civil servants. Later in the decade, a new association, TAA (Tanganyika African Association), was established in Dar es Salaam, another coastal town. It had a special appeal for Muslim townsmen who became its most active members. After World War Two TAA began to develop into a national movement. It appealed to traders and farmers. In 1954 TAA leaders met to establish the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The new party inherited a good political organization with a popular support base among Muslims of the urban centers such as Tanga, Tabora, Dar es Salaam and other towns. The Qadiriyya of Bagamoyo, who are worth mentioning, produced some of the staunchest supporters of TANU. Widespread Muslim participation in the party was partly motivated by the hope that they would be able to contribute to future policies that would redress economic and educational imbalances in society.

The above notwithstanding, some Muslims set up their own autonomous organizations to promote modern educational advancement and government employment. This was the case, for instance, with AMNUT (ALL-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika), which attracted conservative leaders, mainly elderly TAA activists. They wanted to organize and promote specifically Muslim goals independent of TANU. In 1959, AMNUT, like the Mwambao movement in Kenya, called on the British government to delay independence until Muslims had achieved some parity with Christians. This course of action was motivated by the fear that Muslims would not get a fair share of the benefits of independence. Nevertheless, the majority of Muslim leaders rallied behind TANU and roundly criticized the organization. It was when individuals within TANU advanced what were called “Muslim demands” that the party moved quickly by creating an Elders Section within TANU. It came to be dominated by coastal Muslim elements in Dar es Salaam and Tanga, in what was called the Elders’ wing of the party. In 1958 Nyerere expelled one of these elders, Shaykh Taqdir, from the party for complaining that there were not enough Muslims on the TANU election slate. In other words, Taqdiri was accused of mixing religion with politics when he drew attention to TANU’s putting forward more Christian than Muslim candidates. Perhaps he thought that TANU was attempting to replace the Muslim trader-politician with the more educated Christian.

Similarly, in 1963, a few years after independence, another Muslim organization, Daawa al-Islamiyya, was set up to promote Muslim educational advancement. When the society sent a public letter to all bishops and religious leaders, complaining about the lack of educational parity among the religious communities and the lack of support from the government, serious consequences followed. Khamis Abedi, President of the society, and Abdillah Plantan were sent to detention camps in Mnulu and Chunya “in the interests of security.”
11. THE MUSLIM CRISIS OF 1968: PAN-ISLAMISM VS NATIONALIST UJAMAAN

The most serious Muslim-State encounter in Tanzania was the Muslim crisis of 1968 during the period of the one-party/Ujamaa rule in Tanzania. At the center of the controversy was the best established and most inclusive Muslim association in East Africa, the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS). By virtue of its being pan-Islamic and nonsectarian, EAMWS activities were felt all over post-World War Two East Africa. It was, therefore, capable of unifying Muslims, coastal ones in particular, into a bloc that could pose a threat to TANU. Moreover, the fact that it was supported by Asian Muslims - the Aga Khan, leader of the Ismailis, was its patron-, put it at odds with the government, which at the time was looking for partners for its Ujamaa programs. The government could not count on Asians, by virtue of their ownership of many businesses and properties, to support its programs which would target them in the first place.

What started as a minor conflict within the EAMWS between the Bukoba branch and the headquarters of the association soon developed into a full-fledged crisis that was exploited by the government for its own purposes. The Tanzanian government engineered changes within this Muslim organization similar to those brought about by Obote in Uganda when NAAM was established specifically as a bulwark against monarchical forces in Buganda. To establish control over Muslims, especially in the era of the one-party State Muslims, whether in Kenya (through SUPKEM), Uganda (NAAM and later USMC) or Tanzania (as the discussion below will demonstrate), they had to be brought into step with the government’s political agenda. This was a clientalist strategy in which the government affirmed the leadership of the Muslim organization and even legitimated it by invitations to important ceremonies, may even award some funding for this or that program in return for acting as faithful clients of politicians as the price to be paid for political conformism50.

The occasion for the State to interfere with the affairs of the EAMWS was provided by a minor Muslim conflict in 1968, which pitted Pan-Islamic African Muslims and their Asian financial supporters (of capitalist orientation) against national/pro-TANU Muslims (supporters of Ujamaa socialism)51. What began as a minor theological conflict between two factions of the Bukoba branch of the EAMWS later developed into a crisis of national proportions. What was at stake was the issue of leadership in Bukoba society. The territorial office, which sided with one of the Bukoba factions, accused the regional office in Bukoba (led by Adamu Nasibu) of embezzlement of society funds and of anti-Indian and anti-Arab propaganda. Moreover, Nasibu, a pro-TANU Muslim, was one of the major organizers of a mass demonstration in Bukoba in June 1967 in support of the Arusha Declaration, which was said to be in keeping with the spirit of Islam. His faction cultivated the support of anti-EAMWS forces in Dar es Salaam led by Shaykh Abdalla Chaurembo, a TANU central committee member. Clearly, therefore, individuals with party connections were heavily involved in the dispute. This meant that two prominent African Muslims who represented the head office of EAMWS, President Said Tewa and Vice-President Bibi Titi Muhammad, both former ministers in the Nyerere government, found themselves at the center of political intrigues that were beyond their control. The fact that they had fallen out of favour with the party meant that they had little power to influence events. Furthermore, Asian/Ismaili involvement with EAMWS made it less likely to be a Muslim national council that the TANU/Ujamaa regime could hope to promote as a Muslim support base for its policies. They could not hope for that as long as the office of the secretary-general and education secretary-general were held jointly by an Indian Ismaili Muslim, Aziz Khaki.

The alleged capitalist political orientation of EAMWS’s territorial leadership was made into an issue by the rival Bukoba branch of the association led by Nasibu. In its June 1968 meeting the pro-TANU elements passed resolutions calling for the society to be led by those committed to the national ideology of TANU and for office holders, including the chief patron (until then the Aga Khan, whose headquarters were in Western Europe), to be Tanzanian Muslims committed to building the nation by cooperating with TANU leaders52. It was when these resolutions were rejected by the head office that the Bukoba branch used this as a justification to secede, followed by other regional branches.

The EAMWS attempted as best as it could to preserve the society from total collapse. These efforts were frustrated by the State-controlled
media (State radio and party press) which publicized the crisis. Worse, the then first Vice-President of Tanzania, Shaykh Abeid Karume (known for his anti-Asian views), exploited the situation to make political statements. For instance, at a mass rally in Zanzibar he declared that the EAMWS was an instrument of the capitalists who used it to exploit the common people53.

At the Iringa conference, organized by the regions that had seceded from EAMWS and attended by 200 delegates from all regions and also by Muslim political leaders, including government ministers, regional commissioners and party regional chairmen, the destruction of the EAMWS was carried out with the support and blessings of the ruling party. The first Vice-President, Karume, opened the conference by accusing the EAMWS of colluding with anti-party foreigners. He also went on to assert that, contrary to the TANU policy of keeping religion and politics apart, “religion cannot be divorced from politics because politics was the lifeblood of society […] the people have risen to shake off the remnants of the colonial era, including religious domination […] From now on the leadership of the Muslim religion must be in the hands of the people themselves, without any attachment to pretenders from the outside”54.

The second Vice-President, Rashid Kawawa, who was the last to speak, urged Muslims to remain loyal to TANU as they had done by standing up for what was right. At the conclusion of the conference, a new society known as BAKWATA (Supreme Council for Tanzanian Muslims) was formed. Its leaders consisted of Saleh Masasi, a TANU central committee member, as the national chairman, Shaykh Abdalla Chaurembo, another party faithful, as his deputy, and Adamu Nasibu, a pro-TANU Muslim who had been at the center of the crisis, as the acting secretary-general.

The creation of BAKWATA, with the open involvement of the ruling TANU followed by the banning of EAMWS, left a legacy of mistrust concerning this new society. It was considered to be a “branch of TANU” precisely because EAMWS’s destruction had been on political, not religious grounds. Moreover, the heavy involvement of political leaders, despite being Muslims, was seen as a cause for suspicion. Finally, whereas the EAMWS had included Muslims belonging to different sects to its leadership roles, BAKWATA was accused of being a sectarian society organized for mainland African Sunni Muslims55.

The above examples illustrate TANU’s cynical attempts to undermine institutions of civil society in its efforts to eliminate sources of potential opposition to the regime and the one-party Ujamaa policies during this period of the one-party dictatorship. The nature of this State control over civil society, and of popular perceptions of that control, lies at the root of Muslim groups’ dealings with the State.

Religious issues, especially involving Islam and Muslims, being considered too sensitive for public discussion in Nyerere’s Tanzania, the strategy devised by him to deal with concerns affecting the Muslim community was to let high ranking Muslim ministers in his government manage the problem. This essentially meant that their task was to coopt Muslims to the State’s political agendas. This was despite Nyerere’s continuous insistence that Tanzania’s politics knew no religion. Not surprisingly, therefore, during the period of Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s presidency (Nyerere’s successor), Muslim activism came out in full force.

Factors that have contributed to Islamic activism in post-Nyerere Tanzania include: the collapse of the one-party system, which allowed Muslims to organize and to speak freely in the new multi-party environment of the 1990s (although no party based on ethnic or religious affiliation was to be allowed to function), the activities of external Islamic organizations, including Muslim embassies (in sympathy with Muslim aspirations), in financing new mosques, scholarships, dispensaries, and so on, and the importance of the Islamic revolution in Iran at the end of the 1970s56. Both external (global Muslim network) as well as internal factors explain why the 1980s and 1990s witnessed not only the intensification of organizational activities by groups that were critical of BAKWATA, such as Warsha, BALUCTA/the Council of Tanzanian Qur’an Reciters and others, but also public interfaith debates by Muslim missionaries (UWAMDI) who engaged Christians on Bible-based discussions.

A combination of factors, including the size of the Muslim community57, the role of Muslims in the politics of the country, and the on-going concern of some Muslim groups regarding equitable power sharing, has contributed to Tanzania’s opting for a system of presidency.
that alternates between Muslim (Mwinyi and Kikwete) and Christian (Nyerere and Mkapa) candidates. This follows the abandonment of the statist approach to development in the country in the late 1980s, when the process of State control over the institutions of civil society began to ease, especially with the collapse of the Ujamaa system.

CONCLUSION

This paper has demonstrated that it has been difficult for the regimes in the three East African States to separate religion and politics in their one-party or military dictatorships and that, in fact, they have sought to coopt religious/civic groups to the State’s political programs, be they Ujamaa or Nyayo. The plural and multi-ethnic nature of the East African societies makes a secular system of government best positioned to deal fairly and equitably with all its citizens, irrespective of their ethnic and religious backgrounds. Unfortunately, the fact that the State has been a captive of ethnic, regional or other narrowly based interests has meant that religious minorities (Muslims in Kenya in the Moi period) or perceived enemy “ethnic groups” (the Acholi and Langi in Amin’s Uganda and the Baganda of the southern part of the country, especially during the Obote II period) have not been well treated. In such situations, the government has functioned through a network of personal patronage and clientage. This political arrangement, however, did not promote equitable sharing of economic and social goods in the country. On the contrary, it rewarded only those who supported the regime and had entered into some form of patron-client relationship based on ethnic, regional and other forms of alliances. This was the basis for mobilization of the population to gain its political support.

NOTES

1 Cruise O’Brien, Donal, “Coping with the Christians: The Muslim Predicate in Kenya”, in Hansen, Holger and Twaddle, Michael (eds.), Religion and Politics in East Africa. London, James Currey Ltd, 1995, 201-202. Muslim sources estimate much higher figures for the Muslim population in all the three East African countries (35% for Kenya), whereas Western/Christian writers/sources have tended to underestimate Muslim numbers (5-10% for Kenya). The Muslim figure of between 20% and 30% is given in Bakari, see footnote 11 below.

2 Cruise O’Brien, Donal, “Coping with the Christians”…. op. cit.


7 Ibid., 21

8 Ibid.


10 Ibid., 234.


12 Ibid., 168-183, 247-248.


16 Among the most famous Moi detainees was Ngugi wa Thiong’o, a novelist and leftist critic of what he calls neocolonial politics in Africa.


19 Ibid., 237.

20 They were known locally as Bafaransa, as the faith had been introduced from France. Its adherents form the second most significant political constituency.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.


25 See the discussion in Hansen, “Pre-colonial Immigrants and Colonial Servants”. op. cit., 559, Rowe, John, “Islam under Idi Amin: a case study of déjá vu?”, in Hansen, Holger B. and Twaddle,


27 Hansen, Holger, “Pre-colonial Immigrants and Colonial Servants”, op. cit., 579.

28 Ibid.


30 Hansen, Holger, *Ethnicity and military rule…*, op. cit., 579.

31 The population of Muslims in Uganda is estimated at between 12 and 16%. See, for instance, the speech of President Yoweri Museveni, “NRM United Muslims”, New Vision-Uganda, 19 March 2008, where he mentions a figure of 12%. Other sources put the Muslim population at 16%: see Gall, Timothy (ed.), *Wordmark Encyclopedia of Culture and Daily Life. Vol. 1 – Africa*. Cleveland, Ohio, Eastwood Publications Development, 1998, 448-449.


34 Museveni, Yoweri, “NRM United Muslims…”, op. cit.


39 Ibid.

40 In his book, *Life of Prince Badru Kakungulu* (Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 2005), A.B.K. Kasozi argues that this Muslim leader with ties to the Buganda royal family negotiated an honorable deal for Muslims and averted a Muslim holocaust.

41 Museveni, Yoweri, “NRM United Muslims…”, op. cit.

42 See “Who are the Tabliqs; What do they want”, *New Vision*, Kampala, Uganda, 27 November 1996.

43 Museveni, Yoweri, “NRM United Muslims…”, op. cit.

44 Chande, Abdin, “Radicalism and Reform…”, op. cit., 359.

45 See Nimtz, August, *Islam and Politics in East Africa…*, op. cit.


48 Bienen, Henry, *Tanzania…*, op. cit., 64.


53 Ibid. with reference to *The Standard*, 9 November 1968.

54 Ibid. with reference to *The Standard*, 13 December 1968.


57 Muslim population approximates at least 40 percent of the population. The remaining 60 percent is divided between Christians and followers of African Traditional Beliefs. See Chande, Abdin, *Islam, Ulaama and Community Development…*, op. cit., 7 footnote 8.