

‘PERMANENTLY REMOVED FROM SOCIETY’: THE CRADOCK FOUR, THE TRC, MORAL JUDGMENTS, HISTORICAL TRUTH, AND THE DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

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Resumen: On 27 June, four men from the South Africa town of Cradock left the coastal city of Port Elizabeth. Among the four was popular teacher and anti-apartheid activist Matthew Goniwe. The only people who would ever see the again would be their killers, members of the South Africa Police (SAP). The identities of the killers would remain hidden for well more than a decade, when the killers applied for amnesty through the Truth and Reconciliation (TRC), which the Government of National Unity had established after the apartheid government gave way to a multiracial democracy. This article focuses in particular on a culture of deniability that emerged during the 1980s. In the course of the investigations of the killing of Goniwe and his colleagues, journalists uncovered “Die Sein” (Afrikaans for “The Signal”), which called for “the permanent removal from society” of Goniwe. When pressed, officials of the state and security forces insisted that there were many ways to interpret Die Sein and that the document did not necessarily call for Goniwe’s death. This followed a pattern in which South African officials had stretched the limits of credulity in asserting that similar words and phrases did not mean what the security forces nonetheless always took them to mean.

Palabras clave: anti-apartheid, Cradock, Matthew Goniwe, South Africa.

On June 27th, 1985 Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto, and Sicelu Mhlawuli left Port Elizabeth, a coastal city on South Africa's eastern Cape, and headed toward Cradock, a small community approximately 120 miles to the north. They

never arrived. Indeed, they never made it out of the greater Port Elizabeth region¹.

Matthew Goniwe was a prominent activist in the eastern Cape, and was a community leader in Cradock. He had been active in leading various elements of the anti-apartheid movement that had heated up in South Africa in the wake of the Soweto uprisings in 1976, and especially in the months after September 1984 when mass protests hit the country. Those protests began in the Transvaal and quickly spread to the eastern Cape, a traditional hotbed of black activism. Goniwe was a popular teacher in Cradock. He had helped to organize and support a school strike in the community, a strike that served as a symbol and catalyst for the small town's unexpectedly strong ongoing resistance to South Africa's racial caste system. The State had responded by attempting to transfer Goniwe, but he refused the assignment. Then they attempted to fire him outright --again, this tactic did not work, and in fact it merely served to heighten the resolve of the striking children who were at the forefront of the protest movement. Goniwe was also instrumental in helping to form CRADORA, the Cradock Residents' Association, which helped to provide an organized structure for black South African protest against the State and the municipality. Finally, Goniwe was a respected and tireless field organizer for the United Democratic Front (UDF) an organization that for all intents and purposes took the place of the banned African National Congress (ANC). In sum, Goniwe represented a serious threat to the apartheid state, all the more as time went by and it became clear that the ANC/UDF plan to "make South Africa Ungovernable" was coming to fruition.

Thus the four men left Port Elizabeth knowing that they were vulnerable. While not as visible as the forceful and charismatic Goniwe, Calata had a history of activism that extended deep into his family's roots, as did Mkhonto². The four would never arrive in Cradock. After they had been missing for several days, which greatly alarmed and disturbed the black community up and down the eastern Cape, their charred remains were discovered.

Badly burned, their bodies each bore numerous stab wounds; and although it would take a coroner to determine as much, their bodies also revealed numerous other signs of physical harm. Some distance away stood their car, which also had been burnt almost beyond recognition. Curiously, the license plates on the car were not only still affixed, they also appeared to be untouched by the effects of the fire that had otherwise gutted the car. The license plates were not those of the original car in which the four had been travelling. Those license plates had been found in yet another location. Clearly someone was trying to hide the true nature of the crime. The question quickly became "who was responsible, and why?" For many South Africans, the answer was self evident. The problem lay in the fact that the evidence to justify that answer was as yet nonexistent. The murders bore all of the signs of a political killing. That being the case there were two real possibilities. One was that this was the result of a conflict between the UDF and another anti-apartheid group. In the eastern Cape, that would most likely mean AZAPO, the Azanian People's Organization. But most observers envisioned a far more likely scenario. That tableaux involved the State, and thus what was known as the Security Forces, an unofficial agglomeration of the South African Police (SAP), South African Defence Forces (SADF), Railroad police, and other groups the existence of which many South Africans knew so little. These were the "Third Force." Of course the South African Police and state officials denied complicity in the killings.

The death of the Cradock Four quickly became major news across the country, and of course it hit hardest in the eastern Cape, and especially in the veld community of Cradock. In subsequent weeks and months, an already overheated situation would increase in intensity. Cradock would continue to stand as a strident symbol of resistance. The funeral of the Cradock Four would become a major political event as had so many funerals before it. The Langa Massacre of March 1985, which had occurred twenty years

to the day after the Sharpeville Massacre, began as a clash between funeral marchers and police. The heightened sense of indignance, protest, and anger that the anti-apartheid masses felt, coupled with State fears that the ANC and UDF were indeed fulfilling their promise to "make South Africa ungovernable" helped to fuel a crisis that would lead one newspaper to call 1985 "the worst year of our lives."³ In timing that was too close to be a coincidence, on the eve of the funerals, state President P.W. Botha declared most of the country to be under a State of Emergency. After a brief respite, a Second State of Emergency would follow in 1986.

Eventually two inquests would attempt to clear up the issues surrounding the killings. Each would merely serve to create more questions than it could possibly answer. After the first inquest, held in Port Elizabeth in 1989, Judge E. De Beers announced his findings. He declared, after establishing the obvious --namely that the Four had indeed been murdered-- that there was "absolutely no evidence before me that any member of the Force had anything whatsoever to do with the killings."⁴ Not surprisingly, few in the African community believed the truth of the finding. But it was not really the fault of De Beers. Based on the evidence before him, it is clear that he decided in the only way that he could. The Security Forces covered up their actions well. They left no paper trail; no one who knew anything was speaking; there was no physical evidence, no witness. Any involvement of the police or other agents of the state seemingly went up in the smoke that charred the bodies of Matthew Goniwe and his fallen comrades.

The killing of the Cradock Four provides a ripe case study for the examination of modern South Africa, not just its history, but also its present. The murders mark a signature event in arguably the most tumultuous year in the tumultuous history of the struggle against apartheid rule. Findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) have opened up doors to an understanding of the past that could not have been imagined twenty years ago. And yet the TRC had its limitations. Furthermore, by understanding what the TRC revealed (and of equal importance, what it was unable to reveal), we can understand some of the limitations as well as the strengths of studying, researching, and writing contemporary history. Furthermore, as an examination of a few cases, the Cradock Four chief amongst them, will quickly show, the

uses and misuses of language can make understanding, knowing, and seeking the truth incredibly difficult indeed. Aside from questions of objectivity, the South African example calls into question some of the basic tenets of history. And yet at the same time, the example of South Africa can help to reveal why history matters, why contemporary history can be effective, and why fears of the impossibility of true objectivity and objective truth should not keep us from pursuing the work that drives us.

It was not long before the need for a second Inquest into the killings arose. Almost immediately after the De Beers findings, information and allegations began to seep out into the public, despite occasional media bans and in spite of the maintained Emergency measures that engulfed the entire country by the end of the 1980s. In the process of some investigative work, journalists had discovered what would come to be known as "Die Sein," Afrikaans for "The Signal." This signal seemed to provide the smoking gun in the hands of the security forces. Heightened newspaper investigation, pressure from some of the more liberal and progressive political organizations, as well as that from the black community and its political organizations, and liberal white groups such as the Black Sash led to the calling of a Second Inquest in 1992. Heading the second inquest was N.W. Zeitsman, by all accounts a fair-minded, liberal Grahamstownian. This inquest revealed a great deal more about the killings, and it seemed that the noose was drawing tighter around the neck of the Security Apparatus of the State. Allegations of a "Hammer Unit" intended to stomp out black resistance organizations and its leaders emerged with some substantiation⁵. Members of the security forces had begun to break their long held code of secrecy. And "Die Sein" did indeed seem to signal that justice might finally come to the killers of the Cradock Four.

The Signal, an internal document, read as follows: "Dit word voorgestel dat bogenoemde persone uit die saamelewing as 'n saak van dringende verwydering word." The lawyers for all sides took considerable time in debating this passage. It would seem that its meaning was obvious, especially in the context of South Africa in 1985: "It has been suggested that the abovementioned persons should be permanently removed from society as a matter of urgency."⁶ But in the never-never land that was South Africa at that time, the meaning of this was

apparently not clear. At least this is what some of the lawyers for the State would argue.

Although on its face it would seem obvious that permanent removal from society, especially in the context of the South African case, and with special attention to which the state had paid Goniwe, meant that Goniwe and his colleagues were to be killed. However, in strained and syntactically muddled language typical of the government's arguments regarding these Afrikaans words and phrases, state lawyer Mr. Mostert asserted that "there is a narrower context and a greater context, and I want to deal with that and deal with the way, the contextual issue [...]" As far as the newspapers that reported the signal, Mostert would go on to argue "they seized on a different meaning and a meaning which we say was not justified and [...] they went to town on it." Indeed, as far as the newspapers were concerned, their reading of the signal was misguided:

«If one looks for a colouring of the meaning of that word in a contextual sense, one looks at these papers, and what we have been able to find thus far indicates the very opposite of what the newspaper sought to attach without any justification as not the ordinary dictionary and as not the contextual meaning [...] when evidence is received, it should be received within the perception and perspective of the twin meanings of the ordinary grammatical meaning and of the context as it emerges from the papers of the Attorney General.»⁷

Not surprisingly, the Attorney General was not inclined to interpret the "colouring of the context" to mean that the agents of the State that the Attorney General's office represented advocated political murder.

Nonetheless, this small sample from the debate highlights the difficulty in interpreting language, especially in contested terrain such as the battleground over apartheid. The argument is all the more difficult when dealing with a multilingual society in which the fine points of language were subject to debate. In the early stages of the Second Inquest, the belief of George Bizos, the lawyer for the Cradock victims, and many other observers, was that members of the SAP and Security Forces were responsible for the killings. In trying to in his clients favor, Mostert brought in a leading semanticist from the University of Free State, Professor van Jaarsveld, who submitted documentation asserting that in Afrikaans the

word *verwyde* could have many meanings and multiple semantic implications⁸.

The debate was renewed a few days later. A Mr. Salisa, of the Port Elizabeth Herald, had written that morning's paper that "a senior education official involved in discussions in 1985 on the re-statement" of Goniwe in the Cradock school "conceded [...] that a signal ordering the permanent removal from the society of the activist meant that he had to be killed."⁹ The lawyer, this time a Mr. J.M Vermaak, took issue with the assertion, lambasting the Herald and asking Zietsman to take action. Vermaak argued, "Not once did the witness say that this signal as it stands and within its context was an order that the activist had to be killed." Vermaak went on to argue that Salisa and the Herald did not acknowledge "that the witness said that in order to determine the meaning at the time he would have called for an explanation again having regard to the contents."¹⁰ In essence, Salisa had taken the words out of context and away from their original meaning, which Vermaak does not attempt to address.

Ultimately, what these semantic issues address is the vagueness of language even when it does not seem particularly vague. Part of the reason why the state wanted to argue that the language its agents used had many meanings was that it wanted to be able to deny complicity in the deaths of the Cradock Four and hundreds, even thousands of other activists, perceived troublemakers, and innocent victims of the apartheid machine. However, even as the Second Inquest into the murders of the Cradock Four played itself out, many of those former agents of the state began to reveal their horrible secrets, and the apparent vagueness of the language, the supposed complexities of context and vagaries of definitions based upon who was speaking and who was listening were giving way to the grim reality of state-sponsored, or at least tacitly-endorsed, killings.

The first fissure in the apartheid dam came in 1989 when Dirk Johannes Coetzee, a security force officer who had climbed through the ranks to become a senior officer at Vlakplaas, an infamous counterinsurgency unit located on a farm outside of Pretoria. While working for the state in various capacities, Coetzee was responsible for planning, organizing and carrying out abductions, beatings and murders. The most famous of the murders was that of Griffiths Mxenge, a prominent ANC lawyer in

Durban. By 1986, however, after a series of personal difficulties and a number of professional problems, including reprimands that stemmed largely from his reputation as a loose cannon, Coetzee decided that it was time to quit, and after overstating the severity of his diabetes he took medical retirement¹¹.

For a while after his retirement, Coetzee had been engaged in off-the-record talks with Jacques Pauw, a writer for a new Afrikaans independent weekly newspaper, *Vrye Weekblad*. Pauw had hoped to get Coetzee to talk on the record, but the former Vlakplaas leader was wary, and understandably so, given the nature of his past crimes and the way in which the security forces were known to deal with traitors. Nonetheless, as 1989 progressed, it became clear to Coetzee that some of his past transgressions, most notably the murder of activist Griffiths Mxenge, were catching up with him. He allowed Pauw to make arrangements for them to discuss the inside story of the apartheid's security regime in exchange for a place of safe hiding. In what must have seemed the ultimate irony to many of the individuals involved, that safe location proved to be the ANC Headquarters in London. The result of the collaboration was Pauw's *In The Heart of the Whore: The Inside Story of Apartheid's Death Squads*, a book that helped to shatter the wall of secrecy that the apartheid regime had built up around it¹². And although Coetzee's intentions had been self-preservation, he nonetheless proved to be of vital importance for the anti-apartheid struggle, for with his confessions, and his willingness to expose the inner workings of the security state, the prospects of the end of apartheid and white rule seemed more realistic than ever.

In 1991 Coetzee wrote a letter to President F.W. de Klerk asking for "the chance to return and expose the truth." He wanted to "make full statements of who in the hit squads did what to whom" and he believed that his testimony could go a long way in solving some important murders –not only that of Mxenge and his wife, but also of Dr. David Webster, Japie Maponya and others. He maintained that he "would be able to do this because I know the procedures used since I was in the force have not changed." He argued that de Klerk had proven himself to be honest. You have done so much since September 1989 to promote peace and stability for everyone in a new South Africa, and I have got no doubt [...] that you would like to cut to

the bone the mess that is left in the wake of police hit squad activities." Coetzee also told de Klerk that he had "listened to the other side of the story many times, and have trusted and relied on senior police officers, to no avail." He warned de Klerk against allowing "the old lies" to continue, and he couched his argument in terms that would become standard for former security force members in the post-apartheid era: "We must admit what was going on during days when all was considered fair in what was a war situation, because that was precisely what it was." He wanted to be "as a police pensioner with the rank of captain [...] for a period with a specific instruction to help you get to the truth." He acknowledged that he had "just as clean or dirty a record as all of those who" were "involved and who (were) still in the police." He concluded by reassuring de Klerk that his letter was "not inspired by the African National Congress, or written with their permission." He only saw ANC members once a month to collect his monthly allowance, though he did admit that "they do look after me well." He signed off on his sworn statement by saying that he was "acting on my own, as a patriot, in the longer-term interests of my people."¹³

Whatever his motivations, Coetzee was vital in breaking down the walls of National Party and Security Force secrecy. De Klerk never took Coetzee up on his offer, but Coetzee still had served a vital function. On 1994 the first freely elected multiracial Parliament in South Africa created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Its creation allowed for other security force members to come forward and reveal the atrocities of the old regime. Most did so in order to gain amnesty for crimes that had already been discovered, or to prevent their roles from being uncovered, or for numerous other reasons, ranging from the self-serving to the truly repentant¹⁴. But the testimony of Coetzee had been vital in unlocking doors that in 1985 looked as if they would remain forever sealed.

And of course with each testimony, the depth of the apartheid atrocities piled up. Many of the security force officers pointed toward their higher-ups, indicating that the ethos of death squads, *Vlakplaas*, Hammer Units, *Koevoet* (an insurgency unit whose Afrikaans name meant "crowbar"), "Third Force" and myriad others extended to the highest echelons of the bureaucracy and government of the country. One former police lieutenant, Charles Zeelie, said simply about his superior officers: "My

seniors up to commissioner knew about these methods, and condoned them." The methods about which he spoke were the application of electrical prods on various body parts to coerce information from suspects¹⁵. Many of Zeelie's superiors denied his testimony, but by that point, such revelations had become commonplace. It was clear to most observers that only the most deluded and anachronistic amongst the security force elite could deny their roles in the atrocities.

After 1994 more and more big names came forward. Eugene De Kock, known as "Prime Evil" because of his efficacy as a killer and commander of security force atrocities at Vlakplaas testified in charismatic, mesmerizing, and gory detail about numerous murders and escapades ranging from Ovamboland in Northern Namibia to Botswana to Zimbabwe and of course back at home in South Africa. He maintained that his orders came from the highest levels of government and was willing to tell all to the TRC in order to mitigate his multiple life sentence that has him in prison for more than 200 years for his roles in murders and conspiracy¹⁶. Retired Security Police general Nic Van Rensburg asserted that Senior government cabinet ministers including former Minister of Law and Order Adriann Vlok and defence Minister Magnus Malan were aware of "dirty tricks" campaigns¹⁷. Former Port Elizabeth Security branch chief Gerrit Erasmus testified before the TRC that "the politicians had to know. They were aware of what was going on. I believe that the President [P.W. Botha] was also aware [of the policy of getting rid of trouble-makers.]"¹⁸ Clearly in the minds of security force members, the responsibility for their actions was not theirs alone, and they were certain that many of their directives came from the highest levels of government.

Adrian Vlok, Minister of Law and Order during the Botha years, confirmed many of these assertions when he finally testified before the TRC in 1998. Vlok maintained, "The buck stops here with me, I have to take political and moral responsibility for actions, regular and irregular."¹⁹ Nonetheless, Vlok did assert that de Klerk knew of such allegations as far back as 1994, because Vlok had told the former president about his intentions to go before the TRC.

This is not even the most compelling aspect of Vlok's testimony. In October 1997 the TRC held

a lengthy "Security Hearing" in Johannesburg. At those hearings a number of issues came up about the nature of the organization, structure, and methods of the security forces. Once again the question of the meanings of certain phrases and words came up. In addition to "*uit die saamelewing verwyder*" ("remove from society") and "*permanent uit de saamelewing verwyder*" ("permanently remove from society") a number of other apparently ambiguous phrases and words occur: "*elimineer*" ("eliminate"); "*neutraliseer*" ("neutralise"); "*uitwis*" ("obliterate or wipe out"); "*vernietig*" ("destroy"); "*opspoor en vernietig*" ("track down and destroy"); "*hou vas, breek*" ("break their grip"); "*bekamp*" ("fight against, curb, control"); "*stuit*" ("arrest, stem")²⁰. Security Force members from the highest levels on down used such phrases. And almost to a man, each believed that every phrase had a multiplicity of meanings and interpretations, and that none could be taken at face value²¹.

Adrian Vlok was one of the foremost adherents of the idea that even the most seemingly clear phrases, words and sentences were fraught with ambiguity. «There was nothing unnatural or unusual in the use of these expressions. It is however so as already said that with the benefit of hindsight, it is an indisputable fact that there wasn't necessary consideration of the perspectives in interpretations of other people who did not attend these meetings. With my knowledge and my insights into the mechanisms of the SAC I say that no decisions were taken by it to act illegally but at the same time, I know, or I know now that it would have been unavoidable that people who did not experience the spirit and intent of these meetings could very easily come to other conclusions and apparently they have indeed done so.»²²

It seems that while Vlok was willing to take on full responsibility for the actions of those beneath him in the chain of command, he was equally sure that what it comes down to is that his directives were misunderstood or misapplied, that "divisional commanders and their troops on the ground who were [...] responsible for controlling uncontrollable situations and to normalise abnormal situations and on whom there" were extreme pressure from outside forces, ranging from politicians and commanding officers to the general populace, "These people would not easily have linked an innocent interpretation to these expressions."²³ Despite his willingness to stand up to the TRC

and face his past, which many of his cohorts, such as Magnus Malan and P.W. Botha steadfastly refused to do, there is something inherently unsatisfying about the nature of Vlok's apology. It is institutional --"the buck stops here," he says, but only because it was supposed to. Such an apology seems a far cry from actually accepting responsibility for actions that clearly caused profound harm. One can assume that Vlok's contrition has some legitimacy, but at the same time he proclaims that a word like "*uitwis*" has many interpretations, and his underlings time and time again chose to infer the wrong ones.

The Mail and *Guardian* was skeptical of Vlok's contrition --far more so than it was that of "Prime Evil" De Kock or of vicious security policeman Gideon Nieuwoldt's testimony. In addressing Vlok's testimony, the *M & G* wrote, "He accepts "political and moral responsibility" for the misdeeds of the police, but not "direct" responsibility: Christ-like, he offers to take the sins of the world (or at least those of his men) upon his shoulders, but let no one dare suggest he was a sinner!"²⁴ In essence, Vlok wanted to put forth the appearance of performing his duty to the TRC, to the nation, and to his position without putting himself in the direct line of fire for the deeds and misdeeds of his past.

Eventually seven security force policemen stepped forward and testified before the TRC to the murders of Goniwe, Calata, Mkhonto, and Mhlawuli. The seven were Eric Taylor, Gerhardus Lotz, Nicholas van Rensburg, Harold Snyman, Johan Martin "Sakkie" van Syl, Hermanus du Plessis, and Eugene de Kock. De Kock's involvement was relatively peripheral. He was involved in the coverup but not the murders themselves, and the amnesty commissioners found him to have been truthful as to his involvement. The others were not so forthcoming, however, and as a consequence, the Commission refused to grant them amnesty. No criminal charges have since been filed²⁵.

Granted, even after the amnesty hearings questions remain. The whole truth might never be known, might have receded into a past as charred as the car and bodies of the Cradock Four. But the TRC also proved to have a power not only to promote healing, reconciliation, and hope for the future of South Africa. It also revealed a capacity to bring out some semblance of the truth, however imperfect. In a special seminar at Rhodes University in Grahamstown

in 1997, Dumisa Ntsebesa, the Head of the TRC Investigative Committee, used the Goniwe case as an example of why the TRC was the best tool available to South Africans for uncovering the heretofore hidden aspects of their past. He argued that the evidence in the Cradock Four case was impossible to discern. "It might have been "known" what happened and who was responsible, but short of confessions" in this case, evidence was impossible to obtain²⁶. [26] After six months in the second inquest, despite the presence of *Die Sein*, the top counsel could not pinpoint who exactly was responsible and therefore could not hold anyone accountable. In that case the truth was not exposed and the families of the victims could not reconcile themselves to what had happened. In many cases similar to that of the Cradock Four, what happened might seem clear, but in terms of real, extant, useable evidence, without something like

the TRC there may have been no hope for discovering truth, however imperfect.

Words and rhetoric can have slippery and problematic meanings. Evidence can be exasperatingly ambiguous. Sources can contradict themselves. But this case from South Africa's darkest years provides a good example of both the difficulties and the opportunities that contemporary historians face. It is possible to know something approximating truth, if imperfectly and if incompletely. And in so many important historical cases, it is worth taking the leap of faith, doing the work, weighing the evidence, and at times making the hard moral judgments against which we are supposed to flee. We owe that much to history. We certainly owe that much to the Cradock Four.

NOTAS

¹ The background on the Cradock Four comes from an extensive project upon which I have been working. The project focuses on the role of the South African Security Forces in the Eastern Cape in the period from 1984 to 1987. Among the sources that have informed this section are (full citations will appear when I utilize specific sources) the two Inquests into the killings; Documents from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); numerous newspaper, magazine, and journal articles; as well as numerous other primary and secondary sources.

² Recent revelations before the Amnesty Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have questioned whether or not Mhlawuli was active in the anti-apartheid struggle. This could prove to be crucial in the success or failure of the applicants for amnesty.

³ *Port Elizabeth Herald*, 22 December, 1985.

⁴ De Beers finding, First Inquest into the Cradock Four Killings (often referred to as the "Goniwe Murders"), 1989. Cory Library for Historical research in the history of Southern Africa, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa.

⁵ See, for example, Charl Schutte, Ian Liebenberg, and Anthony Minnaar. (ed.), *The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa*. Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 1998, especially, 191-204, 273-296.

⁶ *Second Inquest* 1, (1994), Cory Library. Translation is my own.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ For information on Coetzee see Rosenberg, Tina, "Recovering From Apartheid", *The New Yorker*, November 16, 1996 and Pauw, Jacques, *In The Heart of the Whore: The Inside Story of Apartheid's Death Squads*. Durban, Southern Book Publishers, 1991.

¹² Pauw, Jacques, *In The Heart of the Whore: The Inside Story of Apartheid's Death Squads*. See also Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins*. Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1997.

¹³ Dirk Coetzee to F.W. de Klerk, letter dated February 21, 1991. Oliver Tambo Papers, ANC Archives, University of Fort Hare.

¹⁴ See Derek Catsam, "Text, Lies, and Videotape: Truth, Reconciliation, and the Transition to Democracy in the New South Africa", *Proteus: A Journal of Ideas* 21 (Spring 2004), 13-22.

¹⁵ *South African Press Association (SAPA) News Release*, February 25, 1998.

¹⁶ For more on De Kock and his revelations to the TRC see Catsam, "Text, Lies, and Videotape: Truth, Reconciliation, and the Transition to Democracy in the New South Africa", 13-22.

¹⁷ *East London Daily Dispatch*, September 30, 1997.

¹⁸ Quoted in *Eastern Province Herald*, September 24, 1997.

¹⁹ Quoted in the *Electronic Mail* and *Guardian*, *ZA NOW* July 21, 1998.

²⁰ TRC Security Hearing Transcript, Part 1, 14 October, 1997, Johannesburg. Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

²¹ Ibid. *passim*.

²² TRC Security Hearing Transcript, Part 2. For a very truncated version of Vlok's testimony, see "Apartheid Crimes: One Giant Misunderstanding" in *Harper's Magazine*, March 1998.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "The Gospel According to Vlok", *Mail and Guardian*, July 24, 1998.

²⁵ TRC Amnesty Committee Decision, AC/99/0350, 1999.

²⁶ Dumisa Ntsebeza, Rhodes University Sociology department Seminar, Grahamstown, South Africa, 29 August, 1997. Notes in author's possession.