

CONTINUITY AND CHANGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON CHINA'S NEW GRAND STRATEGY

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Recibido: 6 Octubre 2006 / Revisado: 16 Noviembre 2006 / Aceptado: 22 Noviembre 2006 / Publicación Online: 15 Febrero 2007

Abstract: Since 2003, the China foreign policy research community was absorbed by several new concepts such as 'peaceful rising', 'peaceful development' and 'harmonious world'. In spite of all those debates and evaluations, there are still a set of interlinked important questions to be answered: comparing to the "Tao Guang Yang Hui" (Taking low profile) strategy proposed by Deng Xiaoping in the last decade, or comparing to any other grand strategies since 1949, what are the specialties that this new one are displaying? To what extent are China's top leaders serious about their approach? (If they are serious,) how far can the new grand strategy go in the coming future? This article aims at answering these questions. On the methodology consideration this paper adopts the historical comparative method to put the new grand strategy into its own historical developing process, i.e., comparing the new strategy to the old ones and combining its own unique contemporary background and conditions, so that we can find out some reliable, comprehensive and in depth answers toward these questions listed above. The main argument is: compared to the grand strategies in history, the new one shows more change than continuity.

Keywords: China, grand strategy, peaceful rising, peaceful development, harmonious world.

Since 2003, the China foreign policy research community was absorbed by several new concepts such as 'peaceful rising', 'peaceful development' and 'harmonious world'. By their experience or intuition, scholars believe that these concepts could be taken as an important change of the guideline of PRC's foreign policy—hereby we prefer to replace it with the term 'grand strategy' which originated

in the U.S. and is popular in China nowadays. On this new grand strategy, there are lots of comments and evaluations which are always controversial against each other by both Chinese and western researchers. In the United States, these discussions and evaluations were combined into the undergoing hot debate on its policy toward China. In spite of all those debates and evaluations, there are still a set of interlinked important questions to be answered: comparing to the "Tao Guang Yang Hui" (Taking low profile) strategy proposed by Deng Xiaoping in the last decade, or comparing to any other grand strategies since 1949, what are the specialties that this new one are displaying? To what extent are China's top leaders serious about their approach? (If they are serious,) how far can the new grand strategy go in the coming future?

This paper aims at answering these questions. This research bases itself on the broad interviews conducted in Beijing's foreign policy circle¹ in the past three years, focusing on the process of inner debate on and reception of the new grand strategy. On the methodology consideration this paper adopts the historical comparative method to put the new grand strategy into its own historical developing process, i.e., comparing the new strategy to the old ones and combining its own unique contemporary background and conditions, so that we can find out some reliable, comprehensive and in depth answers toward these questions listed above. The main arguments in this paper are: compared to the grand strategies in history, the new one shows more change than continuity, the differences are very obvious in the aspects of domestic policy bases, the precondition views on the world order and the essence of era, ideological inclinations and intellectual styles and so on. Because of

these specialties, we can be sure that Hu and his colleagues are serious about the commitment in this 'peace-harmony' approach. Although it was doubted and criticized by different perspectives, this grand strategy seems promising in the coming future.

In the first part of this paper, there would be a chronological review about the foreign policy guidelines which could be defined as grand strategies in the history of PRC as well as their policy practices. In the second part, to achieve historical understanding about the new grand strategy, we will conduct a comparative study from five different perspectives among the six different strategies, disclosing its continuity and change. As for a living grand strategy, to get know how it comes is important, but what's more important is how it is applied. Therefore, in the final part, there would be a summary on how the Grand Strategy of 'peace and Harmony' has been doubted and received so far by the research and policy community to find out what kind of result we can expect from it.

1. FROM "ONE SIDE BINDING" TO "PEACE AND HARMONY"

The past half century had witnessed a surprisingly regular rhythm in the changes of PRC's grand strategies. Every decade had its own updated concept: in the 1950s it was a strategy called "one side binding", 1960s the 'two lines fighting' strategy, 1970s the 'one line' strategy, 1980s the 'independent and peaceful diplomacy', 1990s the 'low profile' strategy, and since 2003 the new concept and practices of 'peace and harmony'.

Shortly after 1949, the biggest challenge that the new born communist regime faced with is to consolidate its position both domestically and internationally. Because of the ideological and geopolitical security reasons, Mao Zedong chose to adopt the strategy of "yi bian dao" (Throwing oneself into one side between the confronting two blocks, or, one side binding), that means China made up its mind to follow the Soviet Union and take the capitalist block which was led by US as its enemy. By doing this, China can find shelter for security and physical and political support from the Soviet block. This grand strategy prevailed the whole decade and imposed great influence on China's policies in every aspect. Korean War, in which China fought with the US, sacrificing half a million men and Mao's most beloved son, was one of

the most influential events derived from this grand strategy. But the complexity of the reality is, the disagreements and negative sentiment between China and Soviet Union was embedded during the honey moon when Soviet Union asked for privileges in north-east and north-west China and other concrete compromises on China's sovereignty, which automatically reminded Chinese about the painful humiliations during the half-colonial era in the past century. Chinese communist revolution war, unlike the east European countries, was won mainly by the efforts of Chinese Communist Party, therefore Chinese party can hardly accept the integration instruments imposed by Soviet Hegemony. Once this gap was enlarged by the disagreements on ideological issues, the ally changed into rivalry, and the one side binding strategy came to its end automatically.

In the 1960s, China was on a high risky approach named 'two lines fighting', i.e., to fight against US and Soviet Union at the same time. During the Vietnam War, China sent 300,000 troops to reinforce North Vietnam and the logistic input summed up to 20 billion US dollars². Considering the exchange rate and purchasing power differences between 1960s and today, that was really significant investment to fight against US hegemony. But comparing to the north frontier, this investment was no more than a piece of cake. The public debate and mutual harsh criticize between Soviet Union and China in the late 1950s resulted in a dramatic deterioration of bilateral relationship and was even accelerated by Soviet Union's unilaterally breaking its promise on aid and cooperation, and finally, in 1969 a war broke out around an island on which both sides declared sovereignty. It was really a difficult and dangerous strategy situation for a weak state as China fighting against two superpowers at same time.

From early 1970s, both China and US have been looking for cheap ways to improve their strategic situations which resulted from the wars in 1960s, and both sides found each other an ideal card to play against Soviet Union, therefore the China-US relationship straightened up dramatically. In 1971 US Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger visited Beijing stealthily and effectively changed the global power structure. In 1973, Mao developed the idea to form a strategy of 'one line', i.e. coordinating the strategy of US, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and western Europe to form an anti Soviet Union geopolitical line and restrain the

expanding tendency of Soviet power. As in most years of 1970s, US was looking for detente with Soviet Union and China was no more than a step stone to have a better access to Moscow, it was not until end of the decade that US-China relationship witnessed substantial and concrete developments.

In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping reformed China dramatically and accordingly there were big adjustment in its foreign policy, which was declared to pursue an independent peaceful diplomacy. Deng believe that the theme of era has changed from 'revolution and war', which was defined by Mao, to 'peace and development'. Therefore China should rethink about its tradition of forming allies with one big power to fight against the other. In the middle of 1980s, China declared that it will no longer take ideological element as the arbiter to decide its attitude toward any country; and it will offer its friendship to any country (including Soviet Block countries) if only they would like to take the reciprocal attitude. During the 1980s, the percentage of military expense in China's GDP went down obviously so that China can concentrate its limited resources on the economic development. Partly because of the change in China foreign policy, and partly because the evolvement of the competition between US and USSR, China enjoyed an unprecedented promising international background in the whole decade, and such a helpful international situation formed an obviously positive interaction with its successful domestic reforms, until the coming of political storms which swept the whole communist world.

In the years of early 1990s, China international situation experienced dramatic reversion. As the communist party leaders took tough measures to scotch the Tiananmen event in the summer of 1989, China was suffering from a joint sanction by the western countries since then. Things went even worse when most communist countries collapsed by 1991 and China found itself the biggest communist country exposed to universal strategic pressure and political isolation. As an experienced leader, to survive the difficult period, Deng proposed a series of policy guidelines which was later summarized into two phases, 'taking low profile' and 'doing something necessary'³, which means that China should take low profile in world affairs to avoid from attracting more pressure on itself while continue to open and reform so that it could be

accommodated by the international community which was led by US. During the whole 1990s, President Jiang zemin showed high fidelity in implementing this grand strategy. For example, China was famous for its dull renunciation on any important issues in UN Security Council, China also kept its pace and direction in continually disarmament which started from 1980s. These are the examples for China's low profile. But on the other side, partly because of the stimulation from the military contingencies such as the first gulf war(1991), Taiwan Straight Crisis(1995,1996) and China embassy bombardment in Kosovo War(1999), China's defense investment stopped dropping down in the 1990s so that China can avoid from the potential risk of being left backward in a military revolution motivated by information technology. But obviously the later process was very limited and almost invisible from outside, and to be not provocative, some stimulating projects was delayed and cancelled such as aircraft carriers R&D and producing.

As China's national comprehensive capability kept rising continually and remarkably, and the international situation had changed greatly in the past decade, there was an atmosphere getting mature which demand some update on China's foreign policy.⁴ At the end of 2002, Mr. Zhen Bijian, who was the VP of Central (Communist) Party School and was believed to be the pear and near policy advisor to President Hu Jintao, visited US and had a talk with Dr. Condoleezza Rice. During the talk, he was asked by Dr. Rice again and again about what kind of global role that a more capable China will pursue in the next 20 years. What shocked Zhen in the conversation is not only the frankness of Rice's question but also the deep anxiety and suspicion which, has been witnessed again and again at the similar scenarios in history of human being and resulted in most of the major wars. As US is widely believed to be the only single power that can suspend or even reverse the rising process of China, the anxiety and suspicion from US elites are extremely important to deal with if China want a sustainable and peaceful international environment.

That conversation inspired him to design a clear and transparent policy guideline both for domestic and foreign policy which can serve the aim of constructing a peaceful international situation in advantage of domestic development. From 2003, Zhen and his colleagues started to preach in various occasions about the idea of

'peaceful rising' as the new guideline of foreign policy. In Chinese context, his stand and his unique identity indicates that his ideas have already been endorsed by the top leaders. According to him,

'China will experience a period which is full of both golden opportunities and difficulties, therefore China has to focus its energy on domestic affairs for quite a long period rather than detract itself by outside aims. China will rise, while in a peaceful way; China will keep its policy independence, while will continue to participate in the process of globalization. China's peaceful rise is a Chinese dream rather than a copy of any other nations' dreams. Take energy consumption for example, we can't afford an 'American dream'. Take population flow for example, we will not pursue the 'European Dream' either. We Chinese have to rely on our own efforts to address the migration problem within our own territory. Take the enhancement of our national strength for example, we do not want to dream a 'Soviet Union Dream'⁵.

In short, by unswervingly adhere to a development path of peaceful rise, we seek to become a modern socialist country that is prosperous, democratic and culturally advanced, and a responsible big country playing a constructive role in international affairs which doesn't seek hegemony or leadership of the world nor becomes a vassal state.

China is the beneficiary of the current international order, particularly economic globalization. China stands for reform, rather than violence, in the efforts to establish a new international political and economic order. If people fail to see these important and basic concepts of the Chinese leadership which are in conformity with the trend of our times, they may arrive at a serious strategic misjudgement of China's direction in the 21st century and thus commit a historic mistake'⁶.

These words provoked a wave of debate not only in west, but also in China, even between different ministries of the government. As it was difficult to reach an absolute unanimous consensus, the name of the strategy itself underwent a shift in the past three years: first changed from 'peaceful rise' to 'peaceful development'⁷, and then came out the idea of 'harmonious world' which was presented directly by President Hu and Premier Wen

themselves in 2005⁸. Researchers believe that the term 'harmonious world' should be taken as a development and alternative expression of 'peaceful rising'⁹ rather than replacement and veto to the later. Comparing the concrete explanations of the 'peaceful rising' 'peaceful development' and 'harmonious world', it's easy to find that the consistency between them are much more impressive than the literally differences. To some extent, as an answer toward the questions from Dr. Condoleezza Rice, 'peaceful rising' provided half answer, i.e., made clear what aims China will not pursue; while the 'harmonious world' finished the answer by making clear what kind of world order China would like to construct. According to President Hu, China want a harmonious world order which is characterized by 'lasting peace and common prosperous', and the means to construct such a world are 'getting rid of the cold-war mentality' 'adopting the new perspective on security' 'supporting multilateralism' 'democratizing the relationship among the international community' and 'reforming the world economic institution'¹⁰ etc. Therefore, in this paper we prefer to create a new term which combines the three terms together and put it as 'peace-harmony' strategy.

Since 2002, there was obviously a new atmosphere embodied in almost all kinds of policy adjustments both domestically and internationally, and accordingly the mass media and internet media created a new word 'Hu-Wen xin zheng' (new politics by President Hu and Premier Wen) to address those new phenomena. On the foreign policy aspects, people find that Chinese government is showing more readiness, braveness and political will to pursue its international aims. It's not difficult to mention the most impressive movements since then which were by China's initiative, for example, the strategic cooperation between China and Russia under the structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the active participation in regional integration with the ASEAN on the platforms of '10+1' and '10+3', the energetic economic diplomacy in Africa and Latin America, the construction of Strategic partnership with EU, the cooperation with US on the regional and global hot issues such as DPRK and Iran's Nuclear projects and last but not least, the energetic diplomacy toward Japan which showed both the principled will and flexible strategies. All these actions are indicating an obviously deliberate initiative and energetic posture and style on the foreign affairs

which is very different from the 1990s' 'Low Profile' doctrine. In 2006, till middle of November there were three international summit conferences took place in China, including the SCO summit in Shanghai in June, the ASEAN-China summit in Nanning in October and the Africa-China Beijing summit in November. With these three summits, there were more than 50 national leaders gathered in China in 2006, which means that following US and EU, China is now becoming the third center for world

diplomacy activities. Reviewing the history of the 6 grand strategies, we can find they could be clearly divided into three groups considering their different designers. The first three strategies designed by Mao could be taken as group one, the next two both by Deng could be taken as the group two¹¹, and the nearest one could be taken as the third group. With such a classification we can simplify the comparative study a lot.

TABLE 1. CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGIES

China's Grand Strategies	The GSs in Mao's era: 'one-side binding', 1950s 'two lines', 1960s 'one line' 1970s	GSs in Deng and Jiang's era: 'Opening up', 1980s 'Taking low profile' 1990s	GS in Hu's era: Peace- harmonious 2003-
Domestic bases of GS	Moscow Consensus	Washington Consensus	Post-Washington Consensus
Judges on the essence of the era and world order	It's an era of war and revolution. Hobbes style anarchy characterized the international relationship.	Peace and development have already become the theme of the era. Lockian style anarchical international society.	Peace and development are (and should be) the theme of the era. Try to construct a kantian anarchical international community.
Ideology and traditional intellectual styles	Revolutionary Internationalism plus realism; School of Law, especially its faction of maneuver	Non-ideology, Pragmatism and realism; Taoism	Socialism, pacifism, Confusionism
Aims and means of GS	To keep national independence and pursuing international revolution, by the means of war and confrontation	National development by means of opening up and embracing global market	To achieve both national development and international harmonization by the means of international institutions, multilateral cooperation and reform
Intention and capability of GSs	Use China's very limited capabilities as leverage to prize the process of world revolution	Covering up its capabilities and intentions, pursuing practical interest at the cost of international influence and prestige	Acknowledging the rising of capabilities, while showing goodwill of international peace and harmony

2. COMPARISON AMONG THE GSS

The first perspective for comparing is to consider their different domestic bases. The foreign policies always have their domestic bases which are consistent with them respectively¹². And in most cases, the national grand strategy serves the domestic agenda, therefore the changes of the later could result

in the consequent changes of the former. Here, we take the national development approach as the most important indicator of domestic agenda. According to the research of Professor Hu Angang, a prominent economist and policy advisor in Beijing, PRC had zigzagged its way in exploring a proper approach for social and economic development, first tried the 'Moscow Consensus', then the 'Washington Consensus'

and now are looking for a 'post Washington consensus'. In the first 30 years after the inauguration of PRC, China enthusiastically copied the model of Soviet Union to develop itself as soon as possible, invested most of its resources into the heavy industry at the cost of light industry and agriculture, relying on the economic planning system rather than a national market to distribute 'scientifically' its economic factors. In quite a long period after the WW2 the Moscow model was quite attractive to the developing countries, and China was one of them. Because of the over-confidence on the Moscow Consensus, China declared to achieve the goal of 'exceeding the UK and catch up with the US' in the 1950s and then the goal of 'four modernization'. When Deng came into power China shifted its interest to US and adopted a systematic reform which, especially in its economic aspects, was similar to the demand of 'Washington Consensus' appeared later, including opening up to the world market system, free trade, using market mechanism as the basic instrument to distribute the economic factors. For more than two decades, China overcame lots of political difficulties and disagreements and marched forward in this direction. Besides the obvious great differences between those two periods, they are surprisingly similar to each other on several facts such as: both believed that copying the 'advanced' model could automatically result in China own success; both emphasized on the quantity of economic growth and the accumulation of material wealth rather than the development of human being; both of them want to have some leap effect through an imbalanced growth. Different from those two periods, the new approach adopted by the government today emphasize on a series of new ideas such as 'new understanding on development', 'people first policy' (instead of material wealth accumulation), 'Green GDP'.

The new leadership seems to believe that China must find its own develop approach which is well-balanced and sustainable without too much cost on social and natural environment and resources. They attached much importance to the 'self-dominated innovation' measures to produce the critical intellectual and technological support for the further development. Obviously, the grand strategy of 'peace and harmony' is highly consistent with the 'post Washington consensus' which demands 'getting more

involved into the world economy while keep the policy independence', 'looking for a proper model of developing by ourselves rather than copying others'.

The second perspective is to see how the policy designers look on the essence of the world and the era which are logic premises for a sound grand strategy. As we all know, the world order is characterized by anarchy. But among the west classics there are different viewpoints on the logic of anarchy, with Hobbes, Locke and Kant as the most prominent intellectual contributors. In Mao's three grand strategies, we can see there are plenty of passion for revolution and complex about national survive. For a revolution leader who has been struggling among the very risky and excruciating wars and even more inclement inner party tussles since his youth, it is understandable for his taking the rivalries that he faces in the international arena when he become the leader of a nation as equally dangerous, insidious and obstinate as those he had annihilated before. This kind of judgment was deepened and confirmed again and again in his later life by several interlinked elements such as his own idea of world revolution, his foreign policy practices aiming at overthrowing both the US empire and USSR hegemony and, last but not least, the inclement geopolitical situation that PRC faced. Therefore, during the period of nearly 30 years under his leading, China was the most pugnacious state and obviously the most revisionist one among the big powers. For many times, Mao judged and proclaimed that the third world war is impending, and the theme of the era is revolution and war. According to his world view, especially after his nightmare experience of Soviet Big Brother's hegemonic intention, he was reassured that the international society seemed to be an anarchical one with Hobbesian characteristic, and the game between US, USSR and China seemed only to be a desperate struggle with at most one survivor.

Deng's viewpoints were obviously much more optimistic than Mao's. Deng declared that the theme of the era had already shifted to 'peace and development' and the world war would not be reality in the near future because the elements in favor of peace had overwhelmingly exceeded those favor of war. International anarchy was a problem, but there are mutual containment and cooperation

between big powers instead of pure clash and hostility. Therefore we can more or less use the term 'Lockian anarchical system' to describe the essence of world order in Deng's understanding, in which the national sovereignty is very important for a proper world order.

While in the 'harmonious world' perspective, there are some Kantian concepts¹³ emerging: Lasting peace, common prosperous. In the ideal 'harmonious world', the peace between nations depends not on the integration by hegemonic power, but on the democratized international institution which appreciates value of pluralism and multilateralism. Although they acknowledge the fact that the era today is still far away from the ideal scenario, they believe it's the moral responsibility for a rising China to promote the progress toward that dream so that the world can get out of the chaos, violence and turbulence today.

The third perspective is the difference on ideology and philosophy. According to professor Stuan R. Schram, the most noted American researcher on Mao Zedong, Mao was a Maoist (realist) before he came into power, while after that he transformed himself to be a Leninist (revolutionist). This opinion is in line with the one held by prof. Li Junru, a Chinese expert on Mao Zedong. But if we take a closer look at Chinese foreign policy between 1949 and 1976, we may discern Mao's realistic aspect, such as the coalition with U.S. against U.S.S.R.. Therefore, we should say in Mao's era, Three Grand Strategies is a mixture of revolutionary internationalism and realism. Deng Xiaoping Era is featured by non-ideology and pragmatism which were embodied by both domestic affairs and diplomacy. While with Hu and Wen in office, we have witnessed a tendency of socialism, pacifism, humanism and the renaissance of Chinese traditional value¹⁴.

As far as philosophies are concerned, we can examine the different Chinese traditional philosophy styles embodied in the Grand Strategies put forward by these three generations. About 2500 years ago, roughly when ancient Greek philosophy and Buddhism flourished, Chinese philosophy reached its peak during the 'Spring-Autumn Period' and 'warring states period'. Many schools were

established and they placed attention on various philosophy topics concerning life and governance, etc. Among them, the most distinguished ones are Confucian, Taoism, Mohism, Legist School, military school, etc. The distinction of different schools was drawn during this period and it evolved and came down till today. Now they has been merged into the Chinese culture gene. If we analyze the Grand Strategy of three generations from this angle, we can find the differences on disposition and tendency among them. Mao tends to be fond of Legism¹⁵, that is, to focus on and stress on exerting strategies and maneuvers on international affairs. Deng's intellectual inclination could be described as Taoism. His policies could be summarized by the phrases from Taoist classic such as 'following rather than fighting against the tendency', 'self-restriction to avoid conflicts with others', 'deliberately give up the position of pioneer', 'should be good at performing a dull appearance' 'taking low profile'. When we look back on the Chinese performance on foreign policy of the past 20 years¹⁶, it could be taken as a positive note for the famous phrase 'he never compete with others therefore nobody is able to defeat him' (yi qi wu zheng, gu mo neng yu zhi zheng), which is one of the most impressive aphorisms in the book Laozi. While in today's 'peace-harmonious' strategy, it's not difficult to find out that lots of terms and expressions are directly from some Confucian classics, such as 'He Xie', 'He Er Bu Tong'. This interesting phenomenon could be explained partly by the renaissance of Confucian School which is one of the most powerful intellectual tendencies in nowadays China, and partly by the Confucian School's robust function of providing legitimization to a power centralized state.

The fourth perspective is to analyze the goals and means of different Grand Strategies. The goal of Mao's Grand Strategies contains two aspects. One is to maintain the national security and integrity of sovereignty, the other is the fulfillment of world revolution. The means to reach these goals includes not only the widely-known bold military confrontation, but also the abundant selfless international foreign aids toward developing countries¹⁷. Because of the kind of settings of GS's aim, international affairs seemed to be always superior and prior to domestic affairs in that period. Deng's strategy holds the opposite. The domestic economic development has come to

be an overriding issue. Diplomacy aims at insuring a favorable international environment for domestic economic development. In order to serve the aim, the exertion of force lessens dramatically and lots of researches on military equipments were even suspended in the 1980s. Inaction and compromise are adopted as the policy of diplomacy during this period. When it comes to the strategy of 'Peace and Harmony', it continues the saying 'to construct a favorable international environment for economic development', but some new elements were added, like 'to maintain the world peace by self-development', which indicates that the goals of the contemporary Chinese foreign policy focus on the stability of the international system as well as the domestic interests. Economic Diplomacy has by far been served as the main means. On one hand China took advantage of the accumulated wealth in the last 20 years to strengthen the power and effect of diplomacy, on the other hand, China makes use of diplomacy to guarantee the supply of the indispensable resources and others needed in the process of economic development.

The fifth perspective lies in the differences on the relationship between the capability and the intention. In Mao's era, although China's capability is very limited, Mao is willing to use it as a leverage to push the revolution of the world forward. Therefore, the influence of China is magnified. In other words, the capability and intention of Mao's era has been exposed in exaggerated manners. Deng stressed on the significance of economic strength in relation to military strength in the 1980s, then in the face of the crisis of the 1990s, Deng calls for a policy of concealing its true capability and intention and seeking for safety and interests at the expense of its international prestige. By contrast, in today's China Grand Strategy, it is obvious that China doesn't make covering up like before. Instead,

China is more likely than before to take initiative and makes use of its relatively abundant economic resources¹⁸ to construct a preferred international environment rather than merely adapting itself to it. As to military build up, the transparency of military force has been enhanced and the capability of the hi-tech Local War has been increased. Acknowledging the rising of capabilities, China today is emphasizing on the aspiration for international peace and harmony all the more.

To sum up the comparison made above, it could be reasonable to say that although Peace-Harmony Strategy seemingly follows many policy dispositions¹⁹ and doctrines of Mao and Deng's Eras, the new leadership has already based their grand strategy on very different bases from before.

3. DOUBTS, RECEIVES AND ITS FUTURE

Knowing the origin of a strategy is important, but it's even more important to get know its implementation and influence. In this part, we will summarize the doubts and receives toward the 'peace harmony' Strategy and will talk a little about its future.

In China, as has mentioned above, the debates on the peaceful rise of China has lasted for quite a long time, which involves the competition of policy influence between different institutes and ministries. The most distinguished critique comes from some sections of the government, who argues that the word 'rise' is over provocative to some people, especially to some Americans, and they hold that China should keep on the strategy of TAO GUANG YANG HUI 'taking low profile' so that China can ensure the peaceful development environment and opportunity. While critics from the academe community argues that the concept of 'Peaceful Rise' challenges the common sense based on world history and the IR theory, because so far there has never been any power who has risen peacefully and successfully. And according to IR theory, peaceful rise means a unilateral consideration in logic: since whether you will have war or peace could never be decided by yourselves. It's a business involving at least two actors. That is to say, peace is not maintained just by your own will. Some suspect about the feasibility of this Grand Strategy. If you commit to your promise made in advance, it will contradict with the policy of deterrence on the Taiwan independence issue. It is just the credibility of deterrence that sustains the stability of the great triangle among Mainland, the USA and Taiwan. Partly because of the above criticisms, there is a change in the concept from "peaceful rise" to "peaceful development" and then to "harmonious world". It is obvious that harmony has some similarity with peace in notion, but it avoids the contradictive

promising to peace and it is not that provocative, instead, it advocates a type of world order.

Critiques from outside China are even more straightforward and they are composed of the following ideas. The first voice comes from fundamental liberalists. They stress on the difference of value between China and the mainstream of international society typified by America. The Chinese development model itself poses challenge and peril to America, so the success of China itself is unacceptable to Washington. Washington Consensus is composed of three elements: absolute capitalist mode, democracy and individual value with individual rights at its core. While the Beijing Consensus²⁰ or the Post Washington Consensus demonstrates the opposite: socialist market economy, socialist democracy and the community value with responsibility and obligation at its core. So we can see China and America worship different Gods²¹. Although China has realized the potential risk of advocating Chinese Consensus, therefore avoided using this sensitive term, and stresses that every country is supposed to choose his own developing path according to his own condition and can't implement some so-called successful modes (Chinese Mode included) mechanically, China's success has aroused the interest of many developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Many governments have put it on agenda to study and learn the experiences from China. This tendency, which is not pushed by China, will, to quite large extent, weaken or deconstruct the target of Washington's National Strategy — to promote democracy over the whole world²². Consequently, China considers itself to be a status quo power, and tried to avoid challenging America's core interest, but its success and influence have been a severe challenge to America.

The second voice comes from realists such as Measheimer, who is the representative theorist of offensive Realism Theory. He firmly asserts that the conflict between China and America is unavoidable and this estimation is based on the performance of Germany and Japan in the first half of 20 century and his own international theory. He is suspicious of Chinese commitment to peaceful development and the peaceful environment of the world. 'The key problem is how Chinese leaders and people of 20 years later will deal with the Taiwan Issue?

We can't know the answer right now. So today's politics is irrelevant and should be neglected. And the most important theory should be one that can predict the future²³. This kind of opinion takes China's commitment as a trick to delude America with the aim of winning the needed time and accumulating power so that it can make troubles to America in the future, push America out of the western Pacific area and then replace him as the predominant power in this region²⁴.

The third voice focuses on the specific issues, for example, China's strong request on energy and resources conflict with America's vested interests. They can easily show the following figures: at present, American consumes 500 gallon per year per capital, 100 gallon for Japanese, and only 15 gallon for Chinese. While if China's consumption reaches the same level of Japanese, considering Chinese population (account for nearly quarter of the world population), American living style will be threatened severely which is set up on the cheap energy supply. This kind of voice speaks loudly in the domestic policy debate of America in 2005 when CNOOC attempted to purchase Unocal Corporation²⁵.

Despite of all these voices, we can still hold an optimistic view on the prosperity of China's peace-harmony strategy, which is based on the following reasons.

The most important reason lies in the fact that the international structure (which is formed according to the distribution of power) has been changed in the past several years. America's power has declined relatively, so in a period it can't easily resort to force or other confrontational means to contain China, even though China's rising tendency frustrates it.

Europe, Russia and some other major powers make a positive comment on China's demonstration of peaceful rise, especially on the proposition of harmonious world, because the opinions such as Multilateralism, Democratization of International Society and New Security Concept agree with the claims of these countries.

Furthermore, Chinese economy has integrated itself tightly with the world economy; in addition, the evolving US-China relationship has been called A Balance of Financial Terror.

So each party knows that this relation has to be stable and not to be deteriorated, or the result will be a lose-lose game.

While to some extent, China's vulnerability and penetrability has made some American political elites feel ease at China's rise²⁶. America is and will still be in control of the routes of Chinese energy supply for quite a long time; China's nuclear strategy still maintains the lowest –level deterrence, based on the declaration of a no-first-use policy; China is still bothered by its inner instability; Tai Wan issue is still a sensitive topic. All these contribute to the vulnerability of China. And that makes some American strategists feel that the China's challenge would not be so dangerous as what some disaster-predictors had described.

On one hand, China should meet the following requests to guarantee the success of peaceful rise strategy.

To emancipate the US-China relation from the destiny of the conflict between newly-rising power and the traditional power is the linchpin for the success of the "Peace- Harmony" strategy. After all, there are two basic facts which can provide enough hope for the positive resolution of the problem. The first fact is, during what is called the Crucial Period of Strategic Opportunity, as long as US fail to concentrate enough resources, determination or to obtain enough international support to turn against China's strategy, China can basically ensure its safety and the peace. The Second fact is, if US wants to keep its predominance throughout the 21st century, one sine qua non is to avoid from getting involved into any face to face clash or confrontation with any of major powers, such as EU, China, Russia, Japan and India, though he might maintain some advantages or even leading position over other powers. Otherwise, even if US could win a Third World War or a Second Cold War, it will be very likely to lose its prospect for another American Century. Based on these two judgments, we can hold a relatively optimistic view on the future of Peace- Harmony Strategy. So far, judging from the present situation, China has already achieved a lot both in domestic affairs and in international affairs through putting forward, debating on and implementing the strategy of 'Peaceful Rise- Peaceful Development – Harmonious World'. First of all, it has almost unified the viewpoints

of its political elites and gradually brings out a new consensus on its foreign policy. Second, China's proposition has attained some positive response from the Bush Administration. Just a week after President Hu Jintao's speech on 'Harmonious World', U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Robert B. Zoellick put forward a new concept 'a responsible stakeholder'²⁷ to define China's future role. In 2006, Even Donald Rumsfeld also used this concept. Therefore the U.S-China relationship is already in a relatively stable stage, which to some extent, should owe to the Grand Strategy of 'Peace-Harmony'.

CONCLUSION

Through the comparison to its predecessors, we can find the new grand strategy has much more specialties than continuity. It is a GS with ideal and normative characteristics, embodying ancient China's Confusion philosophic base, looking forward to construct a Kantian Lasting peace, and to some extent, it pursue a benign interaction between the self-development and world peace rather than care only about self-interest. Expressed on policy, This Grand Strategy demand China to maintain the stability of international system rather than break or overthrew it; it also demand China to take initiative to mold rather than to wait for a peaceful and favorable international environment. Although it was and will continue to be doubted questioned by different perspectives, GS of 'peace and Harmony' will act as a guideline for the Chinese foreign policy and consequently participate in the molding of the world order of early 21st century.

NOTES

¹ Except for the Chinese scholars and policy advisors in Beijing, the interviewees also includes some colleagues from US and Europe among whom, there were not only optimists like Robert Rosecrance but also pessimists such as Measheimer. Most interviews were conducted face to face, but some are also in indirect way. For the viewpoints from Chinese colleagues, in most cases this paper will avoid mentioning their name.

² Shengyi, Yan, "Contemporary China Diplomacy" (2004), 185.

³ When Deng gave the inner instructions on 'low profile' and later made the 'south visit' in 1992, his only public position was the honorary chairman of China Bridge Association. Obviously his authority do not need any support from any title or position,

and his political wills were still being implemented dutifully even when he has passed away.

⁴ Late 90s there were some publications by and informal discussions between some scholars on the issue of China's rising, for example, Yan Xuetong and three other researchers in the Institute of Contemporary International Relations published a book entitled *International Environment for China's Rise* in 1998.

⁵ Bijian, Zheng, 13 June 2005. "A New Approach of China's Peaceful Rise and China-US Relations" (Speech at Luncheon by National Committee on American Foreign Policy) [document online] Available from Internet at: <http://www.crf.org.cn/peacefulrise/nyeng.htm>.

⁶ Id., 16 June 2005. "China's New Road of Peaceful Rise and China-US Relations" (Speech at the Brookings Institution) [document online] Available from Internet at:

<http://www.crf.org.cn/peacefulrise/wseng.htm>.

⁷ The later replaced the word "rising" with "development", therefore it seems to be more neutral but less necessary, because it sounds no more than an abbreviation of Deng's phrase of "peace and development has become the theme of era".

⁸ The term of "harmonious world" came out from the speech of President Hu on the Asia-Africa summit in April 2005, and was further elaborated by his speech on the UN 60 years anniversary summit in September that year. Soon this term was adopted by Premier Wen in other international occasions.

⁹ Yiwei, Wang, "From 'Peaceful Rising' to 'Harmonious World'" [document online] Available from Internet at:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2006-02/23/content_4215250.htm.

¹⁰ As far as the international economic order is concerned, Chinese attitude today is much milder than before. Here they use the verb "reform" rather than "reconstruct". The main motivation of the intention to "reform" is that China government feels the importance and influence of itself in the international economic institutions is not suit to its real economic percentage in the world, and its right to voice its own interest is not enough.

¹¹ The strategy of "Taking low Profile" in the 1990s was designed by Deng but implemented by Jiang Zemin.

¹² Rosecrance, Richard N., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993, 4.

¹³ It's important to note the fact that from 1950s to middle 1960s Chinese society was absorbed in the idea and belief of communism and consequently the morality in China culminated. It was exactly the same period that the new leading generation formed their weltanschauung, with the Marxism Works as one of the main intellectual resources. The philosophical origin of Marxism could be cast back to the German classics including Immanuel Kant's

Works. Therefore, it's not surprising to find out the inherent relationship between "Lasting peace" in 18th century, "communism" in 19th century, and the "Harmonious world" in 21st Century.

¹⁴ As an additional proof to support this judgement, there was an interesting remark made by a high rank policy advisor who had been deeply involved in the policy making, "both nations and leaders could be sorted into basically three type: the first type is crazy about belief, Mao and his China could be the model of that type; the second type cares about national interest, US could be regarded as its typical example; there are a third type whose key word is society and human being, Europe nations are the models of that type; if we put Deng as a leader of second type, then President Hu could be put into the third type obviously".

¹⁵ In fact, Mao has seriously mobilized political and intellectual movements to endorse the Legist school and depreciate the Confucian teaching. But obviously, what he is really fond of seems not to be the faction who preached the importance of rule with law, but the faction whose main concern was political maneuvers.

¹⁶ In my conversation in 2004 with Prof. Steve Halper, a former Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of US in Reagan-administration, he remarked China's foreign policy of the past 2 decades as the most successful one among that of all the big powers.

¹⁷ Most important cases are the Chinese aids toward Viet Nam, Africa, and Albania in 1960s and 1970s.

¹⁸ By October 2006, China has been ranked as 1st by its foreign exchange reserves with a size of 1 trillion \$; and also ranked 4th by GDP, and even 2nd by PPP. Vid.

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html>.

¹⁹ For example the five principles invented in 1950s, the emphasis on the importance of sovereignty and non-intervention principle, the emphasis on the role of development countries. All these slogans and doctrines are still repeated by Chinese Foreign policy documents.

²⁰ Cooper Ramo, Joshua, "Beijing Consensus", in *China and Globalization: the Washington consensus, the Beijing consensus, or what?*. Beijing, Social science academic press, 2005, 8.

²¹ Jing, Huang, "Can the peaceful development go well?". Chinanewsnet, 23 May 2006 or see Kagen, Robert, "The Illusion of Managing China". *Washington Post*, 15 May 2005.

²² Ibid.

²³ Mearsheimer, John J., "Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi". *Foreign policy* (January 2005).

²⁴ Shambaugh, David; Tellis, Ashley, 15 October 2006. "Will China be a Coherent Strategic Actor in Asia?" [document online] Available from Internet at:

<http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1032/transcript.asp> or see, Tellis, Ashley J., "A Grand Chessboard". *Foreign policy* (January 2005).

²⁵ Dr. Huang Jing's interview, "Dark clouds on the horizon" [document online] Available from Internet at:

<<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/>>.

²⁶ Katzenstein, Peter J., "China and Japan in the US system" [document online] Available from Internet at:

<<http://www.iwep.org.cn/pdf/2006/bidekazansitan.pdf>>.

²⁷ Taking into account the fact that Bush administration was so unfriendly to China at the beginning that he changed the definition of bilateral relationship from "strategic partnership" into "strategic rivalry", the term "stakeholder" is a very positive and helpful expectation.