MUSIC, YOUTH AND MORAL PANICS IN FRANCE, 1960 TO PRESENT

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Abstract: French society since 1945 has been characterised by a generally negative social discourse on youth, frequently precipitated by specific anxieties that relate to the emergence of apparently new groups onto the social scene. This article undertakes a comparative study of two such moments, when moral panics and an accompanying discourse of control developed in relation to the appearance of new forms of popular music in France: rock’n’roll in the early 1960s, and techno in the mid-1990s. On the basis of this comparison, it draws some conclusions about the relationship between regulatory authority and the ordinary citizen in France, and about the evolving role of the state.

Keywords: popular music, France, Fifth Republic, youth, techno, rock’n’roll.

Since the demographic rejuvenation of its society with the onset of the baby boom in the years after 1945, the tone of social discourse concerning the young in France has on the whole been set in the minor key. Dominant apprehensions of youth, whether promoted by politicians, analysed by commentators and academics, or resolved in the programmes of educators and campaigner have been characterised by a tendency to view the emergence of new youth groups as a problem to be broached, rather than as an opportunity to be embraced. This dominant tone has apparently not been altered by the progressive ageing of French society, as the baby-boomers have grown into both a position of numerical predominance and positions of influence within the social structure.

Where anxiety was once expressed about French society’s incapacity to respond to the needs and aspirations of a new numerically dominant group, now concern is frequently expressed about the imbalance between generations, the inequity of the distribution of wealth and opportunity across age groups, with those following the baby-boomers inevitably falling on the wrong side of the equation.

If the general tone of social representation of French youth has been marked by a certain caution, even a certain pessimism, then it is also true to say that the evolution of this social representation has been marked by a series of ruptures and breaks, where new youth groups emerge spectacularly on to the social scene. France has passed through a succession of moments where interventions by specific groups of young people have acted as a focus for debate, discussion and questioning about the place that youth as a whole occupy on the social scene. Not infrequently, this debate has gathered momentum in the form of a social or moral panic, implicating politicians, social commentators and the media in diagnosing the ills of the young, seeking explanations for their apparent intractability and anti-social nature, and proposing remedies for their better integration into the social structure. From the sudden rise in the juvenile crime rate following the second world war (which produced the essentially therapeutic structure of the contemporary French juvenile justice system), via the explosion of the student revolt of May-June 1968 (reckoned by most commentators to be the only campus-based movement of its kind from that period to thoroughly implicate the rest of society), through to the periodic outbursts of violence in France’s suburbs since the 1980s (the most spectacular being the conflagrations of November 2005), French society has moved in a stuttering relationship to its younger members, marked by a series of uncomfortable confrontations when it apparently discovers hitherto unrecognised aspects of their behaviour.
If these moments are united by a reinforcing of the predominantly negative social representation of youth in France, then it is also clear that within themselves, these revelatory breaks or ruptures are marked by a certain diversity in terms of the specific sub-group of young people that is held to be responsible for them. In terms of the social origin of the groups, in terms of the arena in which they act, and in terms of the particular dangers that they are deemed to pose, only the thread of gender acts as a common characteristic in the line of descent: when youth constitutes a “classe dangereuse”, it does so predominantly in the form of the male\textsuperscript{4}. Violence is a frequent if not universal feature of such outbursts. If youth groups act in a violent way, it is obvious how that can be perceived as a threat to the wider social order. However, occasionally and as will be seen below, the threat can sometimes be perceived in the form of the danger that the young pose to themselves and their own future, and by implication the future of society, rather than through the apprehension of a direct threat that they already pose.

A comparative history of such moments is therefore instructive: if further common elements can be identified between two such irruptions, establishing the ground for genuine contrast and similarity, then a comparative perspective can act as a wider focus for understanding the evolution of the French republic in the interim of these two moments. On occasion, and perhaps not surprisingly, the role of popular music has been central in mediating a fresh representation of young people as a whole. This article explores and compares two such instances: the arrival and development of rock’n’roll in France in the period 1959-1964, and the reaction to the development of a free party and rave scene in the period 1994-1998.

The implantation of rock’n’roll music in France can be seen as occurring in two distinct phases. The first begins with the “summer of the gang” in 1959, labelled as such by youth work specialists and sociologists in response to a sudden rise in juvenile delinquency\textsuperscript{5}. This delinquency was particularly concentrated in the emergence of large gatherings of the young at France’s coastal holiday resorts, reflected in wide press coverage of anti-social gangs, one of whose core characteristics was their predilection for the new American music of rock’n’roll. A significant link was being drawn between collective social alienation and age distinctive musical practice, perhaps not surprisingly given that 1959 was also the year that saw the launch of the “Salut les Copains!” radio show on Europe 1. Hosted by Daniel Filipacchi, this marks the advent of the first niche youth music show to be broadcast in the French language. Initially devoted to playing a broad array of American popular music, including jazz, the show quickly concentrated exclusively on rock’n’roll, in response to growing audience demand. Its success is further underlined by the appearance of similar shows on competitor commercial peripheral radio stations such as RTL, Radio Luxembourg and Radio Monaco (the state broadcasting authority the ORTF would remain resolutely closed to the new genre).

The new music continued to be associated with social disorder through 1960 and 1961, with the furore surrounding the national concert tours of France’s first “indigenous” rock’n’roll stars (Johnny Hallyday, Eddy Mitchell), as they moved from their Parisian bases (the subsequently famous Golfe Druot club, site of their initial concerts, and their core fanbase in the gangs and groups of Paris’s working class suburbs, exemplified in Hallyday’s base in the Square de la Trinite near the Gare St-Lazare in the northern part of central Paris). These tours became the occasions for repeated scenes of vandalism and violence, and occasional confrontation between young music fans and the police as local facilities, ill prepared for the new practices of audiences in relation to the music (a refusal to remain seated, a desire for proximity to the singer by “rushing” the stage) were overwhelmed by their youthful clientele. The extent of the panic such events generated in the provinces is shown by some mayors exercising their powers to ban concerts in their town. This first phase culminates in the so-called “Nuit de la Nation”, when a free open-air concert held in June 1963 at the Place de la Nation in Paris, featuring the key representatives of the new music and organised by the promoters of the “Salut les Copains!” show was similarly overwhelmed by an unanticipated response. Extra security had to be drafted in to escort the singers on stage through an estimated audience of more than 150,000, (approaching eight times the projected figure) and the chaotic nature of the event was underlined when at the end of the concert, violence flared in the streets and metro stations surrounding the Place de la Nation, again occasioning the intervention of the police.
The spate of headlines and social commentary that this event provoked to some extent mark a transition to a new perspective on this culture, founded less on its alienating novelty, and more on trying to grasp the reality of its successful implantation amongst significant numbers of the young drawn from all social backgrounds. Attention increasingly turned to the promoters of this event, amongst whom the radio DJ and publisher Daniel Filipacchi, and especially their magazine that took the name of the radio show. Launched in September 1962, by the time of the concert at the Place de la Nation in June 1963, Salut les Copains was already approaching the circulation figures of one million per issue that it would reach a year on from its launch. While not the first magazine aimed explicitly at the young in France, it was new in its singular focus on music, and in particular on the lifestyles, attitudes and outlooks of the stars that produced that music. Its success marks the second phase of the incorporation of rock’n’roll into France, a period when its more overtly rebellious features are domesticated and adapted to the French market. This process of domestication can be seen as having several dimensions. There was an increasing focus on romance between an idealised young couple as the central theme of lyrics in the songs, thus accentuating the role of honest, romantic love as forming a well-spring of the republican order. In a similar vein, the increasing association between rock’n’roll music and the introduction of certain dance crazes (for example the twist), emphasised its more general appeal to audiences of all ages, enabling it to take its place more easily within existing patterns of sociability (the wedding, or bal populaire). Increasingly, artists who had been at the forefront of the initial wave found that they had to adapt themselves to the entertainment environment of the French variety show if they wanted their careers to continue, a transition made rather more successfully by singers like Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie Vartan, than by those such as Eddy Mitchell.

Replacing the earlier publicity shots of a leather-jacketed Hallyday in rebellious or aggressive pose, highly reminiscent of James Dean, his physical resemblance to whom was clearly being accentuated, photography of Hallyday and the other stars who dominate the magazine increasingly places them in domestic, social situations, at once familiar to the reader (everyone can recognise a kitchen when they see one), but also immediately unattainable and distant (not many will have seen so large a kitchen). Idols are either seen smiling or wearing wistful expressions, their clothes either indicative of their more relaxed and casual attitude, or signifying social success in the shape of the upwardly mobile suit-and-tie or trousersuit. This transmutation is completed in the cover shot of April 1964, the moment when Johnny Hallyday started his military service: he is pictured in his army uniform, standing in front of the tricolour flag. He retains a link with his adolescent audience however: he is not shown in typical military pose (neither at attention nor at ease). Instead he stands half-smiling, with his thumbs hooked into his belt, as if it were holding up a pair of jeans rather than nipping in a khaki tunic. Nonetheless, the overall message is clear: Johnny the erstwhile rebel is ready as anyone to fulfil his social duty, a mark of his respect for the social order. On completing his military service, typical for its low-key banality in the wake of the Algerian war, Hallyday’s further social integration is indicated by his marriage with fellow-copain Sylvie Vartan in April 1965, an event given enormous prominence not just in Salut les Copains, but equally in adult magazines such as Paris Match. The stars of rock’n’roll have completed their journey of recognition from niche to mainstream audience.

It is noticeable that the two distinct phases in the development of rock’n’roll music in France also produce a characteristic and recognisable figure of youth: in both instances, it seems that the emergence of a particular musical form was readily being interpreted as a way of getting at the wider characteristics of France’s young populations. The dominant figure of the first phase is the masculine and alienated “blouson noir”, metonymically identified from his wearing of a black leather jacket, but readily associated with other signifiers of his social alienation: long, swept-back hair (significant in a society where compulsory military service had been extended beyond 18 months, and which now included an obligatory term in Algeria); an
habitual gathering in gangs in the old working-class areas of inner city deprivation, given to the violent tracage of members of the local immigrant population, or of easily identifiable sexual outsiders (homosexuals in particular); the aggressive deployment of his mobylette, whether through the defiant occupation of squares, pavements and other areas reserved for pedestrianised leisure, usually accompanied by the loud and provocative revving of engines, or in the self-destructive practice of “rallyes sauvages” in the wastelands of France’s new suburban developments; in his identification with the alienated anti-heroes of contemporary American cinema (James Dean and Marlon Brando), or with the new French heroes of rock’n’roll music, much closer to them in terms of their own youthfulness.

In contrast, the *copain* presents a rather different social face. More unisex, less aggressive, but apolitical and socially impractical, they are presented by certain commentators as being more unknowable and more beyond the reach of the adult world than the *blouson noir*. Overt rebellion is seemingly more understandable in the French social and political context. Wilful adoption of apolitical attitudes presents a more disquieting aspect in a society that accentuates political socialisation based on active citizenship. Inhabiting a hermetic adolescent world, peopled by its own array of idols and heroes, who display none of the characteristics admired by educators and moral guardians, the *copain* is above all oriented towards the present, and specifically towards the pursuit of ease and leisure in that present. The key is to be *available*, to be free of effective and social ties that would prevent the instantaneous response to the opportunity to socialise with one’s like-minded peers, whether it be in the shape of surprise parties, sessions listening to records of *la musique yeye*, or sharing the latest gossip about one’s idols over the pages of the latest copy of *SLC*. The recurring theme through external characterisations is on the impracticability of this group’s goals and social ambitions. While its relative material prosperity and autonomy from the adult world is interpreted as a by-product of the modernisation of social relations in France, and sometimes celebrated as marking a new more relaxed stage in the inter-gender relationships of the young, concern is often expressed that contemporary society should not be too sanguine about this apparent integration into the materialistic mores of technocratic capitalism. This is in obvious contrast to the appearance of the *blouson noir* and the initial impact of rock’n’roll music. In that case, attention was repeatedly drawn by experts and analysts to the chronic failure of the institutions of youth socialisation: to the failure of the republican school, divided in its mission to serve the elites of the country, and in its pursuit of the more egalitarian equipping of citizens for life in the skills economy; to the failure of cultural policy in reaching the young with the benefits of France’s classical cultural heritage; or to the failure of the youth justice system, presented as conceptually well-equipped, but as financially under-resourced in the face of the demographic explosion. What unites such positions is a desire for greater state intervention and institutionalisation of the young. Paradoxically, at the height of discussions around the *copain* phenomenon, this theme of greater intervention persists, but with a different tone. Now the young appear more socially integrated, but in the wrong way, and by the wrong people: they need, but have not been given, the tools to resist the blandishments of advertisers and promoters selling a petty-bourgeois dream. Newspaper accounts in the wake of the “Nuit de la Nation” translate this ambivalent attitude to both *copain* and *blouson noir*. Some headlines sought to stress the presence of only a violent minority in the crowd, but even this could have paradoxical effects: what if the rebellious *blouson noir* could by their presence act as a contagion on the otherwise docile *copain*, who appears to some commentators to be clearly ill-equipped to resist the essential demagoguery and mass manipulation inherent in the new music.

Whether represented by concern over the actions of the *blouson noir*, or by anxiety at the lack of action on the part of the *copain*, the overwhelming sense is that music has provided a uniquely privileged vehicle for articulating a vision of a society that now finds itself faced with “the rise of youth”. The unanimity of this discourse surrounding the young, and its origins in the shared perception of a cultural practice deemed common to them all, is further reinforced by the fact that it soon produced its mirror image, in the form of a backlash challenging its basis in social reality. The sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron had already used the columns of Sartre’s *Les Temps modernes* in 1963, to launch an excoriating attack on the complaisance of certain commentators, who in their view deployed a sociologising discourse to reinforce
contemporary but misguided notions about the emergence of forms of mass culture that promised to challenge existing social inequities through its democratising and anti-hierarchical influence.\textsuperscript{15} Put simply, they refute the notion that cultural practices could constitute a form of social promotion. For Bourdieu, this intervention marked only the beginning of attempts to challenge prevailing ideas of youth as a new social force. In theoretical terms, he developed with Passeron the notion of unequally distributed cultural capital as a way of underlining the persistence of social and class relationships of domination within this apparently new framework\textsuperscript{16}. In practical terms, he was at the heart of efforts to coordinate a collective reclaiming of sociological discourse on a more scientific basis, whether by participating in the formation of the Societe francaise de sociologie, or with Alain Darbel in coordinating the agglomeration of economists, statisticians and sociologists in the Groupe d’Arras, devoted to the study of the distribution of the benefits of economic prosperity\textsuperscript{17}. The analysis of youth and adolescence that appeared in the published collection of the group’s work, presented by Jean-Claude Chamboredon, underlines its dissatisfaction with easy generalisations about the presence of a new youthful social force in French society\textsuperscript{18}. While in its first part, it acknowledges the novelty of the cultural pursuits of French adolescents, and in particular in their constitution of a universe of values and aspirations that sets them apart from other age groups in society, and while acknowledging that this autonomous universe does in fact cut across existing social categories and classes (with readership of Salut les copains being presented as exemplary in this respect), the second half of the analysis seeks to accentuate the temporary and transient membership of this club: once adolescence is over, the social hierarchies and separations that mark this age group are reasserted as they reproduce, with a greater or lesser degree of success, the social position of their parents\textsuperscript{19}.

Situated as it is at the halfway point between the high watermark of Salut les copains culture (1964), and the next significant paradigmatic rupture in the social representation of youth (the events of May-June 1968), it is curious how strangely reassuring a picture of French youth Chamboredon paints. Alien in their leisure pursuits, he reveals the young to be essentially conservative in their aspirations and social ambitions. It completes the picture of “la musique ye-ye” as a socially integrative force, contributing as it does to the petty bourgeoisification of its essentially working class audience. However, despite general references to new patterns of music production and consumption amongst the young, Chamboredon’s analysis stops well short of a serious engagement with these patterns as new social practice, limiting itself instead to an analysis derived from the social profiles of the readership of Salut les Copains. This is despite the fact that a closer analysis of the new popular music culture would have if anything contributed to his case for establishing the social reality of a somewhat less than homogenous youth. In common with other contemporary commentators, Chamboredon does not appear to realise the potential for understanding the more subtle internal distinctions and rivalries that exist within and between youth sub-cultures, already apparent in 1966 with the emergence of an anti-ye-ye music (represented by singers who modelled themselves on the American folk revival such as Antoine)\textsuperscript{20}, or which had been present even earlier when rock’n’roll first arrived in France, either in the oppositions between Hallyday (presented in the first issue of Salut les Copains as the “ange blanc” or the white angel) and Vince Taylor (an English rocker signed with French record label Barclay, and presented in the same issue as the “ange noir” or “dark angel”), or between the happily married Hallyday and Vartan (the epitome of the bourgeois couple) becoming more progressively integrated into the structures of French chanson, and the more raucous Eddy Mitchell, who remained loyal to the socio-type of the blouson noir and “working class” hero of his and Hallyday’s initial emergence. Neither does he take seriously music as the basis for a set of discrete social practices (clothing, hairstyles, sites of sociability, consumption of drugs, exploration of new parameters surrounding sexual relationships) which might ultimately become the basis for a more permanent transformation of society, either by the will of a fraction of adult society to respond to such trends by copying them, or by the permanent reconfiguration of concrete urban spaces or (night-time) economies to accommodate them, or by the reinforcing of a sense of generational identification that produces a specific rejection of adult patterns of authority.

By the time of the emergence of electronic forms of dance music in France in the early 1990s, an emergence which prompted the
second case under consideration of a moral panic related to the irruption of a new musical form, it was a more widely accepted commonplace that such forms are frequently marked by tribal and even arcane distinctions, and oriented around the ethics and networks of sub-groups, that generate their distinctive and discrete sub-cultures. This contrasting perspective takes its place within a wider apprehension of youth in contemporary societies being resistant to reduction to a single homogenised social group, but that it is instead marked by its plurality and social diversity. In this context, it would seem impossible for a particular form of music to be read for general conclusions about the “state of the young”, and for conclusions then to be derived about the “state of society”. Indeed the example of the development of indigenous forms of rap music in France is instructive in this regard. They very quickly became associated in the public mind with the social revolt of particularly well defined category of youth, namely “les jeunes de la banlieue” (“youth form the suburbs”). In this case, however, the revolt precedes the music, with the latter being read as symptom of underlying social problems, rather than the cause of alienation in the first place.

A rather different process however can be observed in the debates provoked by the emergence of electronic forms of dance music in France, assimilated by the French under the generalised heading of “la techno”. Perhaps because the audience for this music is presumed to be nearer the social mainstream (white, middle class, college or university educated), there is a greater tendency to repeat the pattern of the moral panic of 1959-1962, when a particular musical form was read as symptoms of a wider disengagement of youth from the social project. As with the implantation of rock’n’roll into the French context, the establishing of an indigenous techno culture is equally marked by a phased establishment of its presence. However, these phases are less clearly distinguishable in strictly chronological terms, but correspond more directly to different aspects of social practice associated with dance music implanting themselves at different rates, and in different spaces.

In parallel with arrival in France of punk rock in the 1970s, and early forms counter-culture in the late 1960s, the role of a fashionable, young, Parisian-based vanguard was key in embracing the music in a network of branché clubs and bars in the years 1989-1991. At this stage, dance music was treated only in specialist magazines or as an aspect of the entertainment sector, with an accent on France’s tardiness in respect to other more important European centres (Britain, Holland, Belgium, Germany). Despite its vulnerability to being dismissed as simply the latest fashion trend destined to disappear as rapidly as it appeared, dance music, especially forms of club and house music proved nonetheless to have a sustained existence in the sites of their initial discovery, not least because they quickly found a home in the burgeoning network of gay clubs, shops and bars that by the mid-1990s formed a staple of Parisian nightlife. Of equal importance in their persistence was the development of the so-called “French touch”, whereby a cluster of producers, DJs and musicians gained a respected even revered reputation on the international circuits of dance music (its festivals, clubnights, its record labels and shops) for a particularly identifiable form of dance music, marked by a combination of funky house rhythms, with an unusually melodic (even cheesy) sensibility, and most radically with the use of highly treated and filtered machine-like samples, the latter being highly reminiscent of the more purist and strictly defined techno in its origins in Detroit. This characteristic eclecticism was in some observers’ eyes in part enabled by the very tardiness of the French in discovering the phenomenon: embracing the history of a culture in one swoop, yet free from some of the unwritten taboos surrounding the distinction of genres and purpose for the music, musicians associated with the French touch were able to use the full resources of the genre without any hang-ups surrounding what could be combined with what. As the very label applied to this otherwise very loose affiliation of mainly Paris-based artists, producers and DJs implies, it took outsiders, and the British dance music press in particular, to activate recognition of and applause for the new wave of French productions. Conveniently too, such plaudits often fell back on occasionally rather simplistic notions of “Frenchness” to explain the success of the new genre: the producers and consumers of the “French touch” are overwhelmingly characterised as cool, sophisticated and sexy, and yet endearingly earnest and intellectually committed in their desire to render mere pop music as a sophisticated art form. Such international recognition preceded any widespread acknowledgement of these artists within France, but had an important feedback influence in extending their sphere of action.
from Paris to other important towns in France. This global acknowledgement of the virtues of a distinctively French version of dance music was also a vital factor in the later authentication of “la techno” as an artistic and aesthetically grounded culture in its own right, of particular interest to forces within the Ministry of Culture because of its genuine economic clout, and real potential for promoting a prestigious image of France in the world markets of popular culture.

Nonetheless, for dance music in France to move beyond its status as a relatively rarefied phenomenon, it needed, in a way that punk had singularly failed to do, to move beyond its initial rather restrictive social base. In this respect, the summer of 1992 was decisive for the establishing of the first itinerant sound systems in France, and with it the practice of free outdoor parties and festivals, running very much in parallel to existing networks of clubs and discotheques. Certain organisers of these parties had made a permanent move from the UK, in an attempt to escape the new regime of restrictions imposed by the Criminal Justice act of 1994, and as such, they were targeting a much younger less socially integrated clientele than had sustained the beginnings of the club scene in Paris. This alternative festival circuit was also the site for the development of the more “hardcore” strands of techno (rave, jungle) in France, and organisers frequently presented themselves in opposition to the more urbane and fashion-conscious club scene, offering their social and musical practice as a potentially more decisive political intervention in its overt rejection of commercial and consumer-oriented values. This embracing of a more socially marginal position was to some extent only confirmed by the growing tendency of local (whether departmental or municipal) authorities to withhold permission at the last minute for the organising of legal raves, and for the growing number of instances when the police would intervene to halt illegal gatherings. However, the contribution that the free-party circuit made to enhancing the reputation of techno in France, coupled with the growing acknowledgement of successful artists associated with the “French touch” phenomenon, can be gauged by techno’s increasing integration into the existing circuits of French popular music production and dissemination. By 1995, both the Transmusicales at Rennes, and the Printemps festival at Bourges, important annual dates in the calendar for the music industry in France, had permanently made room for techno-oriented events in their respective programmes. In the same year, the state-sponsored national Fête de la musique (a creation of the socialist culture minister Jack Lang in the 1980s) also witnessed an official rave at the Tokyo Palace in Paris which drew 5000 people. By now, techno had its first non-affiliated association (Techno Plus) dedicated to the promotion of the music, its artists and cultural practices, but also to the educative role of promoting safe drug consumption. Similarly, the firm establishment of techno within French musical life by this stage can be seen in the fact that it sustained its own media (specialist magazines like Coda and Trax, radio stations like FG, a significant presence on existing stations like Fun, Nova and Voltage), its own specialist stores and outlets, and that it had an increasing space in “mainstream” megastores like Fnac and Virgin. Perhaps final confirmation that techno had arrived comes in the negative attention that it was also beginning to draw.

In the first instance, techno and its associated genres attracted criticism because of its largely non-verbal characteristics. Founded on an aesthetic where rhythm not discourse was the primary social function of music, techno was held responsible by some critics for promoting a social and political disengagement amongst its participants. In some instances, this was equated with cultural and musical fascism. Observers of raves highlighted the solitary and isolated individual at the heart of the rave gathering, focused intently on his or her trip at the expense of any genuine social interaction. Despite its apparent ability to mobilise the young, critics saw at its heart an emptiness that translated less the possible oppositional transformation of society through a mass movement, than the successful and subliminal integration of that mass into the circuits of contemporary consumption, for which techno was now the perfect soundtrack. In part, this negative reaction to a predominantly non-verbal musical culture highlights the dominance within France of nationally-derived paradigms of the essentially narrative function of music represented in the traditions of the chanson. It was noted earlier how the reorientation of American rock’n’roll in the French context was in part achieved by aligning it with such paradigms. Even commentators and analysts who had made their careers in the post-1968 context of reassessing pop and rock music as art forms in their own right, with their own aesthetic and performative value-systems, were
hesitant to extend such dignity to electronic forms of dance music. Pierre Mayol wondered whether their emergence signified a decline in the creativity at the heart of popular culture. Musicologist Lucien Roux saw in techno’s incessant sampling and reappropriation of other musical genres a process whereby the original genre’s social function (its response to an “imperious need”) was lost, it now being inserted in a seamless but “insipid and noisy mush.”

There were other features of the new music which posed a challenge to the regulatory systems of value that organise the circulation of popular music in France. In common with its equivalent national movements elsewhere, the promoters and producers of dance music culture in France were strongly marked by an ethic of autonomy and personal initiative, which translates very easily and without complex into a strong entrepreneurial ethos. Practitioners have little qualm about the commercial value of the scene, the vital point being to remain in control of all aspects of the business process, not to resist commercialisation per se. This is in marked contrast to the well-established circuits of rock and independent music in France, where commercial values are viewed with great suspicion, and as constituting a threat to the authenticity of the revolt deemed inherent to the culture in its pure origins. This fear of commercial recuperation outweighs even the possibility of recuperation by political power, such that there already existed in France a strong overlap between rock music circuits of performance, production, and diffusion, and state-sponsored initiatives aimed at bolstering the profile of French popular culture, both for its socially integrative properties in the domestic environment, and for its promotion of France’s economic profile globally. The dimension of techno that seemed to embrace the free market of culture, its confidence in its global commercial success, could be seen as a threat in the context of wider campaigns to resist globalisation and neo-liberal economics in France. There is no doubt that techno was viewed by some as a kind of economic Trojan horse, subliminally converting its adepts to the virtues of the Anglo-Saxon socially deregulated economy, preventing them from asking wider questions about the direction of contemporary capitalism.

However, such reactions can be explained as typical of those provoked by the emergence of all new popular music forms, either because of the threat of new commercial and artistic rivalries, or because they pose a challenge to those who may have built a certain cultural and social capital on the back of already existing forms, or more fundamentally because of the generational dividing lines that such new forms immediately introduce into the fields of taste and appreciation. More particular to the emergence of techno in France was the almost immediate association between the music and patterns of dangerous drug consumption. Thus, aside from any musical considerations, the development of the free party circuit and the increasing visibility of large scale raves was interpreted primarily as a problem for social order, and as a carrier of a health threat to the young. Rather than posing an immediate threat to the social order, techno was perceived as a forum through which the young were posing a threat to themselves, and by extension to the future of the nation. It is principally on these grounds that the arrival of techno in France was the occasion for a moral panic about its potential impact. It has already been noted above that the first raves and techno festivals in France were often viewed with suspicion by local authorities, and frequently subject to intervention and interdiction. As the movement became more widespread in France, it also came to occupy a greater prominence in the national media, and between 1993 and 1996 several articles appeared in the written press adopting a frankly alarmist tone in their reporting of the phenomenon, with the link between uncontrolled consumption of psychotropic drugs and the music being made explicit. The last-minute cancelling of a legal rave (Polaris) organised in Lyon in February 1996, and with a great financial loss for the organisers, reflects this growing sense of suspicion. The municipal authorities were responding in particular to pressures from the local association of nightclub owners, who had organised their campaign against the event around the theme of the protection of minors. This particular interdiction also provided a key link to national politics, given that it was carried out in the name of the Mayor of Lyon, Raymond Barre, also a former government minister and member of the National Assembly, and a heavyweight of the ruling conservative party. The growing weight of opinion against raves can be seen in the dossier circulated by the Direction générale de la police nationale in January 1995, entitled “Les raves, des soirées à hauts risques” (“Raves, high risk night-time gatherings”). It urged that efforts
be made to alert local authorities to the true nature of such events, and offered models of local by-laws that could be mobilised to prevent them occurring. In the National Assembly in May 1996, Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debré indicated that in the name of the protection of minors, he had given firm instructions to police and prefectoral authorities to instigate repressive measures against any potential organizers of raves, using the courts if necessary. The fact that in the public mind a firm link had been established between a particular genre of music, its practice in a particular kind of gathering (the rave) and the fact that such gatherings were seen as harbingers of a drug threat to the nation’s youth is reflected in some curious local modulations of the application of such powers. Etienne Racine gives the case of Nantes, where a local bar owner was given specific permission by the town hall to play music up to a certain noise level before 11.30 at night, provided that no techno music was played at any time.

However, and this is in fundamental contrast to the moral panic generated by the emergence of rock’n’roll music in France, the discourse of repression in the name of protection of the nation’s youth by no means held exclusive reign within political and media circles. The complicating factor in all this is the evident international success that French artists associated with the genre were beginning to garner, thus fulfilling a long-held ambition for French popular culture within Ministry of Culture circles. Even while the conservatives were in power, the then minister of culture Philippe Douste-Blazy spoke positively of techno as the most dynamic of contemporary music forms, and hinted at a possible legal compromise with organisers of raves who were prepared to uphold the law. With return of the left to power, and under Catherine Trautmann’s tutelage as Minister of Culture, techno suddenly found itself the subject of overtures and explicit encouragement. Former socialist Minister of Culture Jack Lang gave an indication of this conversion in an article in the left-wing daily Libération in October 1997, in which he criticised the false amalgamation of techno with drug consumption. Trautmann herself endorsed this point of view, warning in an article in Le Monde in November 1997 of the dangers of diabolising this form of music and thus alienating its young audience. On the ground, the Technopol association had already succeeded in January 1997 in getting the landmark anti-rave by-law instituted by the town hall at Avignon overturned in the courts. In the wide publicity that surrounded this ruling, the association confirmed their desire to establish a legal framework for the organising of raves, and on that basis they were invited to attend an inter-ministerial meeting, which included representatives of departmental authority, which sought to establish such a framework. The state’s strategy in managing the initial moral panic is clear: separate the good raves from the bad ones, with the onus on organisers to show they could be counted in the latter by showing their will to cooperate with drug prevention measures. Indeed illegal raves continued to be subject to severe repression, but the willingness to endorse techno as an authentic and viable art form in its own is amply demonstrated in the first Techno-parade held in Paris in September 1998, which was funded to the level of 15% by the Ministry of Youth and Sport.

This nuanced response to a challenging musical form is of course unthinkable form the Ministry of Culture under Malraux’s tutelage in the early 1960s. It reflects the fundamental shifts that had occurred in the intervening years within academic, intellectual, educational and institutional circles regarding popular culture in general, and music in particular. This shift is characterised very neatly by David Looseley, who sees French cultural policy prior to the 1980s as having largely oscillated between the goals of promoting democratisation of culture and professional creation on the one hand, and cultural development and amateur creativity on the other. On the whole, it is democratisation and professional creation that usually win out, as they are easier to realise in the form of spectacular new institutions for the professional arts, endowed with a mission to open their doors to a wider public, a mission perhaps only achieved with rather mixed results. While minister of culture in the 1980s, the socialist Jack Lang used his position of close confidant of president Francois Mitterrand to promote a kind of “third way” that would seek to reconcile these two imperatives. Lang’s model, as exemplified by the annual national music day (the Fete de la musique), allows all forms of culture, high, low, professional, amateur, to co-exist in a state of conferred “equality of dignity”. As Lang’s policy of ecumenical cultural festival was implemented, popular music increasingly displaced theatre as the privileged site of this interaction. It is not surprising that techno would seem to officials at the newly re-socialised
Ministry of Culture in 1997 to tick all the right boxes for launching a reinvigorated version of this policy: avant-garde yet popular, art and DIY expression, it appears to blur the distinction between amateur and professional, personal creativity and professional creation. Within this framework of course, the rave takes its place as the ultimate site of collective festivity.

This willingness on the part of key elements with the political authority structure to look favourably on the outworkings of dance music culture in France was no doubt further reinforced by the presence within the educational and intellectual establishment of sympathetic voices and analysts of the phenomenon. The overwhelming consensus amongst such voices was that techno existed as a culture in its own right, with its own rituals, its own systems of value and aesthetics, its own forms of sociability and its own creative energies. It could not be simply dismissed as a the mere ephemeral expression of youth trends and fashions. The existence of this important fringe of the intellectual and cultural establishment also constitutes a significant contrast with the early 1960s. Frequently occupying a position of combining participation in the culture with the early stages of a research careers in disciplines such as sociology, anthropology or ethnography, those holding a sympathetic perspective on techno found that there was an institutional framework conducive to the treatment of popular cultural practices in general, and music in particular. Not only did the framework exist for the production of their research, but also its diffusion: there existed a ready audience for their findings in the network of health professionals, youth and social workers associated with the expanding network of state enterprise in the field of social action. Thus pure intellectual or analytical capital could easily be traded for a more practical focus on the prevention and treatment of drug abuse.

The consequence of both state cultural policy, and of a favourable stance from sections of the intellectual field, was an attenuation of the moral panic surrounding the earlier explicit connections that had been made between techno and increased drug use amongst the young. However, in the distinction made between the legal and illegal rave, it was clear that the favours extended to the music did not go as far as completely eliminating it from the lists of those forces that were deemed a threat to social order and regulation. While the late 1990s saw the apparent downturn in the panic, the strong re-emergence of a national security discourse after 9/11, and the prominence of the theme in the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections (with the concomitant advance of the extreme right) created a context more amenable to a formal crackdown on the illegal wing of the techno movement. An attempt in May 2001 by gaullist National Assembly member Mariani to add an anti-rave clause to Interior Minister Daniel Vaillant’s security bill was initially blocked in June by a coalition of Greens, communists and socialists, mindful of the youth vote and responding to a particularly well-orchestrated campaign by a loose affiliation of free-party organisers and techno associations, a campaign that gained a great deal of sympathetic coverage in the left-wing press. However, the amendment was ultimately passed in October 2001 as the socialists switched sides, perhaps mindful of appearing soft on social order in the new climate. It seems that the parliamentary authorities had not quite got over the tendency to read a particular music style for signs of its wider social significance in the ordering of the nation.

It is in this area of state action and authority that the clearest contrasts can be drawn between the moral panics of the early 1960s surrounding rock’n’roll and those of the mid-1990s surrounding techno. In the latter case, the state, particularly in the shape of national bodies and authorities, has made it its business to intervene in the assimilation of global musical cultures to French patterns of regulation and control. While it is clear that such cultures had the capacity to generate anxieties and insecurities about the status of the nation’s young in the early 1960s, it seems evident that on the whole it was hardly felt fitting that the state’s cultural institutions should intervene directly in this process of acculturation, except perhaps to promote alternatives that might aid in national resistance to the new music. On the whole, the domestication of rock’n’roll was left in the purview of artists, promoters and the market. Neither did national authorities feel obliged to reinforce the legal structures of local regulation and control in relation to specific social practices associated with the music: the power of mayors and prefects was deemed sufficient to control the situation on the ground. In a more general sense, though, the state did reveal a willingness to respond to the broader agenda of dealing with a new social age group viewed as more vulnerable to the negative aspects of
modern civilisation, by reinforcing the role of education in general (extending the school leaving age), and by extending the networks of crime prevention.

As for the more contemporary context, it would appear that despite the growing diversity of youth, perhaps even of its diminishing relative importance within the demographic structures of the nation, it still has, via the apprehension of specific musical practices, the capacity to generate a certain anxiety about its current and potential status as producer of the nation’s future, and that this anxiety is now more likely to generate a coherent and determined political response at the national level, confirmation (if it were needed) of both the greater elision of the local and national within French life, and of the deeper involvement of the state in that elision. It confirms the absence in that relationship between local and national of the traditional intermediary bodies that had a role in the socialisation of youth, those confessional, militant and political youth organisations, whose decline in France since 1945 almost mirrors the rise of popular youth cultures after the emergence of rock’n’roll. It is a further strong contrasting feature of the two eras under consideration that in the mid-1990s, participants and adepts of the new music were able to form legally constituted associations to defend their interests, that to some extent were an attempt to bridge the gap left by such traditional youth organisations. This initiative was both welcomed and encouraged by the state. There is no instance of a parallel response either on the part of fans of rock’n’roll music or of the state authorities in the early 1960s. Nonetheless, the inevitable time lag between self-organisation from within, and the generation of a coherent policy from without, still leaves that crucial period when new musical forms adopted by the young can create a climate of fear and hostility, the key ingredients for a moral panic.

NOTES

1 The theme of generational injustice in contemporary French society was first broached in Chauvel, Louis, Le Destin des générations: structure sociale et cohortes en France au XXe siècle. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998. It has since been picked up in a series of polemical works by authors approaching thirty years old and highly critical of the so-called “soixante-huitards” (“68ers”). For a summary of some of these contributions, see Poulet, Bernard, “Trentenaires à vif”, L’Expansion, 700 (September 2005), 141. This inter-generational clash is reflected in the editorial perspective of a magazine like Technikart, which conducts a constant sniping war against powerful representatives of the 1968 generation, particularly those who hold prominent positions in the media.


3 For more detailed accounts of these transitions, see Mauger, Gérard (ed), “Hippies, loubards, zoulous: jeunes marginaux de 1968 à aujourd’hui”. Problèmes politiques et sociaux, 660 ; and Warne, Chris, “La Jeunesse est-elle toujours en crise? The social representation of youth under the Fifth Republic”, in Allison, Maggie and Heathcote, Owen (eds), Forty Years of the Fifth French Republic. Bern/London/New York/Paris, Peter Lang, 1999, 205–221.

4 The term is borrowed from Louis Chevalier’s study of the constitution of the labouring classes as a perceived threat to social order in the nineteenth century. See his Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle. Paris, Plon, 1958.


10 This French term for rock’n’roll music, which quickly became standard coinage from the mid-1960s onwards, was apparently invented by sociologist Edgar Morin, and derived from the repeated use of “yeah” in American pop music. Morin himself devoted considerable analytical energies to understanding the new youth culture, firstly in a series of articles in Le Monde during the weeks following “La Nuit de la Nation”. They were republished as part of his Introduction à une politique de l’homme. Paris, Seuil, 1965, 213–220.

11 Concern that the youth justice system was not only failing, but in some instances contributing by its very failure to the social production of the blouson noir is reflected in the work of Clarys, Raymond and Tournis, Georges, Enfants difficiles...blousons noirs. Paris, A. Wast et Cie, 1965. Clarys was a school principal, and former assistant director of a Centre for Delinquent Minors. Tournis was a departmental inspector of primary education. As the title of the book indicates, the proposed solution to the blouson noir phenomenon is to be found in preventing difficult children from growing into an adolescent rebel by better supervision and social provision to cater for the gap in family resources.

12 The headline in France-Soir the following day – “A la Fête de la Nation, il y avait 1000 voyous et 149000 copains” (“At the Nation festival there were 1000 criminals and 149000 pals”) – is typical.

13 This possibility of contagion was of course celebrated by some groups such as the Situationists, who saw in the emergence of the blouson noir one of the signs of the contradictions of developed capitalism that could be exploited for its overthrow. In contrast, Jean-Paul Sartre saw in the copain phenomenon signs of the recuperation of revolutionary energies: in the first issue of Le Nouvel Observateur in November 1964, he deplored the lack of political consciousness amongst the young, and stated that they had been betrayed by their idols for the sake of “daddy’s profits”. (Cit. in Sirinelli, J.-F., “Les jeunes”, in Rioux, J.-P. and Sirinelli, J.-F. (eds), La France: d’un siècle à l’autre. Dictionnaire critique. Paris, Hachette-Littératures, 1999, 439).

14 The expression is derived from the 1959 work of the economist Alfred Sauvy: La Montée des jeunes. Paris, Calmann-Lévy.


22 This has not prevented rap from being subject to attempts at social control from various authorities and regulative authorities, if not outright suppression.

23 Since its global emergence in the mid-1980s, one of the key characteristics of dance music has been its separation into a series of genres and sub-categories, the distinctions between which can sometimes be lost on the external observer. In the strict sense, “techno” refers to that strand of the music that emerged from Detroit in 1987-1988, and which was itself a fusion of European influences such as German progressive rock (groups like Tangerine Dream and Kraftwerk), British synth pop (Human League and Depeche Mode), American funk and P-funk (George Clinton, Parliament), and early forms of electro and house music. In Europe, techno subsequently spawned a more “hardcore” version of itself (particularly in Belgium and Holland), characterized by accelerated beats-per-minute (BPMs). In the UK, this development of techno was paralleled by the combination of techno sounds with accelerated breakbeats, dominant on the rave scene in 1990/1. Nonetheless, a purist strain of Detroit techno continued throughout the 1990s and beyond, with its own distinct musical and philosophical aesthetic, as exemplified by record labels such as Underground Resistance. These developments alone would suggest problems with adopting the French terminology: it has the virtue of concision however, and provided its broad application is borne in mind, will be appropriate for discussing the music in the French context. It also has the added virtue of emphasizing the sense of strangeness that the various forms of dance music had in this national setting, accentuating their machine-like and alienating qualities.


26 For example, Jauffret, Magali “Le phénomène rave, mélange de musique, solitude et drogue”, L’Humanité, (15 June 1993), cit. in Racine, Étienne, Le Phénomène techno, op. cit., 116–117.


30 For a case-study of how this anti-commercial ethic defended by independent rock artists in France can work in a rather contradictory fashion, see Lebrun,

32 The campaign against globalisation in France was given new impetus in the 1990s, first by the impact of ecology campaigners like José Bové, and second in the social movements associated with the strikes and protests of 1995, and the formation of groups like Attac. For a full narrative account see Waters, Sarah, Social Movements in France. Towards a New Citizenship, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003.

33 Cf. Racine, Étienne, Le Phénomène techno, op. cit., 117 lists articles appearing in Le Figaro, France Soir, Le Nouvel Observateur, L’Événement du jeudi amongst others.

34 Cf. ibid., 118.

35 Cf. ibid., 122.

36 Cf. ibid., 117 lists articles appearing in Le Figaro, France Soir, Le Nouvel Observateur, L’Événement du jeudi amongst others.

37 Cf. ibid., 122.


39 The research centre on daily life in contemporary societies run by Michel Maffesoli at the University of Paris V (CEAQ) is a key example of such an institutional framework which gave encouragement to young researchers working not only on techno, but rap and world music. The extent of this research is well represented by the regular flow of conferences, special issues of magazines, journals and periodicals and monographs devoted to techno. See above, note 24.

40 A clear example of this progression is provided by Astrid Fontaine and Caroline Fontana. Authors of a 1996 study of rave (Fontaine, A. and Fontana, C., Raver, op. cit.), derived in part from their postgraduate research, they were subsequently commissioned as part of a team working at the government sponsored Observatoire français des drogues et des toxicomanies (French Observatory of drugs and addiction) to report on drug use and prevention in the rave scene. This appeared as: Fontaine, Astrid et al, Pratiques et représentations émergentes dans le champ de l’usage de drogues en France, Paris, OFDT, 2001, accessible at: <http://www.drogues.gouv.fr/article993.html>.