

GLOBAL ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR ONE. PART ONE: THE WORLD CRISIS OVER CONCESSIONS IN CHINA

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Abstract: In the present article the author deepens in the debate on the origins and responsibilities of the World War One. Moving away from an eurocentric approach, the author tries to expose the importance that for the facts of 1914 had the triggering of tensions and diplomatic crises placed in the periphery of the international system. The author will give specially attention to happened in Far East. It will be described the reasons of the same ones, the positions adopted as each of the great powers before them and the consequences that had for the geostrategic balance both of the region and of the planet, linking it to the snap of the World War One.

Keywords: World War One, Far East, China, diplomatic crises, great powers.

Perhaps the Koreans are right to teach their young people that the era of the world wars began with the Japanese attack on Korea in 1895. The interpretation might be called Asiacentric, or Koreacentric, but it might also be an improvement on the Eurocentric proposition that the world wars were really only a single European civil war, a twentieth century version of the Thirty Years War. The craft of European diplomatic history as it was known for most of the twentieth century was largely shaped by debates about the European events that caused the two world wars¹. The mold was set by the international discussion in the nineteen twenties about the guilt of the Germans for the outbreak of war in 1914. There was an obvious stake in the debate; the reparations regime under which the Germans had to subsidize the victors' recovery from the war was underpinned morally by the idea that the Germans had started it. Knowing this, the German foreign office released a huge collection of documents, *Die grosse Politik der europaischener Kabinet*, and

helped the work of many British and American historians who in turn, perhaps not very surprisingly, established in the works they published during the next decade that the immediate origins of the war in the crisis of August 1914 had been much more complex than the Versailles treaty would have had the world believe. Not to say that the historians who in these works created the field of diplomatic history were all duped by the German foreign office. They set a standard for research and narrative that has not been surpassed. They established the case against the Versailles treaty's War Guilt clause that appears in most textbooks today. Even so, the debate ended abruptly when the Germans stopped paying reparations in 1931.

Since that time we have been supplementing and detailing the picture that the earlier debate developed. We have looked at events much more closely, and have assigned guilt rather more proportionately among all the powers, except the British. In the process, some came to conclude that the immediate origins of the war in the crisis of 1914 was exhausted and that diplomatic history itself, depending so much on foreign ministry documents, had become a study of "what one clerk wrote to another." It was this historiography that moved Fernand Braudel to complain of the "factitious panoramas" of history based on the short time span². We know the results. Braudel and the *Annales* school favored a history with a grander time frame and what became a turn away from the study of power. Even now, the many historians who seek a "return to events" feel they are bucking a residual prejudice. But Braudel also loved to trace events across intellectual boundaries, as, for example, with the case of the recession in Florence between 1580 and 1585, which he followed to Ferrara and, by study of Moorish

and Portuguese trade, to the Indian Ocean and the Sunda Strait, thence to China and Central Asia, until he looked up and wondered admiringly that “the research has just taken us around the world”. Let us try something similar with the Great War and its origins in the dawn of world politics at the turn of the twentieth century in the scramble for concessions on the China coast.

The Far East in 1900 was at the intersection of competition between the great powers turning from a scramble for Africa that had culminated in the Franco-British confrontation over the sources of the Nile, at Fashoda, in 1898. The object of their attention was China, whom Jules Ferry called “the sick man of the Far East”. Japan could be said to have started the scramble by her attack on China, but she was preceded in this by the French in Indochina, the British in Burma, and of course, the long shadow of Russia’s drive to the Pacific. In Korea Japan allied herself with the forces of progress, “self-strengtheners” in court circles who advocated the Japanese model of modernization as against the conservative pro-Chinese faction. “Self-strengtheners” in China in the eighteen sixties had been conservatives who believed that western technology could be used to respond to the west without abandonment of Confucianism. Now Korea had a similar movement of reform ideas. Japan saw to it that the two perspectives would have it out, and it was only a matter of months before Japanese armies had overrun Korea and were bearing down on Beijing itself. Making peace by the treaty of Shimonoseki, the Manchu rulers of China granted the independence of Korea (under Japanese supervision), ceded to Japan Formosa and the Pescadores, and gave the Japanese a leasehold on the Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur, commanding the gulf of Chihli and the approaches to Beijing.

Hardly ratified, the treaty drew an immediate response from a grouping of European powers, Russia and her ally France, with Germany supporting. The three powers presented a joint note, in friendly but firm terms, suggesting that Japan should refrain from taking any mainland Chinese territory. The Far Eastern Triple, as it was called in Europe, made Japan back down. And for its efforts it demanded compensation. The French got an extension of their mining and rail rights in southern China. The Russians were permitted to put a rail line through northern Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern Railway, with

mining rights and tax exemptions, along with a south Manchurian line to run to the warm-water Port Arthur. A Russo-Chinese bank, with mostly French capital, was set up to finance the project. In response to the Kaiser’s request, his cousin the Tsar allowed Germany to annex the port of Kiaochow, with its excellent harbor. This as Admiral Tirpitz came into office as Minister of the Navy and a navy bill was introduced greatly expanding the German fleet. Germany proclaimed that the recent gains had been won by the “mailed fist”, announcing a future policy of *Weltpolitik*. Tirpitz explained that the navy was to be a “risk navy”, a fleet “capable of action between Heligoland and the English coast”, perhaps two-thirds the size of the British navy, but big enough to make any attempt to destroy it by the home fleet too costly a risk³. It had domestic advantages. Tirpitz said it would be “a palliative against the Social Democrats”. The Germans intended to have all of the Shantung peninsula as their sphere. They proceeded to work on rail lines and the organization of industries. France claimed additional land in the south of China and Russia followed by the leasing of Port Arthur in March 1898. Kiaochow and Port Arthur, said the Kaiser, were “Saint George and St. Michael, guarding in shining armor the approaches of the Yellow Sea”⁴.

What was Britain to do about this? Through the whole scramble for Africa, she had not confronted a real obstacle to the pursuit of her interests. Since the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1894 as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy), Salisbury and other British leaders had taken the view that Britain need not join either of the two groupings. Her interests were insular and maritime. What was more, the existence of competing blocs with outstanding continental disputes was not necessarily an inconvenience. A position of “splendid isolation” might offer the British a free hand to pursue the expansion of the empire in Africa and other places. This on the basis of naval supremacy according to a two-power standard, the two powers being France and Russia. The rise of a German navy and its implantation in a Far Eastern Triple, on the other hand, was not cause for complacency. The very idea of a risk navy only made sense in terms of increasing German “alliance value” to France and Russia, in a possible continental league of naval powers arrayed against Britain. That, in fact, was exactly what the Far Eastern Triple represented.

Moreover, if a continental league could have such an impact on the Far East, could it also affect the traditional Near Eastern Question. This was suggested when the Kaiser visited Constantinople and the Holy Land in 1898, during the confrontation between Britain and France at Fashoda. In a sensational speech he reminded the Sultan that Germany had no Muslim subjects and assured him that Germany was the only true friend of the Muslim people. It was a direct encouragement to Sultan Abdul Hamid's enthusiasm for the Pan-Islamic idea, which he was attempting to promote by a Hejaz railway to Mecca and Medina, in order to aid in the pilgrimage of Muslims to their holy sites. The Kaiser's remarks could not have pleased Britain with her hundreds of millions of Muslims in India and elsewhere in the empire. At the same time the foundations were laid for the Baghdad railway project, to extend through Anatolia, moving inland to Konia, across the Taurus Mountains to the Gulf of Alexandretta, thence to Mosul on the Tigris, to Baghdad on the Euphrates, and down that river to Basra and the Persian Gulf. As a rejoinder, the British immediately established a presence at Kuwait in 1899 and subsequently warned that any other power setting up a base at the Gulf would have committed an unfriendly act. The Baghdad railway project would arouse bitter contention among Britain, Germany, France and Russia right down to 1914. It helped to poison the atmosphere from the fear that Germany intended to plant herself astride the Road to India and threaten British global interests.

The British fumbled for a response. At first they tried to tail after the Triplets and take something as compensation. They set themselves up at Weihaiwei on Chihli gulf just opposite Port Arthur, at the other end of the Shantung peninsula, the better to keep track of German and Russian naval activities. But this was hardly adequate. Lord Salisbury frankly recognized the Far Eastern events as the opening of a scramble for concessions in China that could likely result in partition into European spheres of influence. Would European alliances function outside of Europe? That had never been the case in the scramble for Africa. There was a Belgian project for a linking of rail lines between Russian Manchuria and the French area in the south of China. It was dropped after strenuous British protest, but was it a logical thing that would soon return in some new form? Britain's interests were primarily in the Yangtze basin, with important holdings in iron and steel

in the Hankow area. She conducted about 65% of the total China trade. But the total might be vastly greater one day. Lord Beresford in his influential book, *The Breakup of China*, spoke of "a trade the extent of which no mortal can conjecture"⁵. The trouble was, as Lord Beresford saw it, that "British influence is in inverse ratio to British trade." The word was about that Britain was afraid of Russia, and that she had been too timid to support Japan when the Triplets ordered the latter out of Korea. Britain and the United States both would have preferred a regime of the Open Door. With British encouragement, the United States would proclaim that to be its policy in 1900. But was that enough? Britain had to break up the Triplets by any means at hand. At first the British tried, without success, to approach Russia directly⁶. Then they considered Germany. Could she be induced to act against Russia in the Far East? Three times between 1898 and 1901 the British tried to patch things up with Germany in order to recruit her. The first attempt was spoiled by the Kaiser's speech in Jerusalem in support of the world's Muslims. The second was Joseph Chamberlain's offer in November 1899 on the occasion of a visit by the Kaiser to England. The United States was suggested as a third partner. Nothing came of the talks.

The third was on the occasion of the Boxer rebellion. China's defeat in the war with Japan had proved to her leaders that the "self-strengthener" idea was not adequate. A few Krupp cannons were not enough to resist Japanese armies. In the summer of 1898 the Chinese Emperor decided to deepen the westernizing reform movement. The civil service exams were revised in the spirit of a "reforming Confucianism". This coincided unfortunately with the humiliating concessions being made to the western powers. The Emperor was stopped by the coup of the Empress Dowager and General Yuan Shih-kai. With their encouragement, in June 1900, there were attacks on all the European legations in Beijing, led by the "Fraternal and Righteous Order of Harmonious Fists", whom the amused Europeans took to calling "the Boxers". The Boxers were anti-foreign in every respect, in fact rather Luddite. At first they seemed to intend to depose the Manchu dynasty itself, under the slogan "overthrow the Chi'ng, destroy the foreigner". The Empress Dowager, taking the movement under her wing, substituted the slogan "restore the Ch'ing, overthrow the

foreigner". The Chinese government had in effect declared war on all the foreign powers. And this met with a united response. An international force of Britain, France, Russia, Germany and the USA intervened to crush the rebellion with great violence and looting. The Russians used the opportunity to station a large army in Manchuria and to continue their probes into Korea. The British took the opportunity to try to woo Germany a third time. And the two agreed, or seemed to agree, to support the Open Door. A few months later, however, the Germans announced that this "Yangtse agreement" applied only to the Yangtse area, that is, to Britain's sphere, but not to the Russians in Manchuria. Germany could not be recruited to do duty on behalf of Britain against Russian expansion in the east.

While Lansdowne, who had succeeded Salisbury as foreign minister, and Chamberlain were talking with the Germans they also opened conversations with Japan. These were much more straightforward. The Japanese were smarting at being displaced in Manchuria by the Russians. Baron Hayashi, the Ambassador to London, told British officials of his "strong sentimental dislike" for the Russian presence. But Japan's real concern was Korea, whose people were "far too unintelligent to stand alone" and might soon come under the Russian sway. It was a "matter of life and death" to keep Russia out⁷. Lansdowne considered the Japanese plaint with sympathy. He told Hayashi that he regarded Japan's cause in Korea as rather like that of Britain in the Transvaal⁸. Britain and Japan quickly agreed on "joint action" to protect their interests. Japan would support Britain in China while Britain would support Japan in Manchuria and Korea. The Anglo-Japanese alliance that was signed on 30 January 1902 provided as well that, in case of war between Japan and Russia, Britain would remain neutral and try to ward off any power supporting Russia. In view of the Franco-Russian alliance, that would have been France. If this failed Britain promised to fight alongside the Japanese. The Treaty seemed to solve many problems, not least the threat posed to Britain by the Triple in the form of a continental league of naval forces. Now Britain had a pact with the leading navy in the region, outfitted with battleships built in British yards. The two navies could dominate Asia, Triple or no Triple. Now Germany, not Britain, was in the position of observing two hostile alliance systems in preparations for combat. Britain was committed

to do battle with France in case of French support for Russia against Japanese attack. The one who understood this best was the French foreign minister Theophile Delcasse. He had been in office at the time of the French confrontation with England at Fashoda in 1898; he had given orders to Captain Marchand's forces, including the humiliating one to back down before the British. But Delcasse was not so bitter as to overlook the possibilities for alternative action. He concluded that the struggle with the British for the sources of the Nile was a sideshow in comparison with what might be gained in North Africa and in Europe from cooperation with Britain. This could be achieved without damaging the aggressive commitments of the Franco-Russian alliance. In an exchange of notes with Russia on 9 August 1899, he had insisted on removing language that described the alliance's mission as "the maintenance of peace and substituted" instead "the maintenance of the balance of power"⁹. Britain, he hoped, might eventually be added to the Franco-Russian alliance.

Delcasse warmed up with a campaign to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance. In 1900 he won a promise of Italian support for the French annexation of Morocco in return for French support for the Italian annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The Italians were wriggling out of their commitments to the Triple Alliance. In 1902 they would renew the alliance for the fourth time, gaining Austrian recognition of their ambitions in Tripoli. Then they turned around and agreed with France for Italian neutrality in a French war with the Triple Alliance. As a result, Italy was practically free of her attachments to Germany and Austria. She was, it has been said, a straw in the wind, but one which showed which way the wind was blowing.

So, according to the various negotiations, Morocco was to be the next item on the menu, a small independent kingdom ruled by a Muslim Sultan, putting up with a weak Spanish hold on a northern port, Ceuta, and permitting the British to enjoy the majority of her foreign trade. Delcasse urged the Spanish to take Tangier and Fez if she could have the rest. In order to win the British, Delcasse offered a general colonial entente, ending a world rivalry that dated back to the time of Louis the Fourteenth. It touched on rights of the two powers in Newfoundland, the New Hebrides, Siam, west and central Africa. Most important, France dropped all

claim to the administration of Egypt, whose seizure by the British in 1882 she had never accepted, in return for British recognition of the French interest in Morocco. The British were thus able to obtain for themselves a kind of reinsurance treaty to keep them from being dragged into a general European war that might start in the Far East. The annexation of Morocco was in effect compensation to the French in a western theater of the war that was being prepared in Asia.

Delcasse's entente with Britain was thus a source of encouragement for a Japanese war on his ally Russia. It was a kind of desertion. But this need not have mattered to Russia if she was truly as strong as she thought she was. In fact Moscow did not view even British support for Japan with any particular trepidation. Perhaps this was due to a kind of racial naivete about Japan. Russian generals thought that their troops would have an easy time with the "little yellow monkeys". Foreign minister Lobanov-Rostovsky wanted to put Russian officers in charge of the Korea army. He was backed by navy men who wanted the Korean ports of Fusan (Pusan) and Mozampo (Masan) in order to extend the south Manchurian railway to the Korea Strait across from Japan. Count Witte, the architect of Russia's industrial revolution, loyally supported this policy. He had once said that "from the shores of the Pacific and the heights of the Himalayas, Russia will dominate not only the affairs of Asia but Europe as well". He liked the idea of a Far Eastern Triple Alliance of Russia, Germany and France, and enthusiastically supported the Russian naval race with Japan. But, along with minister of war Lamsdorf and defense minister Kuropatkin, Witte was intimidated by the Anglo-Japanese alliance and began to moderate his tone, shifting to a line of "peaceful penetration" and patient diplomacy. With the Russian military and naval buildup in the background exerting its pressure, he would have preferred to talk the Japanese out of Korea if possible. Witte was opposed by a more impatient group with influence on the Tsar, who thought that Korea should be won with bayonets rather than diplomacy, and who were confident that if war was necessary it would be a short one.

Russian talks were proceeding patiently along with Russian military pressure when the Japanese decided to cut them short and attack Port Arthur in February 1904. On the other side of the world, Anglo-French talks for the Entente

Cordiale were speeded up and the treaty was signed in April. This was to ensure that the eastern war would be localized. Unable to use its Black Sea fleet because of the denial of passage through the Straits, as effected by Turkey and Britain in various ways throughout the nineteenth century, Russia tried to send a Baltic fleet around Europe and Africa into the theater of war. Apparently as a result of the orders of Captain who was drunk, it fired on some British vessels in the North Sea. Would this be the Anglo-Russian war that many had thought to be inevitable for many decades? The Kaiser hoped so. He was encouraging the Tsar to stand up, not only against Japan but also England. He spoke of Japan as the main barrier in the pending struggle between the white and yellow races. He offered to Russia a "continental league" against English power, which might, he thought, be a prelude to a "United States of Europe".¹⁰ The Tsar agreed, and promised his own best efforts to "abolish English and Japanese arrogance". But no one in Britain wanted an Anglo-Russian war, just a little one in the Far East. That was the whole point of the Entente Cordiale.

On New Years Day, 1905, Port Arthur fell to Japanese armies. Days later in Saint Petersburg, a religious procession of workers, carrying to the Winter Palace icons and pictures of the Tsar, presented a pathetic petition urging royal action for improvement in working conditions and related issues. It was met by the rattle of machine gun bullets. The Russian revolution of 1905 had opened a few months earlier with the appointment of a reforming regime of liberal Tsarist officials, but "Bloody Sunday" ensured that it would have a radical character that no one had bargained for. The deaths of perhaps fifty thousand people on this day meant that the Russian workers would never again march under the religious and monarchist banners, but instead, from this point on, under those of revolutionists¹¹.

In February the French started to make moves on Morocco, demanding control over the police administration. In March Bulow, for Germany, countered with demands for the Open Door and for an international conference, backed up at the end of the month by the Kaiser's personal visit in his yacht to Tangier. This was both a protest against the Entente Cordiale and an attempt to buck up the Tsar who by then was facing a wave of strikes involving perhaps three million industrial workers. These spread rapidly out of

the major Russian cities and into Riga, Lodz, Warsaw, and Vilna. Liberals demanded an end to absolutism and a parliament of the western type. The Tsar held on grimly against the revolution and the Kaiser pressed the French in behalf of the embattled Sultan of Morocco. In view of his advocacy of an Open Door for Morocco, he thought he might bid for the support of the American President Theodore Roosevelt. At the same time the Germans hatched a plan for an attack on France and Russia, drawn up by Count Schlieffen, essentially the plan they were to use in 1914.

At the same time, the war in the east went badly for Russia. She was defeated at Mukden in March by Japanese ground troops. The Russian Baltic fleet, arriving exhausted from its lengthy trip around the world, was decimated by the Japanese at Tsushima. President Roosevelt, who had earlier hoped for a war that exhausted all sides and promoted a balance in the region from which the US could benefit, judged the time to be right to exert pressure on the Franco-Russian Alliance. He urged that Russians open talks for peace with Japan, while he pressed the French to back down and accept a conference. Delcasse, faced with the collapse and defeat of his ally Russia and confronted by his cabinet colleagues who feared war with Germany, had to resign. The Kaiser was giddy with victory. He thought that Russia and France had been humbled sufficiently to be recruited for a "continental combine" against Britain, "blocking the way to the whole world's becoming John Bull's private property". He and the Tsar signed a solemn pact to this effect at Bjorko, on the Finnish coast, in July. It was a kind of culmination of everything in the works since the Far Eastern Triplice had appeared ten years earlier, a continental naval league against Britain-- the whole world, or at any rate, most of it, united against the world hegemon.

What was Britain to do about this? Nowadays we are told constantly, with reference to American primacy in world politics, that the position of hegemon always draws an inevitable reaction from the other powers. Numbers two, three, and four gang up on Mister Big. We are often told that history and theory support this idea. History, however, supports no such idea. Since the advent of the modern nation state, no major war has been waged by a coalition against the hegemon, which would have been Britain. The closest Britain ever came to that was in the period when the Kaiser strove for his continental

league. But, as the Germans were to learn to their sorrow, Britain was not without resources. Her counter-campaign began in August with a renegotiated Anglo-Japanese alliance, this time a pact not merely to support Japan against Russia in the Far East, but to provide for Japanese support to the British in case of any Russian thrust against India, the nightmare of nineteenth century British foreign policy. Britain further took advantage of Russian indisposition to sign a treaty with the Lama barring Russian influence in Tibet. Not that this was immediately on the agenda. Russia was ravaged by revolution. Peasant disturbances had broken out in the summer in central Russia and now they spread into the Baltic provinces, Poland and the Caucasus. The Tsar was forced to compromise with the revolution by promising a consultative assembly elected by indirect vote.

American power was enlisted in the effort to break the continental league. Theodore Roosevelt expressed worry about the growing war mood, based he thought, on "mutual distrust and fear". There was a "panic terror" in Britain about the continental league and a corresponding fear on the part of the Kaiser that the British aimed to smash his fleet. This had stemmed originally, the Kaiser told Roosevelt in June, from the action of the Triplice in defending China from an imminent partition. "My people are sure that England would now back France by force of arms in a war against Germany, not on account of Morocco, but on account of Germany's policy in the Far East".

He was also sure that the British wanted to crush the German navy to get a "free hand" for the partition of China. The Kaiser saw himself as the partisan of the sick men, Turkey and China. Roosevelt assured him that peace could be made without the British or French getting any compensation in the region.

He thereby got the Kaiser to put pressure on Russia for peace. Roosevelt wanted Russia to be restrained by Japan but he still wanted the two powers to balance each other. He also sought some way to improve Anglo-German relations. "Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred for the other", he wrote to William Howard Taft, "each from sheer fear of the other". He wanted to improve their relations but not to the point of an Anglo-German coalition which, he said, would be "inimical to us." Fortunately, he noted, Britain was "too flabby" for that¹².

At Roosevelt's invitation, Witte went to Portsmouth to make peace with Japan. There Russia was forced to surrender Korea to Japan, to get out of Port Arthur and southern Manchuria, giving Japan a leasehold on the Liaotung peninsula, and to yield up south Sakhalin island to Japanese jurisdiction. It was a crushing defeat for ten years of policy, for which Witte was blamed by wags who referred to him as "Count Half-Sakhalin" (*polovina Sakhalina*). But even this mattered little in view of the fact that European Russia was almost denuded of troops before what was to be the most intense period of the revolution. In October came a rail strike that paralyzed transportation between Moscow and Saint Petersburg. It soon turned into a general strike, the largest one seen up to that time. The strike committees took for themselves the name of *soviets*, councils of workers' deputies. These appeared in the capitals but also in Kiev, Odessa and scores of smaller towns. The Tsar had to offer a real constitution with a Duma to be elected on an indirect but wide suffrage, an upper house, and a prime minister on the English model, for which job Witte was thought to be the advisable candidate. At the same time the right swung into action with the "Black Hundreds," anti-Semitic mobs, carrying out a wave of pogroms.

The Russian government was hanging on by its fingernails. Witte stopped on the way back from Portsmouth to see about continued French financing in order to bolster the government against a revolutionary parliament. Russia was going through a process like the British, French, and American revolutions, in which the state was pressed by the estates with the demand for a real constitution in return for the right of the state to tax them. Witte's job was to save the Tsardom from that historic compromise by means of foreign aid.

He succeeded in floating a loan of four hundred million dollars, the largest international loan to that time, one that essentially gave the Tsar freedom from parliament. However, the French also told Witte that the loan was to be linked to Russian support for France on the Moroccan question. Thus Russian officials henceforth had to act as if the Bjorko pact between the Tsar and the Kaiser did not exist. The Russian vote at the looming conference at Algeciras, a conference that met in January, 1906, was in effect paid for by the French loan. By the time the conference met, Lord Grey, who had taken over the foreign

office in December, had gone as far in bolstering the French as to initiate military and naval staff conversations.

He intended these to be supportive and non-binding, but they in effect became the source of what the French were later to consider a "moral obligation" of Britain to defend them against Germany. The Entente Cordiale of 1904 was by 1906 looking much more like an Anglo-French military alliance.

It had to be if all the incentives were to be put in place at Algeciras for a coalition against Germany. The Kaiser found there a solid phalanx of opposing powers, including even the United States, whose support he had mistakenly counted on. It was a preview of the lineup of 1914. It only remained for the world crisis of 1904-1906 to shift its locus from the China coast to the Balkans, from the "sick man" of the East to the "sick man" of Europe.

NOTES

¹ For a review of the debates, see Anthony D'Agostino, Michael, "The Revisionist Tradition in European Diplomatic History". *Journal of the Historical Society*, (Spring 2004), 255-287.

² Braudel, Fernand, *On History*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980, 28. Also Wallerstein, Immanuel, "Three Instances of Hegemony", in *The Essential Wallerstein*. New York, New Press, 2000, 253-263.

³ Langer, William L., *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*. New York, Knopf, 1956, 435.

⁴ Quoted in Condo Baker, Dwight, "Germany and the Far East". Unpublished Doct. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1927, 266.

⁵ Beresford, Charles, *The Breakup of China*. London and New York, Harper Bros., 1899, 433.

⁶ Baron Rosen, *Forty Years of Diplomacy. Vol I*. New York, Knopf, 1922, 165.

⁷ "Landsdowne to Whitehead, 31 July 1901", in G.P. Gooch; Harold Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914. Vol. II*. London, Johnson Reprints, 1927, 91, 97.

⁸ Pooley, A. M. (ed.), *Secret Memoires of Count Tadasu Hayashi*. New York and London, Putnam and Sons, 1915, 131. British *uitlanders* had moved into the Transvaal seeking their fortune. The Cape Colony and the British government had backed their claims to citizenship against the Boer authorities. The quarrel over terms was the immediate cause of the Boer War.

⁹ Bury, J.P.T., "Diplomatic History, 1900-1912", in C.L. Mowat (ed.), *New Cambridge Modern History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968, 120.

¹⁰ "Kaiser Wilhelm to Bulow, 25 September 1904", *Grosse Politik*, xix, 252, quoted in Brandenburg,

Erich, *From Bismarck to the World War*, London, Oxford University Press, 1927, 212.

¹¹ Ascher, Abraham, *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988, 58.

¹² “Theodore Roosevelt to Hay, 2 April 1905”; “Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan, 12 September 1905”, in Joseph Bishop (ed.), *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time. Vol. I*. New York, Scribners, 1920, 378, 472, 418.