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Abstract: This project analyzes the relationship between the rhetoric of Argentina’s fifth military dictatorship on youth, morality, and communism, and the government’s cultural campaigns executed from 1966-1973. During “La Revolución Argentina,” General Juan Carlos Onganía and his cabinet targeted the “immorality” of the youth because they believed the internal threat of communism had degraded the country’s traditional Catholic values. By constructing a moral and spiritual culture through a crusade against immorality, intervention in the national universities, censorship and anti-communist legislation, conservative officers thought they could shield Argentina’s youth from further infiltration of leftist ideologies and preserve the nation’s future leaders.

Keywords: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, La Revolución Argentina, Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía, Catholic Nationalist, conservatism.

INTRODUCTION

In June 1966, in the midst of yet another economic crisis, the Argentine military seized control of the country, heralding their fifth coup d’état of the century as “La Revolución Argentina.” Under the leadership of General Juan Carlos Onganía, the military government asserted that communism threatened Argentina’s future, and that social, political, and economic stability could only occur with its eradication. In their speeches, the generals not only mentioned the need to combat the spread of leftist ideology, but also emphasized an immediate need to deal with stagnant economic growth, high inflation, fiscal irresponsibility, depleted national savings and declining foreign investments. However, during the first six months, the new government expended a tremendous amount of energy trying to save Argentina from moral degradation, and it linked these efforts to its anti-communist position. In particular, Gen. Ongania and his cabinet utilized the police to cleanse the supposed decadence of Argentina’s middle-class youth through a morality campaign, clamp down on communism in the national universities, and implement anti-communist and censorship legislation, even before dealing with economic problems.

With a consensus among the military and Gen. Onganía’s civilian cabinet members that the failing economy warranted immediate action, why did the new government worry so much about morality and link its culture campaigns to the eradication of communism? Based on the officers’ speeches and the military’s revolutionary pamphlets, Catholic Nationalist theology, anti-communist and censorship legislation, magazines and literature, and Argentine and U.S. newspapers, this article demonstrates that cultural and societal factors motivated and directed the administration’s reform efforts, before they established a clear plan for economic stabilization. The anti-communist rhetoric and actions of authoritative and conservative Catholic-minded officers and the Buenos Aires police targeted the “immorality” of the modern youth because they believed the internal threat of communism had degraded the country’s traditional Catholic values. By constructing a moral and spiritual culture, the generals thought they could shield Argentina’s youth from further exposure to leftist ideology and mold them into the future conservative and Catholic leadership.
1. THEORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE 1966 MILITARY COUP

This article departs from much of the scholarship influenced by the theory of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism during the past twenty years. Simply put, Guillermo O’Donnell’s theory argues that Argentine military regimes, such as the one from 1966-1972, established authoritarian rule for the purpose of working with technocrats to implement liberal economic policies that would reverse the ills brought with prolonged reliance on “easy” or “import-substitution” industrialization. However, rather than focusing on economic determinants or political resolutions that impelled the military to establish authoritarian rule, or explaining how the new government attempted to bring economic stabilization, this project follows critics who have argued that Latin American military governments were motivated by concerns other than industrial development during the 1960s and 1970s. Gen. Onganía and his fellow officers had a clear plan to restore the country’s traditional Catholic values and combat the spread of communism, even before they had determined how to address the failing economy. Moreover, after the most intense phase of their moral crusade, Gen. Onganía and his cabinet members continued their struggle against immorality during the later economic stabilization program (1967-1970) by positing it within anti-communist and censorship legislation. Thus, this project responds to recent challenges to consider Argentine military politics and popular resistance from a cultural perspective by analyzing the relationship between the military’s discourse on communism, morality, the modern youth, and the actual campaigns targeted at this sector of Argentine society.

This project also follows the work of two scholars who have analyzed why the Argentine military of the sixth and final dictatorship (1976-1983) included programs of cultural reform with measures to root-out communist influences. Andrés Avellaneda argues that Argentine military dictatorships actively placed censorship on culture because of their motivation to attempt to construct an Argentine lifestyle reflecting traditional Catholic values. Yet, restoring Argentina’s Catholic values in society also required a fierce campaign to weed out influences of Marxism and Communism. Another historian of the final dictatorship, Mark Osiel, argues that the military’s fight against communism coincided with its Catholic orientation because officers of the armed forces developed relationships with Catholic Nationalist theologians during the decades leading up to the nation’s final coups. The theologians’ teachings spoke that communist doctrine and practice resulted from modern liberalism, carried to its ultimate consequences. In other words, the radical cultural changes occurring during the 1960s lead to society’s acceptance of alternative leftist ideologies. These leftist ideas challenged Argentina’s Catholic traditions. Both Avellaneda and Osiel indicate that the military officers of the final dictatorship modeled their cultural reforms on those employed during the fifth dictatorship. Thus, this project fills a missing piece in the scholarship by analyzing how officers of the fifth military dictatorship sought to reform the cultural and social spaces inhabited by the country’s middle-class youth by combating communism and preserving Argentina’s Catholic values.

After the military officers seized control of the country with their coup d’état on June 29, 1966, they articulated the country’s quagmire of problems and their goals to solve them in various documents and speeches. The military believed that previous civilian leaders had failed to establish order and stability -necessary prerequisites for addressing Argentina’s political ineptness, economic stagnation, and social instability. According to the generals, the actions of previous administrations had led to “the bankruptcy of the principle of authority and a lack of order and discipline”. The result, Gen. Onganía declared, was that “our country was transformed into a scene of anarchy characterized by the collision of sectors with conflicting interests, a situation aggravated by the lack of basic social order”. Thus, the first and most important step would be the “achievement of order within the present situation, based on the integral use of the principles of order, authority, responsibility and discipline”. Implied in the officers’ rhetoric is that civilian leaders, particularly the country’s previous president, Arturo Umberto Illia, had failed to establish authority by not maintaining order and discipline. Their declaration to establish order through military authority sent a clear message to the nation and the rest of the world: the country’s salvation would come through military rule. Only through military leadership could reforms be implemented and followed.

With the myriad of economic problems plaguing the country, Gen. Ongania and his fellow officers included vague plans to reform the economy in their discourse to legitimize their
seizure of power and bolster popular support. They promised that the new military government would “eliminate the deep-rooted causes of the present economic stagnation.” They would establish “conditions to make feasible a great economic expansion [based on] the human and natural resources available to the country”\(^9\). Nevertheless, a concise plan to stabilize the economy was less clear in their rhetoric. During the first six months in office, inter-cabinet fighting over a plan for economic reform deterred the military government from fulfilling their economic promises. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) noted in its report of Argentina’s economic reforms, that by the end of 1966 “little had been accomplished in the economic field due to differences of how to carry out economic reforms”\(^10\). The members of the cabinet could not agree on a plan for economic reform. However, all believed that leftist ideologies and modernization had led to the nation’s loss of moral or spiritual convictions, especially among the youth.

2. THE DECADE OF THE 1960S AND MILITARY DISCOURSE

Following similar worldwide developments, Argentina passed through a stage of modernization and cultural radicalization during the 1960s. Argentine historian Simón Feldman argues that this decade marked a period of new experimentation in arts, cinema and popular culture. The “New Argentine Cinema” became a distinctive element of the “generation of the 1960s.” The most “significant development in the Argentine cultural life,” argues Feldman, was “linked to the emergence of new writers, playwrights, journalists, designers and other exponents of our country’s creative spectrum”\(^11\). Also during the 1960s, mass production, advertising, and marketing techniques encouraged the urban middle-classes to consume various new products. Argentine youth became more visible and began to establish distinct identities. Living in an age of worldwide communication allowed many young people to emulate the new and provocative Western dress, music, fads, fashions and cultural patterns. A pair of jeans became the universal article of clothing and defined the youth’s modernity\(^12\). Enticing descriptions and pictures of women modeling the scanty new styles emerging from Paris and New York found their way into the Argentine papers. To catch up on the latest fashions, young Argentine women simply needed to open up a newspaper to learn how other girls worldwide challenged conservative styles. Even after the military coup, one paper ran articles about women’s fashions that informed the young consumers “underwear is also outerwear. Whether you are going to bed or going out, you can wear the same thing”\(^13\). The Buenos Aires Herald taunted young women to push Argentina’s cultural norms by indicating that the “Brazilian Fashion Show Reveals More Short Skirts and Exposing Blouses”\(^14\). As in many countries during the 1960s, conservative and traditional parents became increasingly concerned with the youth’s radical identities and means of expression.

In many cases, the emergence of these identities coincided with covert and overt forms of rebellion. Historian Valeria Manzano has pointed out that youth rebellion constituted a “crucial feature of ‘being young’ in the 1960s that found expression not only in the disruptive aesthetic projects or the troublesome intergenerational relations but also […] in the ‘private’ contestation of the prevalent sexual norms”\(^15\). Birth control pills and changing attitudes toward sexual behavior modified the relations between Argentines in the urban centers of modernization\(^16\). Argentine youth developed their own sexual culture by bifurcating between “sex for procreation” and “sex for pleasure.” The sexualized youth functioned as a “bridge toward modernization: they brought the ‘new’ into the middle-class families, and this time, as in almost everywhere else worldwide, the new had to do with the fall of secular prejudices and the relaxing of strong patterns of authority”\(^17\).

The rapid social and cultural changes during the 1960s also eroded the position of the family as the basic social institution and encouraged the emergence of psychoanalysis. Individual freedom and self-fulfillment replaced old values linked to familial and personal responsibility. Traditional Catholic norms, such as those dictating that marriage lasted a lifetime and the primary purpose centered on raising functional children for society, slowly lost their value. Unhappy marriage partners turned to separation or divorce.

Changes in the traditional concept of the family and of women’s role in the home and in society engendered the reception of the growing professions related to psychoanalysis. For many, psychoanalytic discourse provided a belief system, a therapeutic method that could bring order out of the anxieties and uncertainties that accompanied rapid modernization and cultural
changes. Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts encouraged both parents and adolescents to free themselves from society’s artificial constraints. Psychoanalysis also became an item of consumption that provided status to the middle-class obsessed with participating in and defining their own modernity. Common conversation began to employ terms borrowed from the booming fields of psychoanalysis and sociology, and by the late 1960s popular magazines, fiction, essays, TV shows, and theater were loaded with psychoanalytic jargon and concepts. With radical cultural changes occurring during the 1960s that challenged the family unit and caused the youth to cast off moral constraints, it is no surprise that the role of morality and of religious values dominated military officers’ discussions of the goals of their revolution.

After assuming power, the military made it clear that a central goal of the Revolution would involve constructing a moral and spiritual community built on traditional Catholic values and upheld by a strong authoritarian government. In the Acts of the Revolution, the generals stated a key goal would be to “consolidate our spiritual and moral values” and “defend our spiritual tradition.” The onslaught of cultural changes, in the minds of many conservative officers, had “caused the disruption of the spiritual unity of the Argentine people, generalized alienation and skepticism, apathy and loss of National feeling.” Their discourse focused on making the people “believe” again, to create a new moral consensus around old values, and to restore a spiritual community.

In the Directive for the Planning and Action of the Government, the new administration articulated goals to construct a new moral order. Gen. Ongania and his cabinet would strive for the “attainment of a wide understanding and spiritual community among the population.” Spiritual unity among the people would reorient Argentine culture according to its Catholic values. The administration promised “to maintain firmly national sovereignty, defending our territorial integrity, spiritual values, style of life and great moral ends that form the essence of nationality.” Included in specific plans for reform during the second year of the Argentine Revolution, the administration wrote that if necessary, it would even “establish legislation facilitating the spiritual unity and the moral consolidation of the population.” According to the generals’ discourse, they would dedicate their reform efforts to construct a moral order, spiritual community and restore the nation’s Catholic values during their tenure in office.

Gen. Ongania’s emphasis on spirituality, morals, and religious values reflected the military’s traditionally conservative background, their dissatisfaction with the by-products of progressive and liberal cultural experimentation occurring throughout the globe in the 1960s. More importantly, their discourse reveals the influences that Catholic Nationalist theologians had on the military. Not only did the generals use religious rhetoric to gain popular support and legitimation among sectors of society that shared similar values, but they also intertwined it with their plans to combat the spread of communism.

Historian Mark Osiel has analyzed why the Argentine armed forces of the sixth and final dictatorship (1976-1983) wove religious rhetoric and programs of cultural reform with measures to root-out communist influences. He argues that the final dictatorship’s fight against communism coincided with religion. Officers at that time justified their seizure of power and their counterrevolution as a “just war,” one that was “essential to preserve and defend Christian values.” Consequently, as Osiel demonstrates, the speeches of Argentine generals who advocated this attack on the nation’s intellectuals, concentrated mainly on ethical issues: the need for a stronger sense of cultural coherence, national unity, and moral community. Osiel notes that the generals of the final dictatorship modeled their cultural reforms on those employed by officers of the Argentine Revolution. However, such ideas did not originate from Gen. Ongania. Long before the 1960s and 1970s, officers had started to embrace the teachings of Catholic Nationalist theologians within the barracks.

During the years leading up to the Argentine Revolution, Catholic Nationalists based their theology on the ideas on the Nationalist movement already present in Argentina. Historian David Rock has argued that near the end of the nineteenth century, in reaction to the Liberal party’s anticlerical movements, the Catholic Church bridged the anti-liberal sentiments of Argentina’s conservative Federalist party with the incipient Nationalist movement. By the early twentieth century, the movement had become the expression of the deep-rooted historical forces in Argentina that challenged and resisted the mainstream liberal conceptions of the state and society. Nationalists developed their
own peculiar jargon intertwined with Catholic theology. They called their movement an “authentically Argentine struggle for Catholic truth and Hispanic tradition,” which was the enemy of “liberal philosophy, formal democracy, ideological colonization, and new forms of European and North American imperialism.” However, within the military barracks, Catholic Nationalist theologians galvanized the military’s ideology.

Coming over with Spanish and Italian immigrants in the 1920s, an intolerant version of Catholicism merged with the then present Argentine Nationalist movement and began to permeate Argentine political life, especially the military. A very closely knit relationship between officers and Catholic Nationalist theologians developed in the following decades leading up to the Argentine Revolution. As a result many military schools and academies adopted the works of these thinkers in their curricula. In September 1941, Nationalist theologian Jordán Bruno Genta addressed senior army officers at the Círculo Militar, the high-class military club in Buenos Aires. He proclaimed that “warriors represent the most esteemed class of the state, [because] the nation enters into political existence by virtue of war.” Later, he reflected that “positive law -as man’s own evanescent creation- was inferior to God’s law, and that the soldier owes his professional duties directly to the nation -whose essence is eternal- rather than to its formal law, which is ephemeral.” Catholic Nationalist theologians specifically taught the military that Catholicism was the most important component of national identity. The military’s mission was to prevent “the breakdown of the country’s spiritual unity” and subordinate the “state and culture to religious doctrine.” Thus, Nationalist proponents within the military began to perceive themselves as “the last aristocracy” and the guardian of a “sacred territory and the western Christian way of life,” which answered not to the civilian leaders’ mismanagement of the nation’s wealth distribution provoked various groups in society, especially Argentina’s intellectuals within the national universities, to accept ideas of revolutionary change. A Spanish translation of Antonio Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks* hit the Argentine market in the late 1950s. Gramsci appealed to intellectuals dissatisfied with capitalism. He claimed the cultural world was the main battleground of the eternal struggle between capitalism and socialism. In so doing, Gramsci had shifted the leading role of the “revolution” from the proletariat to those same intellectuals dissecting his book. After reading his book, many
of Argentina’s radical youth realized the struggle between global socialism and capitalism transcended class. Instead of a class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, historian Paul Lewis argues, they thought more in the nebulous category of the people versus the oligarchy; the former comprising both the working and lower-middle-classes and the latter embracing the landowners, urban executives, as well as high military officers. Only revolution could free Argentina from cultural hegemony and distribute the country’s wealth equally to all members of society.

Argentina and the rest of the world witnessed this type of revolution carried out in Cuba in 1959. The Cuban Revolution revealed a Latin America that had risen up against imperialism. According to Argentine historian Luis Alberto Romero, “Cuba enshrined the very idea of revolution, the conviction that, despite enormous obstacles, reality was malleable and collective human action could shape it.” The Cuban Revolution proved that “voluntarism” works and provided radical middle-class intellectuals a formula for revolution in the name of the oppressed but inert masses. In the wake of the revolution, radical intellectuals and university students in Argentina quickly heroized bearded, olive green-clad warriors such as Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Guevara, an Argentine by birth, emphasized that by properly using violence, subalterns could circumvent the traditional Marxist dialectical processes of history and artificially create the necessary objective conditions for revolution. Guevara became required reading for radicalized young people. In La guerra de guerrillas, published in 1960, he encouraged his followers that “it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.” During the 1960s the intellectual youth began to envision change produced by their own hands.

Although the officers’ rhetoric illuminates the premises of the Argentine Revolution, social history cannot be constructed on lofty goals found in political discourse. Rhetoric coming from the mouths and pens of military officers is a mere shell and is not necessarily equal to action. Equally important to discourse is how the military carried out its social and cultural reforms. Moreover, amidst the officers’ myriad of written goals to reform society, the promises the government actually attempted to fulfill and the implementation of their rhetoric concerning communism and religion indicated that first, they believed that leftist ideologies had contributed to degrading society’s spirituality and moral values, thus warranting a fierce anti-communist battle. Second, part of combating communism included restructuring society to reflect its Catholic values. By constructing a moral culture, the officers believed they could shield society, especially young people, from the advance of communist infiltration. They made their rhetoric reality by implementing a morality campaign to halt the nation’s immoral actions, especially among the youth. They also combated the spread of leftist ideologies by intervening in the nation’s universities. Moreover, both the morality crusade and the intervention in the universities occurred immediately after the coup, six months before
Gen. Onganía would finally address the failing economy. Later, the government continued its social and cultural reforms through passing and enforcing censorship and anti-communist legislation.

3. IMMORALITY AND ANTI-COMMUNIST DISCOURSE BECOMES A REALITY

On 23 July 1966, not even a month after the military seized control of the country, the newly appointed mayor of Buenos Aires, Col. Enrique Schettini, launched a morality campaign aimed at addressing the youth’s immorality and combating all that affected the traditional Catholic sense of family. Schettini designated the nephew of Gen. Onganía, naval officer Col. Enrique Green, as the secretary of the Municipal Police, and ex-captain Luis Margaride as Col. Green’s lieutenant, holding the position of head of the General Inspection Board of the Municipality. Col. Green, who had declared that he was “a militant Catholic,” wholeheartedly supported Gen. Onganía’s plans to rid society of communist influences and preserve the nation’s morals.

On the same day, in a press conference Col. Green and Margaride identified the evils affecting society and rationalized their future remedies. “Many inhabitants of the country,” Col. Green declared, “are ill with a contagious disease […] immorality.” According to Col. Green, excessive liberal atheism caused by modernization and the spread of communism destroyed the pillars of Argentine society, what he called “Argentinidad […] a respect for religious and moral principles and historic tradition.” Therefore, he stated, “in order for the decent man and woman to be respected and considered by their co-citizens, it is necessary to eliminate undesirable people.” This was not the first time Argentines had heard rhetoric such as Col. Green’s or witnessed a morality campaign.

Luis Margaride, appointed by President Auturo Frondizi, had headed an earlier morality campaign, from October 1960 until May 1961. Margaride’s moral crusade aimed at preserving the traditional family structure and protecting the nation’s youth from delinquency and immorality. Police officials invoked edicts targeting drunkenness, public disorder, immorality, homosexuality and prostitution. Yet, the spread of communism also concerned patrons and supporters of the morality campaign. Historian Manzano argues that during the 1960-61 campaign “communism, along with ‘immorality’ and ‘delinquency,’ was perceived as the great threat to Argentinean society.” One editorialist from La Nación articulated the link by stating that “immorality is one of the faces that Communism shows, especially to young people.” Just as the generals’ rhetoric later articulated, youth immorality not only polluted the youthful bodies and minds, but also, noted the editorialist, opened them to “dissolute ideas, alien to our culture and our nation.” In many ways, the 1960-61 campaign acted as a prelude to the military’s generalized repression in the decade that followed. Near five years later, Margaride and Col. Green plunged Buenos Aires into another moral crusade.

The 1966 morality campaign attempted to prevent the spread of leftist ideologies and immorality by targeting the young middle-class men and women representing the “modern youth.” The police arrested youth caught necking in cars or mingling together with the opposite sex on street corners. Spotlights installed to illuminate the city’s park benches supposedly prevented “immoral” public displays of affection. The General Inspection Division ordered clubs to improve their lighting and conducted daily inspection of places in which rock-and-roll bands played. They also closed down popular cinemas and well-know theatres. Police forces raided the Maipo and Nacional cabarets (equivalents of the Lido in Paris) and reported errant husbands to their wives. Boys who wore their hair long, such as members of one of Argentina’s first rock and roll bands, Los Beatniks, ended up in jail for violating the police edicts of public scandal and drunkenness. A report emphasized that “their main characteristic is that they wear long hair, according to the fashion imposed by the famous ‘Beatles’.” Even girls who wore short miniskirts ended up in jail. Young Argentine women found themselves in a quandary. On the one hand, newspapers celebrated and department stores sold the new modern and provocative fashions originating from Europe and the United States, on the other hand, the police arrested girls who wore them.

Furthermore, Col. Green and Margaride backed up the officers’ discourse that linked youthful immorality with the corrupting influences of modernization and communism. During a television program, Col. Green promised the nation that “we will repress in a concrete way all pornographic magazines. We do not have to forget that these are the bases for communist
penetration among our youth." In the first two weeks of the campaign, Col. Green ordered police to confiscate at least twenty-seven sexually provocative magazines from newsstands, such as imported *Playboy* magazines.

Although the campaign had the support of municipal authorities in Buenos Aires, the military government, and police forces, not everyone consented to its extreme measures. The middle-class youth during the 1960s had absorbed the collective projects of liberal social and cultural agents: modernizing literature, television programs, consumption patterns and parents who embraced the advice of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts challenging traditional social norms. Hence, to target the "immoral" and "modern" youth meant also attacking all of these agents, mostly adults. While some of the conservative circles of society might have agreed with the ideological basis of the Argentine Revolution, their silence regarding the morality campaign directed against the Argentine youth proved their uneasiness with the military government's attack on the by-products of a modernizing culture. Even the Argentine press was silent about the most controversial aspects of the morality campaign, possibly due to economic and political measures used to discourage severe criticism of the Revolution.

In late November 1966, the municipal leaders and Gen. Ongania's administration seemed to hear the popular discontent. A memorandum leaked to Schettini from the Secretary of State Information, known as SIDE (*Secretaría de Informaciones del Estado*), pushed the mayor to take action. The disclosed letter indicated the military felt Col. Green had been too extreme in carrying out his crusade and was hurting the Revolutionary image. After a brief quarrel, the mayor dismissed Col. Green and accepted the resignation of Margaride, ending the visible morality crusade. However, surveillance and repression of young men and women took on many different forms during the Argentine Revolution, including state intervention in the national autonomous universities, the heart of supposed youth immorality and the alleged bastion of leftist ideologies.

From 1958 to 1967, as matriculation in the national universities rose, perceptions of the function of the university began to change. During those years, the nation's total university youth swelled with a 75 percent increase in enrollment from 137,673 to 240,452. Whereas before, the traditional mission outfitted children with useful skills to make a living and become productive citizens, now in the midst of a decade in cultural, social and political flux, many began to see the schools, particularly the national universities, as a promoter of social change. During the 1960s, young academics became increasingly critical of society, politics and especially the military. Provocative literature, written by fellow university students, sharpened the students' criticisms against the military.

A former president of the Argentine University Federation, Juan José Sebreli criticized the morality campaign that occurred five years earlier in his widely read 1965 best-seller, *Buenos Aires: vida cotidiana y alienación*. "The supposed moral crisis in the country," argued Sebreli "is a way of diverting attention from the real economic and political crisis. The consequence of this stupid repression is of course a hidden corruption, increasingly dangerous and sordid." One year after Sebreli's book was published, university youth found themselves the target of another moral crusade. Some students must have reflected on the irony Sebreli had articulated. Why did the government invest time and energy to dictate what they could wear and how they could express their sexuality, when Gen. Ongania and his cabinet still had done nothing to fulfill their promise to stabilize the economy, end inflation, and produce jobs for the growing number of university graduates? The students' frustrations expressed by authors such as Sebreli often translated into radical criticism of the military's staunch belief in Catholic Nationalist theology. Furthermore, dissatisfaction with the political and economic decisions of the military and elite, and alternative solutions to capitalism found in Gramsci's writings and voiced by revolutionaries such as Guevara, helped fan the flame of student radicalization within the national universities during the 1960s.

Critical university students embraced leftist ideologies and ideas of revolution within the national universities and began to voice their dissatisfaction through protest. At the time of the coup, both students and professors participated in more than twelve national leftist groups, ranging from Marxist Nationalists to Maoists, Trotskyists, Revolutionary Left (Guevaristas), and the official Communist Party. The leftist political groups' high membership provided evidence for the military that intellectuals within the national universities had become dangerously radical in
their political activism through their unchecked consumption and discussion of Marxist literature.

Understandably, Gen. Ongania and his cabinet members believed that the state of the national universities had strayed far from their view of the function of higher education and warranted intervention. The university, Gen. Ongania had declared, is the "organ forming national character and the transmitter of the most precious part of our spiritual heritage." Communism "corrupts youth with a foreign ideology that is destructive of our purest spiritual values."67 The discourse of the Argentine Revolution indicated that Ongania and his cabinet members had obviously taken Catholic Nationalist theologian Jordán Genta seriously. Even as early as September 1943, while serving as the government's delegate (interventor) in the national university of Rosario, Genta had stated that the national universities had been "taken advantage of by the Marxists to lay the conditions for the total subversion of the principle of authority."68 Twenty years later, Genta again reminded the officers that "it is the intellectuals who are the protagonists of subversion, not the masses." He stressed that "the national universities are today the central headquarters of the communist ruling class within our country." Especially criticizing the tripartite governmental administration of the university, which gave students equal representation with alumni and professors in the directive boards, Genta argued that the "tripartite government of the National Universities today is the enshrinement of the soviet university."69

Influenced by Catholic Nationalist theologians such as Genta, Col. Villegas had also just published his book Guerra revolucionario comunista. In it, he warned his fellow officers that "war is developing within our own frontiers," and is as "threatening to us as any of the wars fought in the standard fashion." However, Col. Villega pointed out that "subversion is the procedure chosen [by the communists]," and operates through penetration "of all the national power structures," including "universities and cultural centers."70 Heeding to Genta and Col. Villegas' warnings, among others, Gen. Ongania took measures to end the autonomy of the universities and to revise the system of higher education, to eliminate communism among the intellectuals once and for all.

On 29 July 1966, six days after the government enacted the morality campaign, Gen. Ongania passed Law 16.912, which banned all student political groups and ended the old tripartite system of shared university administrative power.71 That evening, in response to the students' protest against the government’s new law, the Ministry of the Interior, Enrique Martínez Paz, ordered more than a hundred federal agents to restore order. They unloaded from police assault vehicles into the plazas in front of several departments of the National University of Buenos Aires. Within the Department of Exact Sciences, students and department members stood poised behind doors barred by desks, chairs, and chains. Receiving no response to their demands to evacuate, the police busted into the building and filled the halls with tear gas. Police officers then lined up in two rows and forced the dean, assistant dean, several professors, and more than 200 students to run the gauntlet as they used their rifle butts and batons to batter them unmercifully. At the end of the confrontation, more than 400 students from the University of Buenos Aires found themselves in the paddy cars, handcuffed and arrested; 30 of them had been sent to the hospital.72

After what was called the "Night of the Long Batons," Martínez Paz placed the system of higher education under the control of Carlos María Gelly y Obes, the Subsecretary of Culture and Education, and established an Advisory Council with ten members to draw up a new law for the operation of the universities.73 The following year, the council reached a conclusion on how to prevent the spread of communism within the universities and restore the pure objectives of the system of higher education. The "National Universities: Organic Law" placed the system of higher education under the control of the government and eliminated the students' methods of voicing their opinions. Students and alumni no longer could vote in governmental bodies of the universities as they did under the old tripartite governmental system. Pro-military rectors, deans and professors now held decisive power. To snuff out leftist influences, the new law upheld Law 16.912, which had banned all student organizations. The new law also prohibited students and professors from engaging in any political activities and gave the government legal power to intervene in the universities whenever it considered such action to be in the national interest.74

The new university law emerged from the philosophy of the military’s earlier documents with much emphasis placed on the need to instill Catholic values in the masses and to prevent the
spread of communism. During a speech to the nation, Gen. Onganía argued that the “new university policy was to train professionals, technocrats and scientists who love their land and who desire to serve their community”\textsuperscript{75}. The government ostensibly would preserve academic freedom, yet the generals placed greater emphasis on the diffusion of national culture and patriotic and spiritual values. However, communism influenced more than university intellectuals, necessitating specific legal measures to rid the country of its harm.

During the first six months of the Argentine Revolution, Gen. Onganía created the “National System of Planning and Action for National Security” which eventually resulted in the creation of the National Council for Security, known as CONASE (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad)\textsuperscript{76}. Gen. Onganía appointed Nationalist Col. Osiris J. Villegas as the head of CONASE. Col. Villegas had clearly demonstrated in his speeches and writings that combating communism and restoring the country’s Catholic values would receive top priority. After the intervention in the national universities and the four-month long morality crusade, in correlation with CONASE, the government continued combating communism and restoring the nation’s morals by positing its cultural reforms within rhetoric to preserve national security. Specific legislation provides salient examples of the government’s new discourse.

Shortly after its creation, CONASE drafted Law 16.940, “Communist Ideology: Postal Circulation,” decreed on 18 October 1966. The legislation prohibited the sending of communist literature through the mail and enabled the government to open and destroy any material that supposedly contained links to the circulation of leftist material. Ironically, besides outlawing the circulation of “propaganda doctrine [...] of communist objectives and purposes,” the law also specified that the post office could seize any “books, prints, engravings, paintings, lithographs and photographs of immoral character”\textsuperscript{77}. Even within this specific anti-communist piece of legislation, the administration equated the danger of “immoral” material with the spread of leftist ideologies. When a government representative announced the law to the nation, he argued that the law would aid in the preservation of “our Western and Christian lifestyle [...] of our traditions and family organization, [and to] safeguard the future generations from dangerous destructors of our nationality [...] which conspires against international communism”\textsuperscript{78}.

During their first six months in office, Ongania and his cabinet members considered that they had made progress in combating communism and restoring the country’s spiritual and moral community based on its traditional Catholic values. However, by late 1966, inflation continued to rise and the government still had no clear plan to bring economic stabilization. The unpopular morality crusade, the violent university intervention, and the government’s lack of action to fulfill its economic promises generated a “profound feeling of discontent,” even “delegitimizing the government among the Buenos Aires citizenry”\textsuperscript{79}. In response, Gen. Ongania appointed new members to all of the cabinet positions, including internationally respected economist Adalbert Krieger Vasena as the new economic minister. The following year, Vasena eventually drafted and implemented economic reforms to stabilize the economy and produce sustained growth\textsuperscript{80}.

Although the other members of the new cabinet supported Vasena’s semi-liberal economic reform policies, they continued their struggle to preserve Catholic values and combat communism. All but two of Gen. Ongania’s second cabinet were members of the Ateneo de la República, a Catholic Nationalist organization heavily influenced by Italian and Spanish fascism\textsuperscript{81}. The members of the Ateneo possessed an authoritative right-wing Catholic mind-set and embraced the Nationalist movement. As a result, many within Gen. Ongania’s second cabinet agreed that immorality had degraded Argentina, especially the youth, and that belief in God had disappeared. Even though Vasena’s economic program generated excitement and directed the nation’s and international attention to its progress, Gen. Ongania’s new cabinet members found innovative ways to continue to combat communism and immorality.

4. THE ARGENTINE REVOLUTION’S ANTI-COMMUNIST AND CENSORSHIP LAWS

From the beginning of 1967, until dissenting factions within the military overthrew Ongania from power in 1970, the administration continued to combat communism and preserve their religious values, albeit through less public methods, by passing and enforcing anti-communist and censorship legislation. In August
1967, CONASE implemented the government’s most effective piece of legislation to prevent the further spread of leftist ideologies and to deal with threatening elements already within the country. Law 17.401, “Communism: Rules of Repression,” gave agents of the Secretary of State Information (SIDE) the right to arrest anyone linked to spreading, harboring or engaging with communist materials. This legislation enabled SIDE agents to classify anyone with “communist ideological motivation, [who] performed, by any means, proselytizing, subversive, [or] intimidating activities, or disturbers of public order,” as a “communist,” and imprison them from one to eight years. The government now possessed the legal right to prevent persons classified as communist from obtaining naturalization papers, state employment, licenses, scholarships, from manufacturing firearms for commercial purposes, working in printing or publishing firms, and from occupying trade union posts. Often, Argentines only found out that they had been classified as a communist threat after having been denied the right to participate in any of the above activities, or after they ended up in jail. The two pieces of anti-communist legislation allowed the military government to combat leftist influences with subtle but effective methods. Justifying arrests of subversives through legal means allowed government officials to pick and choose whomever they deemed to be a threat to national security. Within the first month of Law 17.401’s existence, police arrested twenty four people. One of them, twenty six year old Alfredo Bass, a night school teacher in Salta, lost his job and ended up in prison because someone had tipped off the police of the existence of leftist books in his library. The government also passed specific censorship laws.

Argentine historian Andrés Avellaneda argues that military dictatorships actively place censorship on culture because it is the expression of morality, sexuality, family, religion, and national security. Generals of the final dictatorship (1976-1983) made a distinction between “true culture” and “false culture.” What they called “true culture” reflected Argentina’s traditional values based on the country’s Catholic heritage. “False culture” did not subordinate itself to morality and reflected the negative influence of liberalism, individual utility, and leftist ideology. Through censorship of cultural mediums, Avellaneda argues that the military, priests and fascist right-wing politicians of the final dictatorship attempted to construct an Argentine lifestyle reflecting its Catholic values “qualified at times as ‘heritage’, ‘tradition’, ‘Christian meaning of life’, and ‘origin’.” However, Avellaneda points out that the generals of the sixth military regime borrowed and modeled their methods of censorship after those implemented by Gen. Onganía.

After the first six months in office, the military regime of the Argentine Revolution continued its struggle against immorality and the spread of leftist ideologies through media censorship. Following Col. Green’s censorship during the morality campaign, the administration continued to pull various “immoral” magazines and books from the market. Law 17.741 and Law 18.019, passed in May and December of 1968 respectively, gave the government the legal right to censor the entertainment industry. Law 18.019 empowered the government to cut out scenes or ban completely, movies, plays and television shows affecting “public morals, morality or national security.” Any material that included content that damaged marriage or family life by justifying abortion, prostitution, crime, sexual perversion, or adultery fell under the government’s censorship. On December 27, the Minister of the Interior, Gen. Guillermo Borda, criticized the entertainment industry, arguing the nation needed the laws because they “tend to the defense of the Argentine lifestyle [and] preserve Christian morality and family.” Furthermore, he reminded the citizens that the law expressed “the philosophy of the Argentine Revolution […] which has the support of the great mass of the population that is fed up with eroticism, violence and immorality.”

Government agents cut and pulled “immoral” movies, television shows, operas and plays at will. They snipped five erotic minutes of Michelangelo Antonioni’s lavishly praised film “Blow-Up,” before only allowing those twenty one years or older to watch it. In addition, they completely banned Alberto Ginastera’s internationally acclaimed opera “Bomerzo” from the stage due to its “obsession with sex, violence and hallucination.” One source reported that rather than increase attendance of morally sound movies, the censorship law had decreased the overall average annual movie attendance from 7.2 movies a year in 1960 to 2.0 movies in 1970. Outraged at the government’s censorship, certain sectors of society voiced their discontent. In April of 1969, the Argentine Association of Actors filed a formal protest against the movie censorship law that had slowly narrowed the scope of acceptable films.
A month later, in May 1969, radical university students protested and rioted in several of Argentine major cities. The largest and most devastating occurred in Córdoba. During what became known as the Cordobazo, disgruntled unionized workers joined with violent students and brought the city to a stand still, forcing Gen. Ongania to declare a state of siege. The emergency powers and the provisions of the anti-communist laws allowed the government to suppress anyone it wished. One source speculated that labeling union leaders and university students as communists allowed the administration to sentence them to long jail terms, regardless of their actual complicity in the riots. Amidst the turmoil and chaos during the final year of Ongania’s tenure in office, he maintained his battle against immorality. Provocative literature continued to disappear from the newsstands, kiosks, and bookstores. In a last ditch effort, on February 1970, Gen. Ongania established the National Council of Radio and TV Agency (CONART) to monitor and censure that aspect of media by improving the moral tone of their programs.

The May riots forged an anomalous alliance between the most radical university students and union workers, inspiring the creation of urban guerrilla groups that plagued the nation during the 1970s with their terrorism. In 1969, guerrilla fighters carried out 114 armed operations, 434 in 1970 and 654 in 1971. The convergence of union workers and university students during the May riots and the ensuing wave of chaos caused many to question Gen. Ongania’s ability to maintain order and authority. Eventually in June 1970, disgruntled military officers disposed Ongania from office. His successor, Gen. Roberto M. Levingston (June 1970-March 1971), and the Argentine Revolution’s final military president, General Alejandro A. Lanusse (March 1971-May 1973), feebly attempted to uphold the anti-communist and censorship laws during their time in office. By then, the military’s worst nightmares had become reality: the Argentine youth had cast off the constraints of Catholicism and embraced leftist ideologies. Their political radicalization had turned to militancy.

CONCLUSION

From 1966 to 1970, the discourse and actions of authoritative and conservative Catholic-minded military officers, civilian cabinet members, and the Buenos Aires police targeted the “immorality” of the modern youth and the nation as a whole because they believed the internal threat of communism had degraded the country’s Catholic orientation and spiritual values. In their minds, combating communism and immorality was just as important as stabilizing the economy. The new government invested time and energy into their social and cultural campaigns months before Gen. Ongania finally took action towards fulfilling his economic promises. After Vasena launched his plan for economic stabilization, Gen. Ongania and his second cabinet persisted in combating communism and immorality through passing and enforcing anti-communist and censorship legislation. Furthermore, the military’s discourse and their crusades to combat and prevent the spread of leftist ideologies through a morality campaign, intervention in the nation’s universities, censorship, and anti-communist legislation departed from anti-communist rhetoric and actions in Western countries during the Cold War, especially the United States.

During the Cold War, politicians and policy makers in the United States linked their struggle to combat communism and totalitarianism with their country’s moral duty to preserve the freedom of religion. They often referred to the evil they faced as “God-less communism,” a system that would curtail citizens’ rights to freedom of choice, especially their choice of religious practice and expression. Yet, in the U.S. these religious motivations did not drive geopolitical policies. National Security, the fear of World War III, and economic motivations - securing markets for trade and preserving sources for raw materials- better explain motivations for U.S. policy and diplomacy during the Cold War. In a sense, politicians employed religious rhetoric to “sell” the war to the public.

In Argentina, the anti-communism voiced by Argentina’s generals put religion at the forefront. The military officers did not fear a political ideology that organized a classless society based on the common ownership of the means of production. They targeted the nation’s loose morals and loss of spirituality because they believed such expressions indicated that leftist ideologies had already penetrated society and had contributed to the youth casting off Catholic values. Furthermore, the officers’ rhetoric and actions demonstrated that by constructing a moral and spiritual culture based on the country’s traditional religious values and eliminating the liberal atheistic cultural expressions, they believed that they could shield Argentina’s youth...
from further infiltration of leftist and liberal ideologies.

The subversive elements that so many saw creeping into society not only brought new ideas which questioned the framework of Argentine culture, but spoiled the youth from becoming Argentina’s future leading class. The nation could not be ruled by a generation of mediocre and liberal atheists. The preservation of a future generation of young people who possessed values based on Catholic Nationalist theology, which rejected leftist ideologies and the materialism of Western Culture, depended on the success of Gen. Ongania’s social and cultural reforms during the Argentine Revolution.

NOTES


13 “Underwear is also outerwear”, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 6 July 1966. The article pushed females to challenge traditional dress patterns through a simple scenario: “You are standing there in your slip, or maybe even your bra and panties, when suddenly you notice a crew of window washers industriously wiping away at the view-obstructing haze on the glass. What do you do? Shriek hysterically and run for a robe? Never. The Solution: Go about your business as though you were fully dressed.”


22 Ibid., 7.


25 Argentine Republic, Presidente, Planeamiento y desarrollo de la acción de gobierno: directiva..., op. cit., 37.
26 Osiel, Mark, Mass Acrotiy, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah Arendt..., op. cit., 105.
27 Ibid., 106-107.
34 Ibid., xx.
37 Argentine Republic, Presidente, Planeamiento y desarrollo de la acción de gobierno: directiva..., op. cit., 9.
38 Lewis, Paul H., Guerrillas and Generals..., op. cit., 26.
40 Lewis, Paul H., Guerrillas and Generals..., op. cit., 22-25.
43 Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Estado de Gobierno, Acta de la Revolución Argentina..., op. cit., 7.
44 Argentine Republic, Presidente, Planeamiento y desarrollo de la acción de gobierno: directiva..., op. cit., 20.
46 “Asumió su cargo el inspector general de la municipalidad”, La Prensa, 23 July 1966.
47 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
56 “Detúvose a integrantes de un trio musical”, La Prensa, 1 August 1966.
57 It is near impossible to know the exact number of people arrested during the morality campaign. Either the Federal Police did not give numbers to the press during their crusade or the press did not publish them, being afraid of possible censorship. Manzano has estimated that the police arrested at least 335 people for different violations during the first three weeks of the campaign. See Manzano, Valeria, “Sexualizing Youth”..., op. cit., 456.
58 “Funcionarios municipales contra el liberalismo ateo y la pornografía”, La Nación, 28 July 1966, cit. in Manzano, Valeria, “Sexualizing Youth”..., op. cit., 455.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 458.
66 For a list of the groups as well as membership by departments, see Herrick, Paul B., The Political Consequences of the Argentine Revolution of 1966. Doctoral Dissertation, Tulane University, April 1976, 284-285.
68 Genta, Jordán Bruno, Libertad, 90, cit. in Rock, David, Authoritarian Argentina..., op. cit., 136.


“Discursó que pronunció el primer magistrado”, *La Prensa*, 21 September 1968.


Vasena’s economic plan received much international praise. In 1968, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency lauded the stabilization plan in their “CIA Report: Argentina-A Promising Effort at Economic Reforms,” see Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Archives, Austin, Texas, National Security File, Country File, Argentina, Box 6, and in 1969 the *Financial Times* of London named Argentina (and Japan) as the year’s two outstanding economic and financial performances. For more on Vasena’s reform policies, see di Tella, Guido and Braun, Carlos Rodríguez (eds.), *Argentina, 1946-83: The Economic Ministers Speak*. New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1990, 101-102.

For a list of the cabinet members who participated in the Ateneo de la República, and their various roles in the organization, see Siegelbaum, Clair Huga, *The first year of the Argentine Revolution: A New Experiment in Corporatism?* Doctoral Thesis, Harvard University, 1968, 113-114.