

ASSESSING THE PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE US-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

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Recibido: 10 Marzo 2005 / Revisado: 15 Abril 2005 / Aceptado: 07 Mayo 2005 / Publicado: 15 Junio 2005

Resumen: For years, in regard to the East Asia cold war and the Chinese foreign policy, scholars have focused more on the Sino-American confrontation or tough Sino-Soviet relations but ignored China's policy toward Japan. Actually, different from its tough policy toward the United States, the Chinese Japan policy during the Cold War was largely flexible and soft, which was typically shown in its People's Diplomacy with emphasis on non-governmental contacts. This paper not only discusses the origins and development of this new diplomatic approach but also explores its impacts on Japan and the US-Japan security alliance. Based on Chinese, American, and Japanese sources recently available, it argues that the People's Diplomacy, with its soft tone and great flexibility, effectively undermined the US-Japan cold war security alliance.

Palabras clave: China, Cold War, East Asia, foreign policy, international relations, Japan, USA.

However, within three years, the changing international situation in East Asia forced the PRC to abandon such a radical policy. Following the conclusion of the PRC-Soviet alliance treaty in early 1950 and PRC's intervention in the Korean War later this year, Sino-American confrontation had become the major theme of the East Asian cold war. Besides economic embargo and military confrontation in Korea, the United States also signed the peace and security treaties with Japan and forced Japan to conclude a separate peace treaty with the defeated Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan rather than the Communist government in the mainland. Japan, the only industrial country in Asia, thus had been incorporated into Washington's anti-China cold war alliance. The possibility to establish any official diplomacy between China and post-occupation Japan disappeared. Under the circumstances, PRC leaders realized that it was unrealistic for Japan to totally escape from America's clutches in the near future.

THE ORIGINS OF THE PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY

The People's Diplomacy was not the official Japan policy of the Chinese Communists in the late 1940s. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Nationalists in the civil war and founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, CCP leaders, with their fervent revolutionary enthusiasm, took a radical policy toward Japan which was still under American military occupation. They urged the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) to use "the revolutionary spirit" to step by step "revolutionize" the Japanese people against the US "imperialism" and Japanese "reactionary forces"¹.

At the same time, their radical policy to Japan suffered fiasco when JCP's reckless and unsuccessful strikes and riots in Japan were suppressed by the Japanese government in mid-1950. As the JCP's influence dramatically declined in Japan, the Chinese Communists could not place any hope on the Communist revolution in Japan in the near future as they urged the JCP before.

More important, CCP leaders realized the Chinese could not ignore Japan in their fighting American threat. After all, the two Asian countries had had over one thousand years of friendly relations, except recent fifty years of conflict and hostility. Fortunately to the CCP, the Japanese were not unanimously siding with America against China. Although the Japanese

pro-American conservative government led by Yoshida Shigeru rejected to recognize the PRC regime, the appeal for promoting Sino-Japanese relationship among the Japanese had never disappeared. To them, China had stayed as an important and attractive market for Japan. As early as May 1949, pro-China Dietmembers established a Dietmen's League for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Trade, including members from the conservatives to the left wing socialists². And Japanese businessmen also formed the Association for Promoting Sino-Japanese Trade (APSJT) [Nitchu Boeki Sokushinkai]. Soon, the Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA) [Nitchu Yuko Kyokai] was established, aiming to develop traditional friendship and cooperation between two countries by increasing "cultural" and "economic" exchanges and thus ensure "mutual security"³. These pro-China forces remained in Japan after the outbreak of the Korean War. Further, the peace and security treaties split the Japanese. Although most conservatives supported the treaties and saw the US protection as the best way for Japan's security, pro-China groups opposed both treaties and advocated neutrality to avoid Japan's involvement in military conflicts in Asia. To these neutrality advocates, the peace treaty excluded China, thus unable to provide Japan with a safe environment; the security treaty was an unequal treaty binding up Japan with America's anti-Communist cold war cause, as it allowed US troops to use Japan's bases for military operations in the Far East without the consent of the Japanese government and granted these US troops indefinite rights including the right to suppress riots and turmoil in Japan⁴.

To the Chinese, the existence of Japan's pro-China neutralist forces was promising. In coping with America's threat, China could take the chance of the split among the Japanese to strengthen the Japanese pro-China forces.

As a result, China's Japan policy changed from promoting revolution to seeking accommodation. By encouraging Japan's independent and neutralist trend, Beijing hoped to put a wedge in the US-Japan alliance and finally create a safe and peaceful environment for China's economic construction. In the absence of the official relationship, Beijing in the spring of 1952 decided to focus on the unofficial economic, cultural, and political relations and promote the People's Diplomacy:

to use unofficial communications and contacts as the first step to promote the establishment of official relationship (*Min Jian Xian Xing, Yi Min Cu Guan*). The new policy directly aimed against Washington's embargo and containment strategy. CCP leaders believed that, as long as the people between the two countries were engaged in mutual contacts, commerce and friendly cooperation, the majority of the Japanese people would support the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and push the Japanese government to change its lean-to-America policy and achieve the normalization goal⁵.

THE BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY AND INITIAL SUCCESS

The initial step of the People's Diplomacy was to resume and promote Sino-Japanese trade suspended by the Korean War. In May 1952, the Chinese invited Kora Tomi, Miyakoshi Kisuke, and Hoashi Kei—three Japanese pro-China Diet members who attended Moscow International Economic Conference—to visit Beijing and signed with them the first Sino-Japanese non-governmental trade agreement. In 1953, Beijing signed the second trade agreement with a Japanese delegation of the Dietmen's League for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Trade. These two agreements, in spite of the opposition of the Yoshida government, resumed the limited Sino-Japanese trade and even had a semiofficial implication because the Japanese negotiators were Dietmembers⁶. As a result, the Sino-Japanese trade quickly increased from about \$35 million in 1953 to \$110 million in 1955. Japan's imports from China increased from \$30 million to \$81 million, while its exports to China increased from \$5 million to \$29 million⁷. Besides the increasing trade, both sides also held commodity exhibitions in each other's country in 1955 and 1956, attracting several million visitors⁸.

With the resumption of the Sino-Japanese trade, the People's Diplomacy soon expanded to other fields. To assist the return of over 30,000 Japanese nationals in China after World War II to Japan was another measure to win Japan's friendship. On 1 December 1952, Beijing issued an invitation to Japan for negotiations about repatriation on a non-governmental level. The Yoshida government had to take "positive measures" and entrusted the Japanese Red

Cross, the JCFA, and the Japanese Peace Association (JPA) to negotiate with the Chinese side. In early 1953, both sides reached agreement on repatriation⁹. The settlement of Japanese repatriation led Beijing to successfully extend its influence on the Japanese. Most Japanese returnees from China and some firmly anti-Communist Japanese joined pro-China forces, calling for improving Japan's relations with China. Many Japanese thus changed their attitude toward Communist China and had a good impression of the Chinese¹⁰. As a result, the repatriation program effectively promoted a change of public opinion among the Japanese towards their relationship with China and ensured further Sino-Japanese economic and other non-governmental contacts.

Following successful Japanese repatriation, non-governmental or semi-governmental exchange visits and personal contacts between China and Japan became increasingly frequent. Whereas five Japanese delegations visited China from 1952 to 1954, nine did so in 1955 alone, including a trade delegation, the Dietmen delegation, and Union Labor delegations. In 1956, fifteen delegations went to China and in 1957 the number increased to twenty. In return, from 1955 to 1957 China sent twenty-seven delegations to Japan. The exchange of visits even extended to the academic and cultural fields. Japan's intelligentsia organized several medical, scientific, agricultural, and educational delegations to Beijing. The Chinese groups, including a delegation to the World Ping-Pong Tournament, a Beijing-opera troupe, a Science delegation, and others, also visited Japan to conduct the academic and cultural exchange¹¹.

The PRC paid much attention to these Japanese delegations. When every important delegation came, Beijing always provided a warm welcome. The PRC's senior leaders held "friendly" talks and meetings with its members. And then both sides often issued a joint statement. Soon the People's Daily issued an editorial on the Japanese visit, re-emphasizing the PRC's friendship to Japan and its great expectation of the Japanese people. In these talks and meetings, Beijing carefully avoided the hostility in World War II but always stressed the importance of Sino-Japanese friendship and China's desire for peaceful coexistence¹².

With the expansion of the People's Diplomacy, PRC leaders further made clear the political

principles of their Japanese policy. On several occasions since 1953, they expressed China's willingness to establish a relationship of peaceful coexistence with Japan, conclude a non-aggression pact with "an independent, democratic, and free Japan," expand bilateral economic and cultural exchanges, and "guard peace in Asia and the world along with Japanese people"¹³. Meanwhile, Beijing did not forget to foster Japan's anti-American neutralist sentiment. In meeting the Japanese visitors, Chinese leaders stressed China's firm opposition to Japan's rearmament under the control of the United States. One editorial in the People's Daily in late 1953 particularly explained the Chinese attitude toward Japan's neutralism: if neutrality meant to "stop following the aggressive policy of the United States," the Chinese people would welcome it. The editorial further told the Japanese neutralists how to achieve neutrality: Japan must achieve its "independence" and peace. The editorial asked: "Now who is building everywhere in Japan naval ports, airports, military maneuver camps and barracks? Who forced Japan to use 70 percent of its budget directly or indirectly in rearmament? Who destroyed the peaceful life of the Japanese people and made Japan a military base so that a large number of peaceful enterprises fell into bankruptcy, a large number of unemployed workers roamed the street, not a few peasants failed to do their farming and not a few fisherman failed to do fishing?"¹⁴ Only when the Japanese get rid of "the American control and enslavement" could Japan realize its goal of neutrality. Thus, Beijing deftly incorporated its anti-American goal into the People's Diplomacy.

Peaceful coexistence through extensive economic, cultural, and political relations and support of Japanese neutralist forces thus became the major themes of Beijing's diplomacy to Japan. Although at the same time Beijing kept a tough policy toward Americans through its support and aid to the North Vietnamese and its shelling of the Nationalist-held offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait area, its new approach to Japan effectively improved the Sino-Japanese relationship in the mid-1950s.

In response to the Chinese friendship, more and more Japanese called for foreign and domestic policies "more appropriate" to Japan's interests. Japanese leftist forces, especially the influential

Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), echoed PRC's call for Japan's independence and demanded for the closer "cooperation with Asian countries" and an independent and neutral foreign and defense policy which had become more appealing to the Japanese. Even within the pro-American conservative forces, many conservative leaders like Hatoyama Ichiro, Kono Ichiro, Miki Takeo and Matsumura Kenzo, and Ishibashi Tanzan to various degrees advocated expanding Japan's relations with mainland China¹⁵. But the Yoshida government, sticking to its "following-America" policy and ignoring the Communist overture, finally lost popular support and collapsed in December 1954. The new government, headed by Hatoyama, expressed its willingness to establish "normal relations" with Communist China "on mutually acceptable terms"¹⁶. Beijing welcomed Tokyo's new attitude and sent a high-ranking trade delegation to Japan in March 1955 and signed the third non-governmental trade agreement with the Japanese¹⁷. In the Bandung Conference at the same time, the Japanese delegation even held secret talks with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and acquired from the top PRC leader the first-hand information which showed the Chinese hoped to establish the "friendly relationship" with Japan¹⁸.

People's Diplomacy not only promoted certain direct contacts between Chinese and Japanese officials but also widened the divergence of judgment on the situation in East Asia between the Americans and the Japanese and created tension for US-Japan security alliance. In spite of Washington's insistence on the Communist threat as "a matter of serious concern" given the Chinese toughness to America and their advance in mainland Asia, Tokyo did not regard the threat as so imminent¹⁹. People's Diplomacy gave the Japanese an impression of détente in the international situation. From late 1954 onward, more and more Japanese believed that the world situation had shifted to a period of relaxation. Not only socialists and labor union leaders but also many "professional commentators" frequently utilized such a relaxation theme, making it rather popular in Japanese opinion, if not completely "representative"²⁰.

As a result, the Japanese neutralist forces became increasingly influential. They not only opposed the existence of US military bases and the rearmament request raised by Washington but also firmly opposed Japan's subordination

to US cold war policy and made an irresistible appeal for Japan's independence and neutrality²¹. The left wing JSP even wrote to Zhou Enlai to express its determination to continuously struggle for Japan's "peace, freedom, and independence." Echoing China's People's Diplomacy, many leading Japanese intellectuals also opposed US non-recognition policy to China and thought Japan's best chance to avoid war in the nuclear age "lies in doing nothing, in remaining immobile and inoffensive," as the country needed "peace to grow again." Their prevailing sentiment was to keep peace through neutrality. If Japan sided with any nation, it would offend other nations. It should contribute to the peace of the world "by remaining neutral"²². Through their propaganda, these neutralist and leftist groups fostered to "a remarkable degree" the anti-American sentiment among the Japanese²³.

These Japanese pro-China neutralist forces further fostered Japanese nationalistic sentiment. Now, to many Japanese, the only way to avoid Japan's involvement in a major war in Asia was independence and neutrality, as in this way Japan could maintain good relations both with Communist China and the United States. The presence of US forces in Japan in the name of the 1951 security treaty, far from guaranteeing its safety, became a source of risk and danger as well as insecurity. As the US embassy in Tokyo noticed, there had developed a "mounting drive" for total independence from the United States and "restoration of full sovereignty" to Japan by the mid-1950s. Such a powerful new drive had won the support of the Japanese people of all "political persuasions." The most important manifestation of this growing sentiment was focused on proposals to revise the security treaty and its related agreements—all of which reflected the nature of Japan's subordination and dependence on the United States—in order to curtail "one-sided" privileges accorded to the United States and to make the agreements "more equal" in nature²⁴.

Pressured by neutralist forces, the Japanese government tended to move toward neutrality. Hatoyama not only asked Washington to reduce "Japan's share of defense expenditure" and refused to increase the 1955 defense budget but also raised the security treaty revision issue, proposing the withdrawal of US forces from Japan and the use of Japan's US bases only for "mutual defense" and no further Japanese

contribution to the support of US forces in Japan²⁵.

Japan's proposal stunned Americans. Washington policymakers simply rejected Tokyo's request. To them, the communists' People's Diplomacy was designed for "wooing" Asian people; just like their advance in Indochina and shelling the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait area, it was another means to expand communism. Thus, any concession on the issue of security treaty revision would only stimulate Japan's further "flirtation" with mainland China while ignoring the importance of other "free nations" in the Far East. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles mentioned, in light of "the present situation," by a new security treaty, "we would gain nothing"²⁶. Yet, Washington could not ignore Japan's trend toward neutralism and independence; after all, such independence in the shape of neutralism would lead to "disengagement" from the United States²⁷. Thus, it became necessary for Americans to take effective measures to prevent this trend.

FRUSTRATION OF THE PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY AND REVISION OF THE SECURITY TREATY

To the Chinese, the People's Diplomacy was not always smooth. Based on these nongovernmental contacts, Beijing further tried to break US non-recognition policy by promoting normalization of the Sino-Japanese relationship but finally was unable to achieve its normalization goal. In the mid-1950s, CCP leaders urged several times official talks for normalization between China and Japan. Hatoyama quickly responded by telling Diet members that Japan "must normalize its relationship with Communist China," He also said that if Zhou Enlai was "willing to hold negotiations," Japan would "have no reason" to refuse²⁸. But To Washington, Tokyo's new move went too far. American diplomats immediately warned that, if Japan sent a mission to Beijing to negotiate the normalization issue, the US response would be "probably more violent" than any one "could even imagine." Under Washington's stern warning, Hatoyama was forced to drop his move which would give Washington's containment strategy a fatal blow. He could not take risks of destroying the Japan-US relationship, as American support remained a key factor for Japan's postwar recovery. Thus,

the People's Diplomacy approach did not bring further official breakthrough and was unable to normalize PRC's diplomatic relationship with Japan²⁹.

Not only American opposition created fatal obstacles for Beijing's goal, but also the Japanese pro-American forces further frustrated the People's Diplomacy in the late 1950s. Within Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which united major conservative groups, anti-Communist and pro-American forces remained powerful. These pro-American conservatives always tried to use every opportunity to reverse Japan's increasing pro-China trend. In early 1957, the change of the Japanese government led Kishi Nobusuke –an extremely anti-Communist and pro-American conservative– to become the prime minister. The new prime minister immediately showed his sincere intention to develop Japan's close political, economic, and military relations with the United States and non-Communist Asia – particularly Southeast Asian countries and Taiwan– to pit against the PRC's increasing influence. He showed a more positive interest in Japan's rearmament and expanded Japan's Self-Defense Force³⁰. Most important, he changed Japan's previous pro-China policy. In his visit to Taiwan in mid-1957, Kishi expressed his overt support to the Nationalist Recover-the-Mainland plan. Meanwhile, contrary to the PRC's normalization hope, he strictly limited Japan-PRC contacts into a non-governmental level³¹. Beijing characterized Kishi's anti-China policy as attempting to "curry favor with his American master" and revive Japan's militarism. As a result, immediately following the so-called Nagasaki Flag Incident of May 1958 in which two Japanese rightists torn down the PRC's flag at a Chinese stamp and paper-cut exhibit in Nagasaki and did not receive any punishment, Beijing terminated all of its trading relations with Japan, as the Chinese regarded the incident as a "viscous" overt affront on China's national dignity³². By then the People's Diplomacy suffered a serious setback and the Sino-Japanese relations reached its nadir since the Korean War.

While the CCP was greatly disappointed with Kishi, the People's Diplomacy did not totally fail. Although foiling Beijing's attempt to normalize relationship with Japan, Washington was unable to undermine the rising influence of the Japanese neutrality force. After 1956, Japan's neutralist and nationalist sentiment –

greatly influenced by the People's Diplomacy—had reached such a level that unless current US-Japan relations were adjusted to an "equal" base, Japan would drift away. American policymakers noted that the leftist position on foreign policy questions, particularly their "advocacy of greater independence from the US" had won the support of more and more Japanese. So the conservatives were forced to support a readjustment of their US relations; in effect, they had to adopt the Socialist position³³. As a result, these conservatives were forced to pick up the nationalist flag of independence and equality. Thus, like the leftist demand, their focus was also on Japan's independence or autonomy in foreign and defense policy, and equality in Japan-US relations. Even Kishi, as an ardent anti-Communist rightist conservative, hoped his pro-American policy would pay off. Particularly on the issue of revision of the 1951 security treaty—the "symbol" of Japan's subordination to America—he expected a positive response from Washington, so Japan could establish a cooperation relationship with the United States based on mutuality and autonomy. Thus, the conservatives could keep the left-promoted neutralist and independence movement under control and prevent it from endangering the US-Japan security alliance³⁴. In other words, Kishi hoped that the United States should yield on the issues of Japan's diplomatic autonomy and independence to meet Japan's demands based on a kind of "mutuality." Otherwise, his conservative government would be unable to contain the voice of the leftist and neutralist forces.

Under the circumstances, if the Americans did not change their policy, they would lose Japan. Thus US diplomats began to consider the adjustment of their Japan security policy after mid-1956. John Allison, American ambassador in Tokyo, called for a "fresh" start with Japan. Confirming Japan's strategic value for US anti-China security alliance in the west Pacific Ocean, Allison admitted that this former Asian power was only "superficially and temporarily" tied with the United States. Japan was "merely staying closely with us long enough to exploit what she can get out of us" and would "drift away when she is ready." To win Japan as a lasting ally, the United States needed a "fresh way of approaching the Japanese." Particularly on the security treaty, he emphasized that, since the Japanese viewed the treaty as "one-sided" and "unequal," it would be wise for Washington to plan in advance a course of action aimed to

insure that future revision be "most favorable" to the American interests. Other officials in the State Department echoed Allison's report and argued that the United States must "act to help normalize Japan's position and relations" because the communist "soft enticing tune" had strengthened Japanese doubts about their relationship with the United States. The National Security Council soon decided to study the steps necessary to achieve a mutual security relationship³⁵. During Kishi's visit to Washington in June 1957, the United States and Japan announced the formation of an "inter-governmental committee to study problems arising in relation to the security treaty"³⁶. In September 1958, after the rapid deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, the United States and Japan officially began the renegotiation of the security arrangement. With over one year's bargaining, both sides signed the new, revised security treaty and other related documents in January 1960, trying to consolidate the bilateral cold war security cooperation against the PRC.

The 1960 treaty moved toward mutuality and equality. It canceled the old unequal terms that enabled the United States to intervene in Japan to suppress domestic disorders and forbade Japan to grant any bases or related rights to any third power without Washington's prior consent. Further, the provision for prior consultation and the "fixed term" of ten years raised Japan's status as an equal partner in certain occasions³⁷. However, such an "equal" status did not mean that Japan had achieved total autonomy. The treaty excluded Okinawa from the treaty area. Since Japan held only "residual sovereignty" over it until the early 1970s, prior consultation was not applicable to the island, so the United States continued to keep the largest and most important military base in the West Pacific area under its control. With Okinawa in hand, Washington's Far East military operations could be guaranteed. Also, through a series of related documents, Washington retained its most important base rights in Japan. First, military operations in Korea from Japanese bases were exempt from consultation. Second, nuclear weapons could be stored in vessels coming to and going from the base, which the Japanese public opposed. Most important, the loopholes in the treaty about consultation, as the Diet members pointed out, further immunized US military operations outside Japan from Japan's veto.

In this sense, Japan failed to achieve its major goal: mutuality and autonomy. It did not obtain any substantial concessions from the United States. The issue of suppressing riots involved Japan's internal affairs. As the key spirit of the treaty was to consolidate the US-Japan alliance, it was impossible for Japan to lend bases to other parties in the cold war situation even if the new pact did not mention this base-lending term. The rights Washington surrendered did not endanger US base rights and the status of US forces in Japan. On the contrary, the treaty continued to hold Japan in the US cold war security orbit through its terms about US bases and the loopholes related to prior consultation. Japanese officials later admitted the new treaty failed to "provide a check against Japan's involvement in war." Instead, it actually provided assurance that Japan would be "drawn into a great war"³⁸. Thus, compared with the security treaty in 1951, the new treaty outwardly raised Japan as an equal partner with the United States but inwardly kept Washington's dominant position in the bilateral relationship. The "equality" and "mutuality" shown in the treaty were merely used to save Japan's face and ease the pressure of Japan's neutralist forces.

To a large extent, the new treaty was the logical product of East Asian Cold War after the Korean War. On the one hand, the rigid Sino-US relationship throughout the 1950s and the possible Japan's drift-away caused by the People's Diplomacy forced Washington policymakers to hold Japan and secure Japan as an important base in their anti-Communist, anti-China security system in Asia. Without Japan's cooperation and bases, the containment strategy could not be effectively implemented. Therefore, to the United States, any attempts leading to Japan's neutrality had to be excluded. "Equality" and "mutuality" must not compromise American security privileges in Japan. On the other hand, however, the People's Diplomacy fostered powerful neutralist forces in Japan and put Tokyo in a quandary. Influenced, the Kishi government, although showing its firm anti-PRC stand and expecting closer security cooperation with the United States, tried its best to avoid any direct involvement in military confrontation relating to China. Such a conflicting stand placed the Japanese in a weak position during the negotiations. With Japan's cooperation with the United States in the cold war as the first priority for its development, Tokyo had to place desire

to avoid war behind US demands for military cooperation. Thus, such an "unequal" result was closely related to the People's Diplomacy.

CONTINUED PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY AND THE CRISIS IN TOKYO

The Chinese did not stand idly by during the US-Japan negotiation process. Regarding the new treaty as a direct threat and a further military collusion between US imperialism and Japan's militarism, they tried their best to foil it. As PRC's relations with the Kishi government irreversibly deteriorated, Beijing decided to continue its People's Diplomacy approach: through Japan's pro-China neutralist forces mobilize the Japanese people against the Kishi government and the new security treaty.

In mid-1958, before US-Japan treaty negotiations started, the PRC attached to the People's Diplomacy the famous Three Political Principles: the Japanese government should not continue to 1) take a "hostile attitude" to China, 2) try "a plot to create Two Chinas," and 3) obstruct the resumption of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship³⁹. In other words, politics could not be separated from economy: if Japan hoped to enter China's market, the Japanese had to politically side with China; if Japan did not follow these three principles, all of the Sino-Japanese contacts would be cut. Thus, Beijing's People's Diplomacy began to increasingly focus on this political aspect and quickly strengthened its attack on the new security treaty. In November 1958 China denounced treaty revision as totally opposite to the desire of the Japanese people and warned Kishi's lean-to-America policy would lead Japan in to a blind alley. People's Daily emphasized that the revised security treaty would never be an equal treaty but one that would make Japan lose its independence and "subject to the US war policy." And then PRC media constantly reminded the Japanese people that the new treaty would make Japan the US nuclear war base and seriously threaten the security of Japan and the whole Asian area⁴⁰. The audience of these statements largely was not the Kishi government –which had lost Beijing's trust– but the Japanese people. In this way, PRC leaders closely related treaty revision to Japan's involvement in war, which the Japanese people eagerly hoped to avoid, thus effectively stimulating Japan's left neutralist forces to oppose the new security treaty.

Japan's pro-China forces immediately echoed Chinese claims. In early March 1959 a JCP delegation in Beijing told CCP leaders that the JCP firmly opposed the security treaty and demanded its total abolition. The JSP also sent a delegation to China, announcing that "US imperialism is the common enemy of the peoples of China and Japan two countries. We struggle against US imperialism." The JSP assured Chinese leaders that its "central" task was to destroy the Japan-US security treaty system. Beijing stressed that both the Chinese and Japanese peoples had "the common task" against the US aggression policy and its war policy and should support and encourage each other⁴¹.

Encouraged by Chinese support, the JSP and the JCP, along with other leftist organizations such as the Sohyo (major trade union), JCFA, Gensuikyo (Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), JPA, the student organization, and others established a new organization against treaty revision, which was named the People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty (*Anpo Joyaku Kaitei Soshi Kukumin Kaigi*) in late March 1959⁴². More than one hundred groups, almost all of which belonged to the leftist progressive camp, attended its first meeting and started their anti-treaty campaign. The efforts of anti-treaty forces greatly influenced the Japanese attitude toward treaty revision. A poll of the Tokyo Shimbun in mid-1959 showed that 44.5 percent of respondents thought the treaty would be likely to "involve Japan in war" while only 21.5 percent thought it could guarantee "Japan's security." From late 1959 the anti-treaty movement had become more and more intensified. In a demonstration launched by the People's Council in Tokyo in November, over 10,000 protestors seized part of the Diet building. Radical students even tried to stop Kishi from flying to Washington to sign the treaty⁴³.

The signing of the security treaty did not discourage the Chinese. On the contrary, Beijing tried its best to create trouble for the Kishi government. PRC's Foreign Ministry issued a statement in mid-January 1960, again denouncing the conclusion of the treaty as a serious step in the mutual collusion of "Japan's reactionaries and US imperialism" in preparing for new aggression and war and threatening Asian and world peace⁴⁴.

The response from China aroused much fear among the Japanese over their involvement in a general war in Asia. In the Diet debate about the treaty from February to April 1960, the China issue became hot. When the opponents questioned the scope of the Far East, the government defined the Far East as the area including the Chinese offshore islands (Jinmen and Mazu). The JSP immediately pointed out that even the Washington-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954 did not include these offshore islands. So the Kishi government would drag Japan into a war against China. Kishi then had to change his explanation, arguing that the scope of the Far East was "intrinsically vague and abstract." Such an "abstract theory" only heightened JSP's attack on the government. Discontent with Kishi's reply, the opposition parties withdrew from the Diet Security Special Committee in late March⁴⁵.

Related to the scope of the Far East, the debate further extended to the issue of "prior consultation." When the Socialist Dietmembers asked Kishi if he would use the veto when Beijing attacked the offshore islands, Kishi replied that, if US forces were sent from Japan to that area, he would "apply the veto." And then the JSP pointed out, if Washington transported US troops in Japan for military operations in the offshore islands but stopped in Okinawa first "for supplies on route," or if "it moved troops from Japan to Okinawa" first and then later left from Okinawa, "prior consultation" would become totally meaningless⁴⁶. The troops fighting in the Taiwan Strait were dispatched from the Okinawa area, which was excluded from the treaty area and thus exempt from prior consultation. Such powerful arguments, in contrast with Kishi's clumsy reply, seriously weakened the government's justification for the treaty.

Clearly the government behaved very badly in the Diet debates. Its poor performance further raised public doubt and worry about the danger caused by the treaty. Although some anti-Communist groups supported the treaty, the anti-treaty forces successfully mobilized major newspapers and magazines in opposition, largely controlling public opinion. Many moderates moved to the opposition side. Public polls from late 1959 to mid-1960 also showed a decline of support for the US-Japan alliance⁴⁷.

Although the challenge from the anti-treaty forces became greater, Kishi was not discouraged. He was confident the treaty would be passed, as the LDP held a majority of seats in the Diet lower house. At midnight on May 20, he forced the Diet to ratify the treaty with the opposition parties all absent⁴⁸. Kishi's forced-passage action enraged not only the organized anti-treaty forces but also ordinary people. After May 20 demonstrations were held almost every day in Tokyo and quickly spread to other local cities. The demonstrators even blocked President Dwight D. Eisenhower's press secretary James Hagerty—who arrived in Japan to arrange the details for the president's schedule visit in June—at the Haneda Airport for fifteen minutes. The incident shocked Washington. Eisenhower had to cancel his visit to Japan⁴⁹.

The situation tended to be out of control. To make the matter worse, China again showed its firm stand against the treaty. Besides large rallies and demonstrations in major cities, PRC leaders also considered military actions. They added 55 jet fighters to its coast opposite to Taiwan. They also issued their "105th serious warning" against US violation of their air space and territorial waters. Meanwhile, they also strengthened their shelling on Jinmens—the Nationalist-held offshore islands group. On June 17, PRC troops heavily bombed Jinmen islands, throwing about 30,000 shells on the islands. The Nationalist troops only threw back 28 shells. Two days later, PRC troops again bombed the island with 38,000 shells⁵⁰. The shelling effectively coordinated the anti-treaty movement in Tokyo by showing Japan a continued tension in the Taiwan Strait area, as it convinced the Japanese anti-treaty forces that Japan's involvement in a war was possible when the tension in the Taiwan Strait became worse.

Indeed, the demonstrations in Japan continued. The demonstrators even surrounded Kishi's residence from day to night. Obviously, the prime minister became unable to control the situation in Tokyo. Finally, after hastily exchanging the ratified treaty documents with US Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II at Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro's residence on June 23, Kishi resigned⁵¹.

With Kishi's resignation, the anti-treaty movement quickly dissolved. However, the crisis in Tokyo proved that Beijing, although failing to block the conclusion of the new

treaty, had the capability to influence Japan's domestic politics and create great trouble for the US-Japan security alliance through its uninterrupted People's Diplomacy and other related actions. Japan's pro-China neutralist groups fostered by this new diplomatic approach had developed into a powerful political force to exert great pressure on Japan's anti-China conservative government. Anyone who ignored this new force would deserve the same destiny as Kishi did. Without the PRC's support and cooperation, Japan's neutrality forces could not launch any large-scale anti-treaty and anti-government demonstrations after the treaty was signed.

THE EXPANSION OF THE PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY AND THE UNDERMINING OF THE SECURITY TREATY

Through the crisis in Tokyo, many Japanese realized that US-Japan security alliance could be accepted only when it did not drag Japan into "unnecessary confrontations with its neighbors," especially China. The succeeding Japanese LDP government led by Ikeda Hayato had to take a more cautious position in their policy related to the China issue. The new prime minister learned the lesson from Kishi's collapse and emphasized "tolerance and endurance." Although not changing Japan's following-America policy, he realized the long-term importance of the China market besides the necessity of close Japan-US economic relations. Thus he took a positive attitude to Sino-Japanese economic and cultural relations. He even said that Japan would not have to take the same China policy as the America. To him, although Japan-China trade was on non-governmental basis, the government still could "make a relevant response" if the businessmen "actively promotes" the trade⁵². These ideas marked a retreat from Kishi's rigid stand.

Ikeda's new posture received Beijing's positive response. China showed its flexibility and adjusted the People's Diplomacy by adding to it Three Trade Principles: 1) governmental agreement, 2) non-governmental contract, and 3) individual consideration. In meeting with Suzuki Kazuo—JCTPA's managing director—in late August 1960, Premier Zhou Enlai explained these new trade forms: although a governmental agreement would not be concluded until the bilateral relationship was normalized, Japanese private enterprises and Chinese companies still could sign the non-

governmental contracts if the business was "friendly, possible, and mutually beneficial;" if the Japanese middle-sized and small enterprises encountered special difficulties, labor unions of both countries could give them "individual consideration"⁵³. This new policy showed that China had had no plan to pursue a quick normalization of the Sino-Japanese relationship but began to re-emphasize the bilateral non-governmental economic relations and separate Japan's private business from the government. But this approach did not mean that China abandoned its Three Political Principles which stressed the principle of inseparability of politics and economy. Beijing still regarded the political element as necessary. As for how to promote such a non-governmental trade, Beijing particularly raised the "political" issue: if the Japanese business took a hostile attitude to China, the Chinese side would have the right to cancel the contracts signed with it; the Chinese would do trade not with the Japanese business hostile to China but only with the friendly Japanese enterprises. Those friendly enterprises at the beginning would include most middle-size and small "professional firms" which supported the anti-security-treaty struggle and then expand to some middle-sized and big enterprises whose employees participated in the anti-treaty struggle and whose employers were not "firmly" anti-governmental but would plan to take friendly attitude to China⁵⁴. Thus, the Three Trade Principles re-opened the Sino-Japanese economic relations in the form of Friendship Trade. The China Committee of the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in charge of the Friendship Trade entrusted Japan's pro-China organizations such as the APSJT, the JCFA, and the Japan Association of the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT) to select and recommend the Japanese firms to become "friendly firms." Most middle-sized and small enterprises involved in the China business welcomed such a Friendship Trade. As a result, the number of these "friendly firms" quickly increased from 17 in 1960 to 348 in 1968. In late 1962, the CCPIT also invited the representatives of the APSJT, the JCFA, and the JAPIT to Beijing to conclude protocols of Friendship Trade. The protocol not only confirmed China's Three Political Principles, Three Trade Principles, and the principle of inseparability of politics and economy as the basis of Sino-Japanese Friendship Trade but also decided to hold commodity exhibits in both countries. With the active Friendship Trade,"

the People's Diplomacy moved into a new stage.

With the reopening of the Sino-Japanese trade, the People's Diplomacy in the 1960s again moved towards the resumption of governmental contacts. The Friendship Trade was dominated by the middle-size and small enterprises. Its scale was limited. Its political initiative was also in the hands of China. Attracted by the China market, Japanese leaders and businessmen involved in the China trade were unhappy with this situation. They hoped to expand further the bilateral trade. Ikeda pointed out, the control of the non-governmental contract merely by the "leftist" parties was "inappropriate for the development of the Japan-China relationship" and the government also must "decide its own attitude." Okazaki Kaheita, one of the JAPIT founding members and president of All Japan Airway, in June 1962 raised his plan to establish a normal channel for Japan-China trade, including direction participation of all manufacturers, a long-term (3-5 years) comprehensive barter trade plan, the establishment of overall coordinating institution, and nomination of guarantees for bank loan. Having approved the Okazaki plan, the Ikeda cabinet decided to send Matsumura –LDP consultant and Dietmen at the time– to China⁵⁵.

In mid September 1962, Matsumura arrived in Beijing and met with senior PRC leaders including Zhou Enlai and Vice-premier Chen Yi. After several talks, both sides issued a joint announcement. The Chinese showed great flexibility: realizing Matsumura's semi-official status and difficulty for the Ikeda cabinet in accepting their three sets of principles guiding Sino-Japanese relationship, they merely reasserted their existing principles and did not force Matsumura to accept them. Yet in the announcement the Chinese and Japanese sides both agreed to take "a gradual and cumulative method" for normalization of bilateral relationships including "political relations and economic relations," which exactly reflected the principle of inseparability of politics and economy. Besides, both sides adopted major proposals from the Okazaki plan and agreed to expand bilateral trade including the existing Friendship Trade⁵⁶. After going back to Japan, Matsumura immediately discussed with Takasaki Tatsunosuke –another pro-China LDP Dietmember– on how to implement the framework set by the joint announcement. With

one month, Takasaki organized a delegation with thirty-three members including Okazaki and twenty-three representatives from industrial circles. In late October Takasaki's mission arrived in Beijing to negotiate with the Chinese negotiators led by Liao Chengzhi, Zhou Enlai's major associate on China's Japan policy. Finally, on November 9 Liao and Takasaki signed the memorandum of Sino-Japanese overall, long-term trade. Both agreed to develop long-term overall non-governmental trade involving manufactured products from Japan (like steel and chemical fertilizers) and primary products from China (like coal, iron ore, and soy beans). Both also agreed to establish liaison offices in both capitals to implement the memorandum: China's Liao office in Tokyo and Japan's Takasaki office in Beijing⁵⁷. The memorandum started the LT Trade which was named after the initials of two signatories. With the involvement of the governments of both countries, the LT trade, in spite of its non-governmental mask, had a strong official implication. The signing of the memorandum was based on the Zhou-Matsumura political understanding. The negotiators actually were the representatives sent by both governments. The liaison offices finally established in 1964 opened a new political channel for improving bilateral relations. Thus LT trade marked the People's Diplomacy achieved a substantial breakthrough and push the Sino-Japanese relationship into a new semi-official semi-non-governmental stage.

With the Friendship Trade and the LT Trade, the Sino-Japanese economic and cultural relations quickly expanded. The bilateral trading volume dramatically increased from \$23 million in 1960 to \$470 million in 1965. Soon after the Liao Office and Takasaki Office were established, the two liaison offices reached an agreement on exchange of reporters. As a result, on 29 September 1964, seven Chinese reporters reached Tokyo and nine Japanese reporters arrived in Beijing. Both countries for the first time realized the reporter exchange. Besides, personal contacts were also restored. From 1960 to 1965, the number of the Japanese visitors to China increased from 29 to 3809, while the Chinese visitors to Japan also increased from 19 to 367⁵⁸.

Following the "gradual and cumulative method," such frequent economic and cultural non-governmental or semi-governmental relations continued and became irreversible

throughout the 1960s. Even after Kishi's brother Sato Eisaku succeeded Ikeda—who resigned in late 1964—as the prime minister and re-picked up Kishi's anti-China policy, the basic structure of Sino-Japanese contacts remained unchanged. By 1970 the total China-Japan trade volume had increased to \$823 million; by 1972 the number of Japanese visitors to China had reached 8025 while the number of Chinese visitors 994⁵⁹.

Through such contacts, Japan's pro-China forces became increasingly influential. Opposition parties, particularly the JSP, continuously sought to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. LDP pro-China members, with the support of business groups dreaming of the China market, created the Asian-African Problem Research Society (*Ajia Afurika Mondai Kenkyukai*) in the mid-1960s to call for improving Japan's relations with China. Its "founding membership" quickly increased from nineteen to seventy-nine, becoming a powerful "intraparty" organization. Even some anti-China LDP members changed their attitude. Fujiyama, the major negotiator of the security treaty, shifted to the pro-China forces and visited Beijing in the spring of 1970. Soon these LDP critics, allied with "opposition parties," formed the "Dietmen's League for the Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations" (*Nitchu Kokko Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Remmei*), urging the government to take "necessary" steps to grant recognition to the PRC⁶⁰. In short, the influence of Japan's pro-China forces steadily increased after 1960.

Accordingly, Japan's anti-security-treaty movement continued in the 1960s. Pro-China neutralist forces, with the support from Beijing, opposed the introduction of the nuclear weapon into Japan and demanded the withdrawal of US troops from Japan and the return of Okinawa as well as the abolition of the security treaty. Their appeal for neutrality became more popular when China successfully tested its first atomic bomb in 1964 and first hydrogen bomb two years later, as China's new membership in the nuclear club under the circumstance of continued Sino-American confrontation seemed to greatly increase the possibility of a nuclear war. American diplomats in Tokyo closely watched the unfavorable trend there, warning that a deep Japanese uneasiness over the China problem threatened the alliance. US observers noted that the strong Japanese sense of closeness to the Chinese, which was expressed

in the term of "same race and same culture," continued. These Japanese believed that a relatively small Japan had strong reasons to be "friendly to both the U.S. and China" and that the United States should take steps to ease Sino-US tensions. Such unease became the most serious problem in US-Japan security relations⁶¹.

Washington, although successfully keeping the Japanese government in its anti-China Asian security system, failed to check the expanding Sino-Japanese non-governmental and semi-governmental contacts and the rising pro-China forces. Although the security treaty had "survived the shock waves of leftist rioting" in 1960, the United States was unable to ask Japan to provide military aid in the Vietnam War, as any request for Tokyo's participation in US military operations against communist countries in the Far East would cause another extreme political turmoil in Japan like the crisis in Tokyo. Thus, after the early 1960s, the US-Japan security alliance "became increasingly close" and Washington's implementation of its containment strategy in East Asia was greatly inhibited by Japan's rising pro-China forces with the encouragement of China's expanded People's Diplomacy⁶².

Fortunately, the United States in the early 1970s abandoned its hostile policy toward China. Washington's détente with Beijing removed the last barrier for Japan. Japanese pro-China forces immediately exerted its great influence. They not only forced Sato to resign but also pressured Tanaka Takuei-the new prime minister-to establish diplomatic relationship with China in September 1972. By then, the People's Diplomacy had fulfilled its major goals: anti-embargo and anti-containment. Given Washington's continuous recognition of the Nationalist government until 1979, it is reasonable to argue that the People's Diplomacy with Japan played a key role in Japan's earlier recognition to the PRC. Meanwhile, following the Sino-US rapprochement and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, China was not seen as the enemy of the US-Japan cold war alliance until the end of the cold war. The US-Japan security treaty largely did not target

this largest Asian communist country for the next two decades.

BRIEF CONCLUSION

China's People's Diplomacy with Japan, in spite of its emphasis on overall non-governmental contacts, was not totally non-governmental. Its goal was to realize the official/governmental contacts. It has been launched, led, promoted, and adjusted by the Chinese government. In essence, as an alternative in absence of diplomatic relationship, it was government-guided non-governmental political, economic, and cultural contacts.

Over twenty-years People's Diplomacy in the cold war successfully foiled US economic embargo against China and finally realized the normalization of the Sino-Japanese relationship. Nonetheless, the greatest and most lasting achievement of the People's Diplomacy was that it successfully fostered powerful pro-China forces and greatly undermined US-Japan anti-China security alliance. The pro-China forces did not decline but has remained influential in Japan, following the more extensive Sino-Japanese contacts after 1972. Even today, when the US-Japan security alliance targets China again on the troublesome Taiwan issue, given the existence of the powerful pro-China forces, it still remains very difficult to implement the security treaty. As one scholar argues, with Japan's "political sensitivity," the United States probably would not depend on Okinawa in a possible conflict with China on the Taiwan problem but would have to turn to its bases in Guam⁶³. It seems Japan still would be unable to carry out its treaty obligation without reservation. Once related to the China problem, debates on Japan's alliance with the United States, as before, immediately split the Japanese and remained a major obstacle for the government to the implementation of the security treaty. Japan's pro-China forces, although not in power, will put great constraints on the Tokyo government if it tries to carry out the security treaty against China. In this way, the influence of the People's Diplomacy has been lasting.

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(Beijing, Zhong Guo She Hui Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 1996, 70-71 (hereafter Wen Xian Ji).

² Qingxin Ken Wang, *Hegemonic Cooperation and Conflict: Postwar Japan's JapanPolicy and the*

United States. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2000, 119 (hereafter cited as *Hegemonic Cooperation and Conflict*).

³ Soeya Yoshihide, *Nihon Gaiko to Chugoku: 1945-1972* [Japan's Diplomacy and China: 1945-1972]. Tokyo, Keio Tsushin, 1995, 68-71; Wang, *Hegemonic Cooperation and Conflict*, 118-119.

⁴ For the text of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the exchange of notes, see US State Department, *Department of State Bulletin*, September 17 (1951), 464-465.

⁵ Xiao Xiangqian, "Zhou Enlai Tong Zhi Dui Fa Zhan Zhong Ri Guan Xi De Zhuo Yue Gong Xian" [Zhou Enlai's Superb Contribution to the Development of the Sino-Japanese Relationship] in Pei Jianzhang, ed., *Yan Jiu Zhou Zhou Enlai-Wai Jiao Si Xiang Yu Shi Jian* [Study Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thoughts and Practice] Beijing, Shi Jie Zhi Shi Chu Ban She, 1989, 214; Jiang Peizhu and Qiu Guohong, "Zhong Ri Guan Xi Wu Tai Shang De Hui Huang Yue Zhang" [The Brilliant Movement of the Stage of the Sino-Japanese Relationship] in Pei, ed., *Yan Jiu Zhou Zhou Enlai-Wai Jiao Si Xiang Yu Shi Jian*, 227.

⁶ Tian, ed., Wen Xian Ji, 130-31, 154-155.

⁷ Nathan Newby White, *An Analysis of Japan's China Policy under the Liberal Democratic Party, 1955-1970*. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1971, 46; see also Soeya, *Nihon, Gaiko to Chugoku: 1945-1972*, 89, and Aaron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle*. Chapel Hill, NC, The University of North Carolina Press, 2000, 15-21.

⁸ For discussion of the exhibitions, see Chen and Pan, *Yi Min Cu Guan*, 155-64; Shao Chuan Len, *Japan and Communist China*. Kyoto, Doshisha University Press, 1968, 57-58.

⁹ Shi Jie Zhi Shi Bian Ji Bu Editorial Department of World Knowledge, ed., *Ri Ben Wen Ti Wen Jian Hui Bian. The Collection of Documents on the Japan Problems*, vol. 1. Beijing, Shi Jie Zhi Shi Chu Ban She, 1955, 97-98, 102.

¹⁰ Kurt Werner Radtke, *China's Relations with Japan, 1945-1983: The Role of Liao Chengzhi*. Manchester, UK, Manchester University Press, 1990, 100-02 (hereafter cited as *China's Relations with Japan*).

¹¹ Chen Dcai and Pan Huanzhao. *Yi Min Cu Guan: Zhou En-lai He Zhong Ri Guan Xi Using the Un-official to Promote the Official: Zhou En-lai and Sino-Japanese Relations* (Chongqing: Chongqing Chu Ban She, 1998), 118 (hereafter cited as *Yi Min Cu Guan*); Lin Daizhao. *Zhan Hou Zhong Ri Guan Xi Shi A History of Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations*. Beijing, Beijing Da Xue Chu Ban She, 1992, 86. Tian Huan, ed., *Zhan Hou Zhong Ri Guan Xi Shi Nian Biao, The Chronicle of History of Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations*. Beijing, Zhong Guo She Hui Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 1994, 68-81.

¹² See Tian, ed., Wen Xian Ji, 211, 228-232, 234, 235, 242-244,, 273, 307.

¹³ Tian, ed., Wen Xian Ji, 150-51, 153-54; Chen and Pan. *Yi Min Cu Guan*, 116-17; Takagi Seiichiro, *An Analysis of Chinese Behavior toward Japan, 1950-1965: An Examination of Three Models of International Behaviors*. Ph. D. diss., Stanford University, 1977, 83 (hereafter cited as *An Analysis of Chinese Behavior toward Japan*).

¹⁴ Tian, ed., Wen Xian Ji, 156-60; part of translation quoted from Takagi, *An Analysis of Chinese Behavior toward Japan*, 84.

¹⁵ J.A.A. Stockwin, "The Japan Socialist Party: Resurgence after Long Decline" in Ronald J. Hrebemar, ed., *The Japanese Party System*. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1992, 89; Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten, and Cecil H. Uyehara, *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan*. New Haven, NJ, Yale University Press, 1966, 43, 228, 54; John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System. A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and the Foreign Policy*. London, UK, The Athlone Press, 1988, 116-36 (hereafter *An Empire in Eclipse*).

¹⁶ The American Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, September 10, 1954, US State Department Decimal File 611.94/9-1054 in Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1950-1954 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1987), hereafter cited as *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1950-1954*; Corel Bell, *Survey of International Affairs: 1954* (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1957), 270-271.

¹⁷ Wu, Xuewen, Lin Liande, and Xu Zhxian. *Dang Dai Zhong Ri Guan Xi Shi (1945-1994) The History of Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations (1945-1994)* (Beijing: Shi Shi Chu Ban She, 1995), 73-77.

¹⁸ Yang Mingwei and Chen Yangyong, *Zhou Enlai Wai Jiao Feng Yun Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Moments* (Beijing: Jie Fang Jun Wen Yi Chu Ban She, 1995), 289-291.

¹⁹ Ikeda talks, the second session, October 8, 1953, enclosed in the letter from Dulles to the Embassy in Tokyo, October 30, 1953, US State Department Decimal Files: 611.94/10-3053 in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1950-1954*.

²⁰ Although the embassy in Tokyo did not see the relaxation theme as "representative" of Japanese opinion, it admitted the theme was "temporary prominent" because of the recent world development. See the letter from J. G. Parsons (Counselor of Embassy in Tokyo) to Robert J. G. McClurkin (Director of office of Northeast Asian Affairs), October 13, 1954, US State Department Decimal Files: 611.94/10-1354 in *ibid*.

²¹ American Consul at Sapporo, Japan, to the Department of State, July 10, 1953, US State Department Decimal File: 994.61/7-1053 in Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Japan, 1950-1954 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989), hereafter cited as *Internal Affairs of Japan, 1950-1954*.

²² "Views of Some Leading Japanese Intellectuals," June 14, 1955, US Department of State Decimal Files 611.94/6-1455, in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1955-1959*.

²³ Tian, ed., Wen Xian Ji, 152; Memorandum on self-defense, September 24, 1953, US State Department Decimal Files: 611.94/9-2453 in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1950-1954*.

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²⁵ William J. Sebald to Secretary of State, January 28, 1955, US State Department Decimal Files: 611.94/1-2855 in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1955-1959*; Parsons to McClurkin, March 10, 1955, US State Department Decimal Files: 611.94/3-1055, *ibid.* Robertson to Dulles, July 28, 1955, U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. 23 (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1991), pt.1, 78-80 (hereafter FRUS).

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²⁷ US Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, "Japanese Attitude toward America," April 16, 1956, US Department of State Decimal Files 611.94/4-1656, in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1955-1959*.

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²⁹ Tian, ed., Wen Xian Ji, 264; Wang Taiping, ed. *Xin Zhong Guo Wai Jiao Wu Shi Nian Fifty Years of Diplomacy of New China* (Beijing: Beijing Chu Ban She, 2000), vol. 1, 367; Memorandum of Conversation, May 21, 1956, US State Department Decimal Files 611.94/5-2556, in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1955-1959*; Memorandum of Conversation, March 22, 1956, US Department of State Decimal Files: 611.94/3-2256,

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³⁰ US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, No: 2305, April 13, 1957, US Department of State Decimal Files 611.94/4-1357, in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1955-1959*; Dulles to US Embassy in Tokyo, May 8, 1957, US Department of State Decimal Files 611.94/5-857, *ibid.*; memorandum from the JCS to Secretary of Defense, June 13, 1951, FRUS, 1955-1957. vol. 23, 350-51; memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State and Prime Minister Kishi, June 20, 1957, 380, US Department of State Decimal Files 611.94/6-157, in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1955-1959*; Herter to US Embassy in Tokyo, June 1, 1957, US Department of State Decimal Files 611.94/6-157, in *ibid.*; US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, No: 2333, April 17, 1957, US Department of State Decimal Files 611.94/4-1757, *ibid.*; Linda Ridgeway Waldron, *Japanese Influence in Southeast Asia, 1940-1968* (Master's thesis, University of Virginia, 1969), 94; K. V. Kesavan, *Japan's Relations with Southeast Asia: 1952-60*. Bombay, India, Somaiya Publications PVT Ltd, 1972, 160, 149.

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³² Tian, ed. Wen Xian Ji, 312-15, 368-372.

³³ Memorandum of conversation, December 4, 1956, US Department of State Decimal Files 611.94/12-456, in *Political Relations between the United States and Japan, 1955-1959*.

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³⁸ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, 146.

³⁹ Tian, ed., *Wen Xian Ji*, 383, 390.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 417-32.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 428-33, 436, 44-45; Yoshihisa Hara, *Anpo kaitei no seiji rikigaku Postwar Japan and International Politics: the political dynamics of Security Treaty Revision* (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1988), 244-246 (hereafter cited as Sengo Nihon to kokusai seiji).

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⁴³ *Ibid.*, 147-52, 156-67, 173-178.

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⁵⁵ Niho Kokusai Boeki Sokushin Kyokai [Japan Association for Promotion of International Trade], Kokusai Boeki [International Trade], September 25, 1960, vol. 217; Li, Zhong, *Ri Min Jian Wai Jiao (1945-1972)*, 276; Tian, Zhan, *Hou Zhong Ri Guan Xi Shi 1945-1995*, 193-194.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 197-199.

⁵⁷ Tian, ed., *Wen Xian Ji*, 646-648.

⁵⁸ Tian, Zhan, *Hou Zhong Ri Guan Xi Shi, 1945-1995*, 206, 217; Li, Zhong, *Ri Min Jian Jing Ji Wai Jiao (1945-1972)*, 312-316.

⁵⁹ Tian, Zhan, *Hou Zhong Ri Guan Xi Shi, 1945-1995*, 206, 217.

⁶⁰ Yung H. Park, "The Roots of Détente" in Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy, ed., *China and Japan: A Search for Balance since World War I*. Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-Clio, Inc., 1978, 364-376; Fujiyama, *Seiji waga michi*, 198-199.

⁶¹ "TELEGRAM. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. CONFIDENTIAL. Issue date: July 08, 1966. Date declassified: No declassification date]. 32 page(s). CDROM Id: 1977100100364. Fiche#: 1977-334C" in DDRS; "CABLE. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. SECRET. Issue date: August 13, 1966. Date declassified: August 16, 1977. 8 page(s). CDROM Id: 1978010100253. Fiche#: 1978-69C" in *ibid.*; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, 281-282.

⁶² Quoted from Marc Gallicchio, "Occupation, Dominion,, and Alliance: Japan in American Security Policy, 1945-69" in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler, ed., *Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001*. Tokyo, Kodansha International, 2001, 132-133; see also Akira Iriye, "Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-1990." in Christopher Howe, ed., *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*. Oxford, NY, Oxford University, 1996, 49.

⁶³ Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan," *International Security*, 26 (Fall 2001), 125.